(dissenting).
Because I believe that (1) it is unreasonable to find from this evidence that the respondent entered into these transactions without being first informed of John B. Davis’ deed to appellant, and (2) the trial court expressly found that respondent had been informed of that deed before he en*13tered into these transactions, I dissent from the court’s decision in this case. If I am correct in either of the above propositions then under the law as stated in the prevailing opinion there was no estoppel for if respondent knew of the prior deed from John B. Davis to appellant he was not “excusably ignorant of the true facts.” 19 Am. Jur., 634, Section 34 quoted in the prevailing opinion. I consider the second proposition first.
The trial court expressly found that
“the defendant, Frank Davis, (respondent) had heard of the existence of a deed from J. B. Davis to plaintiff (appellant) but, on the other hand, plaintiff knowingly permitted said Frank Davis to believe that he was acquiring one-half of the three-fourths interest of the said J. B. Davis and participated in the transaction which resulted in the execution and delivery of the said deed of August 9, 1948, and knowingly permitted the said Frank Davis to perform labor and expend money relying thereon.”
Thus the court clearly and without ambiquity found that the transactions between these parties were entered into after respondent had heard of John’s deed to appellant but that appellant was nevertheless estopped because he participated in the transactions knowing that respondent believed that he was getting one-half of John’s interests regardless of John’s prior deed to appellant. The prevailing opinion makes no claim that this finding is not supported by the evidence, it merely claims that the evidence would support a finding of fact contrary thereto and it seems to recognize that if the facts were as found there was no estop-pel so it completely ignores this finding of fact instead stating that the trial court could reasonably find that appellant informed respondent that he had acquired the one-fourth interest of Jensen but nothing was said about appellant’s having acquired the interest of John B. Davis.
This is certainly a novel way of over-ruling the trial court’s findings of fact. Since in law actions there is no appeal to this court on questions of fact, and even in equity *14cases we do not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, to thus nullify such findings is contrary to any recognized practice in this state. Of course where a jury returns a general verdict, a board or commission renders a decision, or a trial court enters a judgment, without expressly finding the facts this court will not reverse such decision if it can be sustained by assuming the existence of facts most favorable to such decision which could be reasonably found from the evidence. Apparently the prevailing opinion invoked this rule rather than the rule applicable to this kind of a case to the effect that we are bound by the findings of fact of the trial court if such facts can be reasonably found from the evidence, or are not manifestly contrary thereto.
Even if we could lawfully ignore the trial court’s findings of fact and substitute therefore our own contrary findings, I believe it is unreasonable to find from this evidence that respondent had been told only of Jensen’s deed but knew nothing of the deed to appellant from John B. Davis. It is true that respondent testified something to that effect on cross-examination, in trying to explain a statement he wrote in a letter to his brother John dated June 8, 1948, wherein he expressly writes that appellant had told him of that transfer. This explanation was only one of many untenable explanations which he offered when pressed on cross-examination. I doubt that he seriously intended any one to believe that explanation, even his own attorneys have not taken it seriously nor stressed it on this appeal. The Jensen deed was probably not in existence when this letter was written, for it was recorded on June 28th, twenty days thereafter, and though that deed is only dated June _ 1948, there is nothing in the evidence which indicates that it was not recorded immediately after its execution. In the letter of June 8, 1948, respondent writes:
“Migliaccio [sic] told me you turned all of your shares over to him' before you left * * *”
*15The wording of this statement and the context of this letter leaves no room for doubt that he refers to the deed from John rather than the Jensen deed. He expressly writes John that appellant had told him of that transfer. Respondent wrote the letter while John was residing out of this state to tell him that respondent is claiming his interest in these claims and asking him to return and defend his rights thereto. There was no occasion for writing this letter at all if respondent had only claimed the Jensen interest. The fact that respondent wrote John that appellant was claiming John’s interest, conclusivley shows that respondent then knew of that claim, for it would be fantastic to believe that he would write such a letter if he had never heard of such a claim. Appellant’s wife who is said to have typed this letter, freely admitted that appellant had told them of this deed before the letter was written, but she claimed that it was not valid because it was not recorded. In the face of this record it is hard to conceive of a case where the evidence is stronger of the existence of any fact than it is here in favor of appellant and against the facts as claimed in the prevailing opinion. I think it is absolutely unreasonable to believe the above stated fact claimed in the prevailing opinion and therefore for both these reasons I must disagree with my associates.