This case was brought as a quiet title action to determine the rights of various parties in a right-of-way reserved by deed over a parcel of real property owned by defendant Ida Rose Barton. In 1973, a Utah corporation known as BAFCO, Inc. (not a party to this action), conveyed a parcel of real property to G. Devon Barton (now deceased) and the defendant Ida Rose Barton by warranty deed. The grantor reserved to itself a right-of-way over a portion of the property in the following language:
RESERVING unto the grantor, its successors and assigns, a right of way for ingress and egress over the Easterly 25.0 feet of said property.
In 1974, BAFCO, Inc., conveyed an adjacent parcel of real property to the plaintiffs, Edward W. and Nancy D. Wykoff, by warranty deed. The conveyance included the right-of-way reserved in the Barton deed. Also in 1974, BAFCO, Inc., conveyed another parcel of real property, adjoining the Wykoff property on the north, to plaintiffs J. D. and Patricia J. Apgood by warranty deed, without including therein any grant of the right-of-way referred to in the Barton deed. In 1979, BAFCO, Inc., conveyed by quit-claim deed a right to use the right-of-way in question to the Apgoods. The court below found, and the record shows, that at the time of the Barton conveyance, the grantor intended to reserve a private right of use for ingress and egress, including foot and vehicular traffic associated with the use of his residential property and the transport of farm animals permitted by local zoning. Neither the language of the reservation in the Barton deed, nor the circumstances surrounding its making, indicate that it created a general right-of-way for all purposes. The president of BAFCO, Inc., testified at trial that his intent in the conveyance to Wykoff of the right-of-way use over the Barton property was “to allow him a right of way to bring his equipment and items that he may want to bring in and maintain ditches or vehicles or whatever that he intended to go to the back of his property.” There was no intent to permit the construction of a street or roadway, either at the time of the Barton deed or the later transfers to plaintiffs.
During the years after the conveyance to them, and up until sometime in 1978, the Bartons maintained fences around their entire piece of property, including the right-of-way portion, and consistently used it for grazing livestock and for gardening. In fact, Mrs. Barton installed a shed and a chicken coop which impinged to some extent on the right-of-way. The Bartons had purchased the property with a view to keeping livestock and farming and had been informed (by their real estate agent) at the time of the purchase that the right-of-way would be used only for ingress and egress by an occasional vehicle to mend fences or to convey animal stock.
No attempt was made to use the right-of-way for any purpose until 1978, when plaintiffs requested access for a horse to be pastured on the Wykoff property. A disagreement arose over the scope of the use which plaintiffs could make of the right-of-way, which resulted shortly thereafter in plaintiffs’ removing defendant’s fence and placing sand and gravel on the right-of-way *758preparatory to the construction of a road. The sand covered an irrigation ditch which had been used by defendant to get water onto her pasture from adjoining property.
Without a fence, defendant was unable to keep livestock on her property. Plaintiff Wykoff s intent was to construct a road on the right-of-way to provide access to the rear portion of his property in order to subdivide it and build homes thereon. Defendant resisted any further construction on the right-of-way, and this lawsuit resulted.
The trial court found that plaintiffs are entitled to have the right “to use and enjoy the right-of-way for ingress and egress, not inconsistent with the rights of the owner, Ida Rose Barton, and without unreasonable interference with the right of said owner to use her property to the fullest extent.” Plaintiffs were permitted by the court’s judgment to place a surface on the right-of-way that would make it passable in all weather, and to have a private right of use for “foot and vehicular traffic associated with the use of a residence,” and for the transportation of farm animals. Defendant was permitted to enclose portions of the right-of-way by fence and/or gates to keep her animals from straying and to provide access for ingress and egress to those entitled to use it. The court’s judgment permitted chains and locks on the gates so long as all persons entitled to use the right-of-way are given keys. Further relief was provided which is not challenged on this appeal.
The parties are in agreement as to the controlling principles of law and appellants’ sole challenge is to their application by the trial court to the facts in this case. The issue which this Court is asked to resolve is whether the maintenance of fences and/or locked gates across the right-of-way is an unreasonable interference with the use granted to plaintiffs in their deeds.
This Court has on a number of occasions considered and defined easements based on deeds and grants, and it is clear that a right-of-way founded on a deed or grant is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument. Nielson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696 (1943). Thus, the plaintiffs are limited in their claims to whatever BAFCO, Inc., had reserved to itself in the Barton conveyance and could therefore convey to them.1 In Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 584, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (1952), this Court said:
Since it is manifest that a grantee may receive only what a grantor has to give, defendants’ rights are based upon a construction of the original ... deed ....
It is generally conceded that a deed is to be construed most strongly against the grantor, and most favorably to the grantee. It is aláo established in this state that a deed should be construed so as to effectuate the intentions and desires of the parties, as manifested by the language made use of in the deed. Further, when the deed creates an easement the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be obtained are also to be considered. [Citations omitted.]
The Wood decision goes on to comment that if the provisions of the deed leave some doubt as to their meaning, the court may also look to the practical construction placed upon the instrument by the parties.
The trial court thus properly found that plaintiffs had only a right of ingress and egress, as reserved in the Barton deed, and went on to apply the general principle that:
[A servient owner] has all the rights and benefits of ownership consistent with the easement; the right to use the land remains in him, without any express reservation to that effect, so far as such right does not conflict with the purpose and character of the easement. [Citations omitted.]
*75925 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses § 89 (1966). In North Union Canal Company v. Newell, Utah, 550 P.2d 178, 180 (1976), the Court expressed that principle even more broadly, pointing out that owners of property subject to an easement “may use their property in any manner they please so long as they do not unreasonably restrict or interfere with the proper use of the .... easement.”
Whether or not a restriction on access is unreasonable is a question of fact. McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996 (1978); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses § 89 (1966). In this case, the trial court apparently weighed carefully the intent of the parties as it appears in the testimony in the record, the language in the Barton deed describing the right-of-way, the use to which the property had been put by Bartons since the deed, and the reasonableness of permitting locked gates with keys to plaintiffs to permit ingress and egress. The fact that the property in question has consistently been used for agricultural purposes may also have been a legitimate consideration for the trial court. Although the Utah cases have never spoken directly to the question, other jurisdictions have looked at the special requirements of agricultural lands. In Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 293, 29 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1944), the Supreme Court of North Carolina observed:
... a mere private easement for the general purpose of ingress and egress and across agricultural lands carries with it no implication of a right to deprive the ■owner of the servient estate of the full enjoyment of his property. It is subject only to the right of passage. Hence, he may erect gates across the way when necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of his estate, provided they are not of such a nature as to materially impair or unreasonably interfere with the use of the lane as a private way for the purposes for which it has theretofore been used.
The trial court in this case specifically found that it was necessary and reasonable for defendant to maintain locked gates to keep livestock on her property, and that such gates were not an unreasonable restriction upon plaintiffs’ right to ingress and egress. It is worthy of note that plaintiffs’ proposal (that a fence be constructed along the borders of the right-of-way and defendant’s property) would have the practical effect of depriving defendant entirely of the use of her land, a result rejected in Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 14 Utah 2d 364, 384 P.2d 590 (1963). Finally, a review of cases from other jurisdictions cited by appellants demonstrates that those cases are distinguishable in each instance on their facts. The trial court’s findings of fact are amply supported by the record, and should not be overturned by this Court. Metropolitan Investment v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
HALL, C. J., and STEWART and OAKS, JJ., concur.. At trial, plaintiffs appeared to place reliance on some broad language in the Wykoff deed and in the quit-claim deed to Apgoods concerning the right-of-way. However, in both instances, BAFCO could convey no more to plaintiffs than it had reserved to itself out of the Barton grant, and the trial court correctly found that the language in the Barton deed was controlling on the scope of the easement.