dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and disagree with the majority opinion.
The issue presented in this case is whether the appellant, Terry Allen Diggs, violated Code § 46.1-350(a) when he operated a moped on a highway while his operator’s license was suspended or revoked. This section provides that no person whose operator’s license has been suspended or revoked “shall therafter drive any motor vehicle or any self-propelled machinery or equipment on any highway in this Commonwealth.” (emphasis added). We, therefore, must determine whether a moped is a “motor vehicle” or any self-propelled machinery or equipment” to bring Diggs under the provisions of the statute.
We must first know what a moped is. By statutory definition a moped is a “bicycle-like device with pedals and a helper motor which is rated at no more than two brake horsepower and which produces speeds up to a maximum of thirty miles per hour.” Code § 46.1-1 (14b). If a vehicle has more power or speed than provided in the statute, it is not a moped. If we use the generally accepted definition of a motor vehicle to ascertain its meaning, a moped is a motor vehicle under Code § 46.1-350(a). What is obvious, however, turns into obscurity when we read the definitional section of the Motor Vehicle Code. Code § 46.1-1(15) states: “[A]ny device herein defined as a bicycle or a moped shall be deemed not to be a motor vehicle.” Therefore, since a moped is not a motor vehicle, it is encompassed within the prohibition of Code § 46.1-350(a) only *306if it is deemed “self-propelled machinery or equipment,” a term not defined in the Motor Vehicle Code. We must determine whether Code § 46.1-350(a) is clear and unambiguous. If so, the plain meaning must be accepted without resort to extrinsic evidence and rules of construction.
“It is a settled rule of construction in this state that where a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction by the court and the plain meaning and intent of the statute will be given it.” McClung v. Henrico County, 200 Va. 870, 874, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1959); see Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 407-08, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954); Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 1, 14-15, 49 S.E.2d 431, 439 (1948).
Language is ambiguous if it admits to being understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously. An ambiguity exists when the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness. . . .[WJhen an enactment is unambiguous, extrinsic legislative history may not be used to create an ambiguity, and then remove it, where none otherwise exists.
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citations omitted).
Applying these rules to the facts of this case, we find the language of Code § 46.1-350(a), “any motor vehicle or any self-propelled machinery or equipment,” to be ambiguous. Admittedly, the terms “machinery or equipment” are all inclusive and one can hardly think of any device not included. As already stated, Code § 46.1-1(15) defines “Motor Vehicle” and exempts from it, by definition, a bicycle or a moped. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) defines “machinery” as (1) “machines as a functionary unit:” such as “the constituent parts of a machine or instrument; equipment, stock, or range of machines”; (2) “the means and appliances by which something is kept in action or a desired result is obtained.” A synonym for “machinery” is “equipment.” Webster’s gives many and varied definitions for “machine.” The most logical in the context of this case is: “engine, apparatus, appliance, signify [ing], in common, a device, often complex, for doing work beyond human physical or mental limitations or faster than the human hand or mind.” (emphasis *307added). Machine applies to a construction or organization whose parts are so connected and interrelated that it can be set in motion and perform work as a unit.
Webster’s defines “equipment,” among other things, as (1) “the implements (as machinery or tools) used in an operation or activity;” (2) “all the fixed assets other than land and buildings of a business enterprise;” (3) “apparatus, machinery, paraphernalia, outfit, tackle, gear, material ... in common, all the things used in a given work or useful in effecting as given end.” The Commonwealth argues from these definitions that a moped is “machinery” or “equipment.”
I think it unreasonable to conclude that the legislature would pass Code § 46.1-1 (14b) in 1981, providing that a moped is not a motor vehicle, intending at the same time to include the device as “machinery or equipment.” If the legislature had intended this contradictory result, it presumably would not have excluded “moped” from the definition of a motor vehicle. The words “machinery” and “equipment” are so broad that it is difficult to garner from them the meaning and intent of the legislation. Certainly, the precise meaning of these words is difficult to comprehend in the context of this statute. I differ with the view of the majority that the meaning of “self-propelled machinery” is clear and unambiguous. They conclude that judicial construction is not required and that they need not resort to legislative history and extrinsic facts to interpret words whose meaning is clear. I conclude that the language is ambiguous, permitting us to seek legislative history to determine the true meaning and intent of the statute.
Since I find that the statute is ambiguous, I must resort to the history of the statute and the rules of construction to determine legislative intent, which is the primary concern of statutory construction. Virginia Dep’t of Labor & Industry v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va. 97, 101-02, 353 S.E.2d 758, 762 (1987). “The divergent interpretations discussed above demonstrate the difficulty one encounters in trying to ascertain the statute’s meaning.” Id. at 101, 353 S.E.2d at 762.
The history of the Motor Vehicle Code is informative in determining legislative intent. Section 2154(39)a(b) of the 1930 Code of Virginia defined the term “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle, as *308herein defined, which is self-propelled.” The term “vehicle” was defined in subsection (a) as:
Every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
Code § 2154(39)a(a) (1930). The 1930 Code does not define the terms bicycle or moped. Notably, as far back as 1930, motor vehicles have been defined as self-propelled, and devices moved by human power have been exempted from the definition of “motor vehicles.”
In 1958, title 46 was repealed and the Motor Vehicle Code was reenacted as title 46.1. Former Code § 46-347.1 of the 1952 Code was reenacted as Code § 46.1-350 of the 1958 Code. In 1963, the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council compiled a report entitled “Safety on Virginia Highways” which was presented to thp Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia. See Report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council, Safety of Virginia Highways, S. Doc. No. 8 (1963). This report contains numerous recommendations, two of which are pertinent to our inquiry in the instant case.
First, the Council recommended that legislation should be adopted making it “unlawful for any person whose operator’s license is under suspension or revocation to operate any self-propelled farm machinery or construction equipment” on Virginia highways. S. Doc. No. 8, at 7 (emphasis added). The reason given for this recommendation was that the privilege to operate such machinery and equipment was abused by those whose licenses had been revoked, and the use of such machinery or equipment in lieu of motor vehicles added “an unnecessary hazard to our overcrowded highways.” Id, at 16.
In response to the Council’s report, the General Assembly, in its 1964 session, amended Code § 46.1-350(a) to read, in pertinent part, as follows: “No person . . . whose operator’s or chauffeur’s license . . . has been suspended or revoked . . . shall thereafter drive any motor vehicle or any self-propelled machinery or equipment on any highway in this State.” Code § 46.1-350(a) (1967 *309Repl. Vol.). The amendment incorporated the language recommended by the Council except that “farm” was omitted before “machinery” and “construction” was omitted before “equipment.”
Secondly, the Council recommended that “the State Department of Highways be given authority to prohibit the use of controlled access highways by pedestrians, bicycles, horse-drawn vehicles, self-propelled farm or construction machinery or equipment, and animals led, ridden or driven on the hoof.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). This recommendation resulted in the enactment of Code § 46.1-171.1, in 1964, which provided, in pertinent part:
The State Highway Commission may, when necessary to promote safety, prohibit the use of interstate highways . . . and other controlled access highways or any part thereof by any of the following: (1) Pedestrians, (2) persons riding bicycles, (3) horse-drawn vehicles, (4) self-propelled machinery or equipment, and (5) animals led, ridden or driven on the hoof.”
Code § 46.1-171.1 (Repl. Vol). Again, the Council’s recommendation was adopted verbatim except that the words “farm or construction” were deleted.
Ihe omission of “farm” and “construction” in the statutes suggests that the General Assembly recognized that machinery and equipment were operated upon the highways for uses other than “farm” and “construction” purposes. I think that the report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council clearly indicates that the legislature did not have in mind every conceivable mechanical contrivance that man can imagine, but rather those types of self-propelled machinery and equipment usually designed for and associated with agricultural and construction work. The absence of any reference to a moped indicates that the General Assembly did not consider it “self-propelled machinery or equipment.” Even if in existence at the time, they clearly would have been included in the term “motor vehicle.” The primary purpose of machines and equipment is to generate energy with which to perform work. A moped has no connection with work. I find nothing in the legislative history of the statutes which indicates that mopeds are ordinarily considered instruments to accomplish work, as is the case with machines and equipment.
*310In 1981 the General Assembly made several significant changes in Code § 46.1-1 concerning definitions which involved mopeds, and they must be read together to determine their intent and meaning. For the first time a moped was defined in the Motor Vehicle Code:
A bicycle-like device with pedals and a helper motor which is rated at no more than two brake horsepower and which produces speeds at up to a maximum of thirty miles per hour.... For purposes of Chapter 4 (§ 46.1-168 et seq.) of this title, a moped shall be a vehicle while operated upon a highway.
Code §46.1-l(14b).
Chapter Four of the Motor Vehicle Code is entitled Regulation of Traffic. This chapter encompasses Code § 46.1-171, which specifically provides that “[e]very person riding a bicycle or moped or an animal upon a highway . . . shall have all of the rights and . . . duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle.” Since section 14(b) of Code § 46.1-1 states that for purposes of chapter 4 a moped shall be treated as a vehicle while operated upon a highway, this by implication denotes that it is not a vehicle for purposes of other chapters in the Motor Vehicle Code. In subsection (14) the definition of “motorcycle” was amended to except from the motorcycle class any vehicle included within the term “moped.” The term “motor vehicle” was amended to provide that a moped is not deemed a motor vehicle. The impact of these amendments clearly shows that the General Assembly intended to place a moped in a classification of its own and did not consider it to be “machinery or equipment.” If it had intended such a result, it would have added the term moped to the devices specified in Code § 46.1-350(a).
Also in the 1981 session, the General Assembly amended Code § 46.1-171.1 to read as follows:
The State Highway and Transportation Commission may . . . prohibit the use of interstate highways ... by any or all of the following: (1) Pedestrians, (2) persons riding bicycles or mopeds, (3) horse-drawn vehicles, (4) self-propelled machinery or equipment, and (5) animals led, ridden or driven on the hoof.
*311(emphasis added). This amendment further demonstrates that the legislature equated bicycles and mopeds and did not intend “self-propelled machinery or equipment” to encompass mopeds. Otherwise, the language “or mopeds” would be surplusage, and “we will assume that [the legislature’s] amendments to the law are purposeful and not unnecessary or vain.” Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985).
The legislative intent to equate mopeds with bicycles and not “self-propelled machinery or equipment” is reinforced by comparing various definitions throughout Title 46.1. First, a “motor vehicle” is defined as “self-propelled” in Code § 46.1-1(15) while the term “self-propelled” does not appear in the definition of “moped” in Code § 46.1-1 (14b). This suggests that the legislature did not consider a moped to be “self-propelled” in the context of Title 46.1. The terms “Self-propelled” and “machinery” are used in Code § 46.1-1(7) to define “farm tractor” and the term “machinery” is also used in Code § 46.1-352 to describe certain farm and construction vehicles, yet none of these terms was used to define “mopeds.” Had the legislature considered a moped to be self-propelled machinery or equipment, it presumably would have used those terms in describing a moped as it did in describing other vehicles.
Finally, I am cognizant of three opinions of the Attorney General stating that a moped is “self-propelled machinery or equipment,” and that it is, therefore, covered by Code § 46.1-350(a). See Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 215-16 (Oct. 26, 1984); Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 265-67 (July 20, 1977); Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 251-52 (Oct. 2, 1975). Although these opinions are entitled to due consideration, they are not binding. Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 762, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975); Barber v. City of Danville, 149 Va. 418, 424, 141 S.E. 126, 127 (1928). I am unwilling to conclude that the legislature has, by its inaction, approved the Attorney General’s interpretation of Code § 46.1-350(a) because this interpretation is not consistent with the apparent intent of the legislature as disclosed in the foregoing legislative history.
The Commonwealth acknowledges that no Virginia case discusses this issue, and from other jurisdictions cites State v. Senko, 457 A.2d 824 (Me. 1983); Royal-Globe Insurance Co. v. Schultz, 385 Mass. 1013, 434 N.E.2d 213 (1982); Lalomia v. Bankers & *312Shippers Insurance Co., 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1970), aff'd, 291 N.E.2d 724 (1972); Myers v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 502 A.2d 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); People v. Jordan, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1, 142 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1977); United States v. Stancil, 422 A.2d 1285 (D.C. App. 1980), in support of its position. All of these cases are readily distinguishable from the pending case.
Senko was based upon a statutory provision in Maine which defined a “motor vehicle” as “any self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks.” 457 A.2d at 825. Royal-Globe Insurance was decided upon an insurance policy which defined “auto” as “a land motor vehicle.” The defendant admitted that a moped moved over land and had a motor. The court concluded that a moped was a “land motor vehicle.” 385 Mass. at 1013, 434 N.E.2d at 213-14. In Lalomia, a motorized bicycle was held to be a motor vehicle within the meaning of an uninsured motorist endorsement contained in an insurance policy. 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1024. In Myers, a moped was determined to be a motor vehicle because it “was required to be licensed” under that state’s law. 502 A.2d at 677-78. In Jordan, a moped was considered a motor vehicle in a drunk driving case, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 405; and in Standi a moped was considered a “motor vehicle” for purposes of a statute governing unauthorized use of a vehicle. 422 A.2d at 287-88. However, these cases are unlike the pending case because the Commonwealth admits that, by statutory definition, a moped is not a motor vehicle in Virginia.
The most analogous opinion from another state is Velez v. Criterion Insurance Co., 461 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984), where the issue before the court was whether a moped was a self-propelled vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court held that for purposes of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, the statue in question unambiguously defined a moped as a bicycle. It further held that a bicycle was not a motor vehicle as defined and concluded that the legislature did not intend that a moped be considered a self-propelled vehicle. Id. at 1349.
I would hope that a moped is not a “motor vehicle or any self-propelled machinery or equipment” within the meaning and intent of Code § 46.1-3 50(a). For these reasons, I would reverse the conviction.