concurring.
In essence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to recuse because: (1) Judge Harmon testified at the recusal hearing that he could consider the full range of punishment; and (2) the evidence was undisputed that he had consistently told the parties that he could do so.1 Moreover, the comments relied upon by appellant (to show that Judge Harmon would not consider the full range of punishment) reflected only that he thought he would be less lenient than a jury in sentencing, but not that he could not, or would not, consider the full range of punishment in whatever sentencing decision he made. I thus believe it is unnecessary (at best) to determine that Judge Harmon was biased at all, let alone whether as contemplated by case law or from non-judicial sources.2
. See, e.g., Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex.2002) (noting that a trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its decision).
. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1 (requiring court of appeals opinions to be as brief as practicable to address the issues necessary to disposition of the appeal).