dissenting.
1. In this case Bond and Zimmerman (husband and wife) opposed each other on behalf of their respective clients at a rule nisi hearing. Subsequently, they negotiated on behalf of their clients a settlement of temporary custody of the minor children and alimony, which was made the judgment of the court. Zimmerman withdrew from the case, and Mrs. Jones’ succeeding lawyer pursued a motion to disqualify Bond from further representation of Mr. Jones. The trial court granted the motion.
2. The rule in Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406 (276 SE2d 607) (1981), does not require reversal of the trial court’s finding of disqualification. There we stated:
Absent a showing that special circumstances exist which prevent the adequate representation of the client, disqualification based solely on marital status is not justified.
A per se rule of disqualification on the sole ground that an attorney’s spouse is a member of a firm representing an opposing party would be not only unfair to the lawyers so disqualified and to their clients but would also have a significant detrimental effect upon the legal profession. [Emphasis supplied.]
Id. at 408.
3. Consistent with the holding of the trial court, this case presents, in gross, “special circumstances” as alluded to in Borenstein. They are:
(a) Zimmerman and Bond were the lawyers actually handling the litigation for the contending spouses.
(b) Mrs. Jones disclosed confidences to Zimmerman during the course of her representation. Zimmerman is no longer in the case, but Zimmerman’s husband continues to represent Mr. Jones.
4. We note the content of Rule 1.8 (i), American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as follows: “A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.”1
*357Decided June 30, 1988. Charles V. Bond, Jr., for appellant. Charles R. Free, Oscar L. Crumbley, Jr., for appellee.In light of this analysis of Borenstein, and considering the values contained within the Model Rule, I believe that the trial court correctly ordered the disqualification of Mr. Jones’ lawyer.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Hunt join in this dissent.
Under Borenstein, however, such a disqualification would not be imputed — “solely on marital status” — to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.