dissenting.
Because I believe petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that respondent’s decision was improper, see Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 349 N.C. 315, 328, 507 S.E.2d 272, 281 (1998), I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly points out that petitioner’s dismissal was based upon her insubordination in failing to attend the 15 September 1993 meeting with her supervisors and in refusing to re-establish services to her client. Accordingly, in conducting a de novo review of this case, see Amanini v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 678, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118 (1994), this Court must review the entire record, see id., to determine whether petitioner has proven either (1) that the instructions given by her supervisors were improper or unreasonable or (2) that her refusal to comply with the instructions was neither willful nor intentional, see Mendenhall v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 119 N.C. App. 644, 651, 459 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1995). If petitioner fails to meet her burden for either of *13the reasons given for her termination, respondent’s decision should stand.
The 15 September 1993 Meeting
On 13 September 1993, Randy Johnson (Johnson), petitioner’s immediate supervisor, met with Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins to discuss their relationship with petitioner. Mr. Jenkins acknowledged making some of the remarks of which petitioner had complained, but stated that he was joking and that he thought he and petitioner were good enough friends that he could banter with her. After this meeting, Johnson spoke with Suzanne Tate (Tate), his supervisor, and they decided to meet with petitioner in an attempt to resolve the situation. Accordingly, on 14 September 1993, Dorothy Beamon (Beamon), Area Director and supervisor of New River’s health programs, telephoned petitioner to set up a meeting for the next day. Johnson was present when Beamon made the call, and he understood that petitioner would attend the meeting. However, petitioner did not show up on 15 September 1993; when Beamon called petitioner after waiting for her for thirty minutes, petitioner refused to attend.
At the hearing, when asked about the 15 September meeting, petitioner stated that Beamon called her on the fifteenth and sounded “angry and upset.” Beamon “made [a] statement about the meeting, and I told her I didn’t know anything about a meeting.” On cross-examination, she likewise stated that although she did remember Beamon calling her, she did not recall being asked to attend a meeting on the fifteenth. When asked why petitioner attended the 20 September meeting but not the 15 September meeting, petitioner couldn’t “recall.”
However, under continued questioning, petitioner finally admitted that she knew that the meeting had been scheduled and had decided not to attend: “I knew that if I went, it was going to be one person, me, against the three of them, and I was scared.” The following colloquy then occurred:
Q. All right, Ms. Souther, it is true then that you were asked to be at a meeting by your employer on September the 15th and that you did not attend that meeting?
A. Yes, sir.
*14A. I was given a copy when hired of the State Employee’s Grievance Policy. According to that, my first meeting will be with my immediate supervisor. When she called, she was angry, and I asked her to talk to Randy on what it was about. She was very, very, very angry at me.
Q. Okay. So, your reason for ignoring your employer’s request that you attend a meeting on the 15th day of September was because she was angry when she called you—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. —and asked you to come?
A. Yes, sir.
On redirect examination, petitioner testified further:
Q. Why did you not go to [the 15 September] meeting?
A. Because when Ms. Beamon called me about the September 15th meeting, she was very unpleasant. She was rude. She was very angry. I asked her to talk to Randy so she would understand what had happened, and she said Randy was with her in her office and that she did not believe anything and wanted me to meet with all three. I felt like — at that point, I was scared of losing my job when I heard her anger. I didn’t think that I could handle all three of them. I knew if I met with them — whatever took place in the meeting, the three of them would agree on what was said and on what was not. I asked [an attorney] to go with me simply to hear what took place.
Additionally, as part of her case, petitioner offered into evidence her handwritten position letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in which she stated,
The first response from Mr. Randy Johnson in regards to my being sexually harassed was a phone call telling me to come to a meeting with him, Randy Johnson the case manager, Ms. Suzanne Tate the CAP/MR/DD Coordinator and Ms. Dorothy R. Beamon the Area Director of New River Mental Health Center. At this point I felt my job might be in jeopardy and asked if I could have a lawyer present. I was told no. I asked Mr. Johnson if I could meet with just him, Mr. Randy Johnson and Ms. Suzanne Tate. I was told no. I did not attend the meeting because I was very con-
*15cerned, upset, worried, scared and felt I could not deal with the three of them, alone.
Petitioner then rested her case.
The foregoing recitation constitutes the whole of petitioner’s evidence regarding the meeting. She presented no evidence that respondent’s request to meet was in any way improper or unreasonable. Moreover, the only reasons given for petitioner’s refusal to attend was that Beamon was angry and rude and that petitioner was “scared.” The majority finds that petitioner acted reasonably because she understood that more than one management person would be present at the meeting and because she perceived that management did not believe her allegations. I cannot agree. Although there was evidence contradicting petitioner’s contentions that Beamon displayed anger or rudeness toward petitioner, and although petitioner’s credibility was tattered at the end of her examination, even giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt and assuming that Beamon was overtly angry, petitioner was the employee in an employment relationship. Her fear and perception regarding the attitudes or beliefs of supervisors are insufficient to establish that her refusal to attend a proper meeting was reasonable. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the trial court based upon petitioner’s willful and intentional refusal to attend the 15 September 1993 meeting.
Request to Resume Services to Robinette
I also believe petitioner failed to satisfy her burden with regard to respondent’s request to re-establish care to Robinette and her family. Again, petitioner was required to carry the burden of establishing that respondent’s request was unreasonable or that her refusal to comply was justified or unintentional. See Mendenhall, 119 N.C. App. at 651, 459 S.E.2d at 824.
Petitioner claimed that Mr. Jenkins sexually harassed her and that she was neither advised of respondent’s investigation of her complaints nor that anyone had spoken with Mr. Jenkins about her allegations. However, petitioner’s credibility was an issue in resolving these disputed matters. She claimed that if she had been advised that an investigation had taken place and that a representative of respondent had spoken with Mr. Jenkins, she would have returned to work in the Jenkins home. She testified at the hearing that at the 20 September 1993 meeting attended by her, her attorney, Beamon, Tate, and Johnson, Beamon called petitioner a “liar,” that Beamon “knew *16[Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins] longer than [petitioner] had, [and] that [Beamon] did not believe [petitioner],” and that Johnson also said he did not believe petitioner’s allegations. Petitioner claimed that she was not given a choice between resuming services to the Jenkins family or losing her job.
When cross-examined at the hearing, petitioner was confronted with notes taken by Johnson during meetings with petitioner and maintained in a log of supervision. Petitioner denied practically everything recorded in Johnson’s notes:
Q. All right. I’m going to read you a paragraph. And I want you to tell me whether or not you said this to Randy Johnson. “In a meeting with Betty later that day, August 19, 1993, Betty said she wanted Mr. Jenkins to stop yelling at her. The yelling brought back painful memories. She would ask why he could not go somewhere else to get his needs met.”. ..
Q. ... “She explained Mr. Jenkins told her that he would help her move to her new trailer, and she could repay him with sexual favors. According to Betty, he indicated how she could repay him by saying ‘You know what I mean.’ ” Now, I’ve just read you a paragraph from Mr. Johnson’s notes that he will testify that he made on the 19th, and I’m asking you if you agree that that is what you said to him on the 19th? That’s not what you said to him?
A. No.
Petitioner denied meeting Johnson again in person on 31 August 1993 and stated she had only met with him once prior to the September meeting. She also denied everything in Johnson’s notes of the 31 August meeting:
Q. I want to read to you a part of what purports to be a note, and I want you to tell me if this is correct or incorrect. You were talking with Randy Johnson. . . . [Johnson] asked her if she, Mr. Jenkins and [he] could meet. Betty responded no. She said she did not feel that she should be there. She explained that she could not handle it. An ambulance would probably have to be called for her. Betty stated that she wanted me to meet with Lester alone and guarantee her safety. She wants (a) Mr. Jenkins to change his behavior. She *17clarified that to mean no more comments about sexual relations. (2) [sic] She [wanted] ... Mr. Jenkins to treat her with respect — no more yelling. And she wanted to work with Robin in her home — Betty’s home — until she is in a better emotional state. Now, is that an accurate summation of what was said?
A. No.
Q. So, these notes are wrong too?
A. No. No.
Q. Okay. What’s wrong about them?
A. All of it.
Her testimony is in sharp contrast with that provided by respondent’s agents. Johnson testified that he met with Mr. Jenkins after petitioner made her complaints and had investigated her allegations, and that at the 20 September 1993 meeting Beamon gave petitioner the option of returning to work at the Jenkins home or termination. Petitioner asked to be terminated. Tate testified that Beamon advised petitioner that Johnson had met with the Jenkins, that she (Beamon) was satisfied that the investigation had been handled properly, and that it was safe for petitioner to return to the Jenkins home. Petitioner refused. Beamon testified that she advised petitioner that her complaints had been investigated, that she believed Mr. Jenkins’ statement that his comments were made in jest, and that there had been no sexual harassment. In addition, both Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins testified at the hearing and described their deteriorating relationship with petitioner.
Based upon this and other evidence presented at the hearing, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that petitioner has met her burden as to this issue. Looking first to the propriety and reasonableness of respondent’s request, it is doubtless that respondent had the authority to request petitioner’s return to work at the Jenkins home; therefore, the request was proper. As to the reasonableness of the request, respondent accommodated petitioner by allowing her to take vacation time and care for Robinette in petitioner’s own home while undertaking an investigation of the matter. As part of his investigation, Johnson spoke on several occasions with Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins, who candidly discussed two questionable incidents and gave unvarying statements throughout the investigation and during the *18hearing. By contrast, petitioner’s statements to Johnson during his investigation were inconsistent with her testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, respondent’s request that petitioner return to work was made after an adequate investigation and was reasonable.
As to the reasonableness of petitioner’s refusal to comply, I do not believe that petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof. Both the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who heard this petition and observed the witnesses, and the State Personnel Commission found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to alter the status quo. See Peace, 349 N.C. at 328, 507 S.E.2d at 281. Although petitioner stated that Mr. Jenkins made a number of statements to her asking for sex, Mr. Jenkins provided a plausible explanation for his comments. Petitioner denied ever making the statements to which Johnson testified. Despite petitioner’s claims that she was not advised of respondent’s investigation of her complaints and that she would have returned to work had she been told, Johnson, Tate, and Beamon all testified that petitioner was advised both of the investigation and its findings and of the conversations the investigators had with Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins. Other evidence of petitioner’s erratic behavior as witnessed by the Jenkins and Johnson also was presented. Accordingly, I believe the trial court erred in reversing the recommended decisions of the AU and the State Personnel Commission.
For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent.