I concur in the conclusion of my associates that the demands of the unions were ill-advised and unlawful, and that the employer was under the legal duty to reject them. But under those circumstances, and in view of the uneontradicted evidence that, after both the picketing and the boycott had been instituted, the unions continued to demand a closed shop contract, in my opinion, the judgment should be affirmed.
The decision modifying the judgment, in effect, declares that because the unions might picket the employer and institute a boycott for the purpose of influencing its employees to join their organizations and thereby obtain a closed shop, the same activities may not be enjoined when carried on to achieve an end openly and admittedly unlawful. Labor unions, as well as employers, should be required to deal in good faith and held accountable in accordance with their stated purposes. The judgment of the trial court was based upon uncontradicted evidence concerning the demands made by the unions and should not now be modified by approving the economic pressure upon grounds different from those declared.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 25, 1946. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing.