Cobb v. Leyendecker

Terry Crabtree, Judge,

dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I believe that this case should be dismissed because appellant is seeking review of issues denied by way of summary judgment.

The majority’s statement that appellant is asking this court to review the January 6, 2004, judgment rather than the trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment is disingenuous. In truth, the issues on appeal revolve solely around the matters addressed in the denial of the motion for summary judgment. With that in mind, I treat this case as one involving the denial of a motion for summary judgment.

Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on both the issues of statute of limitations and statute of frauds. However, it is a well-settled principle of Arkansas law that a trial court’s order denying a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. See Gibson Appliance Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 341 Ark. 536, 20 S.W.3d 285 (2000); Ozarks Unlimited Resources Coop., Inc. v. Daniels, 333 Ark. 214, 969 S.W.2d 169 (1998). Arkansas appellate courts have repeatedly refused to address arguments where the effect of doing so is tantamount to reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment. See Nucor Holding Corp. v. Rinkines, 326 Ark. 217, 931 S.W.2d 426 (1996). For us to review the underlying basis of the denial of a motion for summary judgment, in this instance, the statute-of-limitations issue or the statute-of-frauds issue, would make meaningless the settled law that we will not review a denial of a motion for summary judgment. See Ball v. Foehner, 326 Ark. 409, 931 S.W.2d 142 (1996).

After his motion for summary judgment was denied, appellant failed to make any motion or obtain a ruling whereby he could preserve the issues of statute of limitations or statute of frauds. In fact, appellant agreed to allow the trial court to decide the merits of the case on the record without any further hearings or pleadings. By doing so, and without any effort to preserve the substance of the issues raised in his motion for summary judgment, appellant failed to keep his issues of statute of limitations and statute of frauds alive. See Ball, supra.

As a result, we should not reach the merits of appellant’s contentions. Accordingly, I believe that we must dismiss. See Sutter v. King, 310 Ark. 681, 839 S.W.2d 218 (1992).

I am authorized to state that Judge Bird joins in this opinion.

Bird, J., joins.