dissenting.
As stated in the majority opinion, the controlling rule is that in the usual case the welfare of a young child will be promoted by awarding custody to the mother, if she is a fit person and if *769other things are equal. While conceding the fitness of the mother, the majority denies her the custody of her young son upon the slender reed of a finding that her “home is not as suitable” as the father’s. Although this particular finding is difficult to support, given the history of the father’s emotional instability, even if the finding is accepted I believe it insufficient to warrant the result reached by the majority. The finding does not, in my opinion, make “other things” unequal between the mother and father. I would reverse, adhering to the established principle that “the mother is the natural custodian of her child of tender years.” Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 270, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1948).
I’Anson, C.J., joins in this dissent.