The question for decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion in relieving a husband of the *391obligation to contribute to the support of his minor child as provided by the decree of divorce, after the wife removed the child from this state contrary to the decree and subsequent orders.
Following the entry of the interlocutory decree awarding to appellant custody of the daughter, Nancy, she was ordered on July 31, 1940, not to remove the child from Southern California. On May 23, 1944, pursuant to her application an order was entered permitting the mother to remove Nancy from the state upon three conditions, namely, (1) the current school term must first be completed; (2) the father must be continuously advised of the address of his daughter’s domicile; (3) the wife must cooperate in making reasonable arrangements for the father to visit his child.
Pursuant to an order to show cause on October 19, 1944, appellant was adjudged “guilty of contempt of court and until such time as plaintiff purges herself of contempt and returns the child to California, defendant will be relieved of the obligation of supporting the minor child. ’ ’ The quoted order was upon a review of the contempt proceeding by this court held to be valid (Olcott v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App. 2d 603 [157 P.2d 36]).
Notwithstanding the foregoing events appellant boldly contends that her sins and derelictions should not be visited upon her innocent child; that, although she had contemned the orders of the court, the chancellor should have made provision that she should suffer no financial discomfort despite her disobedience of a decree in equity. Such contention is based upon wholly selfish considerations. She is entitled to no more than the orders of the court provided for her. The mother is charged equally with the child's father to protect, nurture and educate their infant progeny. * (Civ. Code, §§ 138, 139, 196.) The award of Nancy’s custody to appellant and the requirement that respondent pay money for her support did not absolve appellant from a parent’s obligation. The very decree that awarded her the custody specified as a condition of such award that respondent be privileged to visit Nancy. Her violation of that decree could not have enlarged her rights. If it did not, she is in no position to demand privileges. After spurning the court’s decree by removing Nancy from the state she was in no better position to demand a continuance of respondent’s contribution toward the child’s support than she would *392be had the father been removed from this mundane sphere. Releasing respondent from the duty to make the payments resulted solely from appellant’s rebellion against the decree which had been made for her benefit. One who wilfully frustrates a valid judgment pleads in vain for relief therefrom.
She now argues for her own advantage while pretending an interest solely for the child. But protestations in behalf of the daughter are unavailing for the reason that in the absence of a showing that the child is in need she will not be considered a party to such a proceeding. That showing was not made. As a plea for her own interests appellant’s brief is a vain clamor, for it does not disclose any hardship to have been suffered by appellant. On the contrary she is basking in the chosen liberty of a new life, free from the agencies of the superior court of this state, both of which she preferred rather than compliance with its judgments. The order of which she now complains, viz., withholding payment of monthly sums from her until such time as she purges herself of contempt and returns the child to California, is not capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable but in view of the record was made in the exercise of a sound discretion.
In support of her thesis that “decency demands that the father perform the duty of supporting his own child” appellant cites Laumeier v. Laumeier, 237 N.Y. 357 [143 N.E. 219, 32 A.L.R. 654]; Zirkle v. Zirkle, 202 Ind. 129 [172 N.E. 192]; Arbuckle v. Jones, (Ill.App.) 11 N.E.2d 867; Metson v. Metson, 56 Cal.App.2d 328 [132 P.2d 513], They are not pertinent. Mrs. Laumeier brought an action in New York on behalf of her post-divorce-born child notwithstanding the divorce had been granted in Missouri. At the time of the Zirkle decree in Indiana the wife resided in Illinois and she was not required to keep the child within the court’s jurisdiction. The Arbuckle case announces nothing more than the duty of a husband to support his child even though the wife had disobeyed the decree. The Metson ease involved the contention that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the wife for extra moneys to pay for dental services in the absence of an allegation from her petition that the allowance awarded in the decree was insufficient. After stating that it was not necessary for “the evidence” to be alleged in such petition, the court observed that the divorce court retains “continuing jurisdiction to modify or alter its *393orders in reference to the custody and maintenance of the children. (Sec. 138, Civil Code.) ”
Inasmuch as the order appealed from was within the discretion of the court, it is an effectual modification of the decree and is in fact an adjudication of appellant’s contempt and a punishment therefor.
The order is affirmed.
Wilson, J., and Fox, J. pro tern., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 16, 1945, and the following opinion was thereupon rendered: