The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFarland, J.:This case comes before us on a petition for review filed by James B. Sandy from the decision of the Court of Appeals. In the Overland Park, Kansas, Municipal Court, Sandy was convicted of possession of stolen property, marijuana, and an unlawful weapon (num-chucks). Sandy appealed the convictions *103to the district court. There he made a pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence, which was sustained. The City of Overland Park then perfected its interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. City of Overland Park v. Sandy, 2 Kan. App. 2d 176, 576 P.2d 1097 (1978).
Sandy and a friend were driving in a lawful manner through the City of Overland Park, Kansas, at approximately 1:00 a.m., on April 15,1977, when observed by a police officer. At that time, the two cars were traveling in opposite directions. The officer turned his car and followed Sandy, who shortly turned from the roadway into a convenience store parking lot. The officer followed and conducted a routine driver’s license check on Sandy. While so doing, he flashed his flashlight into the back seat area and observed a set of scales. The officer had observed similar scales in the near past at police headquarters and knew that like scales had been reported stolen from some of the high schools in the area and some had been recovered. Sandy was then questioned about how he came to be in possession of the scales, and when the officer determined the explanation was not satisfactory, he requested consent to search the automobile. This was voluntarily granted and that search revealed the marijuana and the numchucks. Sandy was then arrested, charged, tried in the municipal court and found guilty of possession of stolen property (scales) and possession of marijuana and a dangerous weapon (numchucks).
The sole question to be decided here is whether K.S.A. 8-244 authorizes police officers to stop an automobile in order to make an isolated spot check for a driver’s license. If it does, the discovery and seizure of the scales are justified under the plain view doctrine, and the evidence discovered in the subsequent consent search is not contaminated under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Resolution of the question requires an interpretation of K.S.A. 8-244 and a definition of the scope of authority it confers upon law enforcement officers.
The statute provides:
“Every licensee shall have his or her driver’s license in his or her immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle, and shall display the same, upon demand of any officer of a court of competent jurisdiction or any peace officer, examiner or officer of the division of vehicles. . . .”
*104This precise issue has not previously been before this court. Many jurisdictions have wrestled with the question of at what point does a driver’s license check become an unreasonable seizure contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some jurisdictions have held the type of spot check herein to be an unwarranted intrusion. A case typical of this rationale is Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). In Swanger, the Pennsylvania court specifically held that the right of an individual to be free from government intrusions without apparent reason outweighed the interest of the public in insuring safety on the highways. The Pennsylvania court said:
“The crux of our decision that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of The Vehicle Code, goes to the Commonwealth’s argument the police need no justification to stop the vehicle. We rule before the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion. To hold otherwise would be to give the police absolute, unreviewable discretion and authority to intrude into an individual’s life for no cause whatsoever.” (453 Pa. at 112.)
The issue is presently before the United States Supreme Court in State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359 (Del. 1978), cert. granted __ U.S. __ (47 U.S.L.W. 3188, Oct. 3, 1978).
Sandy argues that his vehicle could only properly have been stopped if the officer had probable cause to believe he was in violation of the law. We do not construe the statute that narrowly. This statute is intended to give the officers mentioned therein the power to enforce driver’s license laws. The licensing laws are safety measures applicable to the use of all roads or highways within the state. It would be most unusual to have an observable indication of a licensing violation of a moving vehicle.
The only practical method of enforcing the licensing laws involved is by stopping the vehicle. The inconvenience experienced by the individual motorist is relatively slight compared to the benefits to be derived from strict enforcement of our licensing laws. Whether this should be accomplished by spot checks or road blocks is a question that has been raised. Certainly there is less inconvenience to the motoring public by using spot checks. Spot checks also have the advantage of always being unexpectedly possible. We believe occasional spot checks are not only more practical but can have a salutary effect in the enforcement of our traffic laws and serve to promote the safety of the traveling *105public. Excessive spot checks can be unduly burdensome to traffic and commerce. The line of demarcation between the two is not easily drawn. However, due regard for the practical necessities of effective driver licensing enforcement requires a brief stop or detention for checking purposes. It is a matter of balancing between the governmental interest in the safety of users of the highways and the individual’s right to freedom and privacy.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), cert. denied as to license check, aff’d on jurisdictional grounds, 411 U.S. 389, 36 L.Ed.2d 342, 93 S.Ct. 1670 (1973), upheld procedure similar to that followed in this instance. Two District of Columbia officers in an unmarked car, recognizing that the car the defendant was driving was a rental car, decided to run a spot check to determine if the defendant had a proper license and a rental agreement (equivalent to proper registration). Defendant had committed no traffic offense and his auto had no apparent equipment defect. The stop was solely to check the operator’s license and the vehicle registration. During the stop, one of the officers in the course of flashing his flashlight in the vehicle noted the presence of a trigger mechanism of a pistol protruding out from beneath the arm rest on the front seat of defendant’s car. He removed the pistol and after learning it was unregistered, placed the defendant under arrest. The narrow issue posed in that case was whether the officers could stop the defendant and demand his license and registration when they had not seen defendant violate a traffic or vehicular equipment regulation and had no cause to believe that he was about to engage in any criminal activity. The government argued that the right to stop was a duty mandated by Congress. The officers had a right to require the driver to produce his license and vehicle registration without the need of first having reasonable suspicion that the driver lacked those particular documents. The following from that case is pertinent herein:
“At the outset, we reject the rigid rule which appellant urges us to adopt: That a police officer may stop an automobile for a spot check of the driver’s license and the car’s registration only when he has articulable suspicion, as defined by Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)], that either of such documents is invalid. The touchstone of the fourth amendment is reasonableness. It seems to us in this age of the motor car that when the community’s interest in limiting use of its highways to licensed drivers in registered autos is balanced against the momentary interruption of the motorist which is necessary to ascertain whether he is complying with these licensing requirements such intrusion is not so unreasonable as to be violative of the fourth amendment.
*106“We must keep in mind that if we were to limit the police, as appellant urges, to stopping only those autos in which the driver might reasonably be suspected to be without a license, for example, because of his youthful appearance, the result would unjustifiably single out and discriminate against certain groups of citizens, i.e., the young. Moreover, such a restrictive ruling by us might render virtually unenforceable the Congressional prohibition against all unlicensed drivers and unregistered cars driving on District of Columbia streets. After all, persons who drive in the District without a valid license and registration will not necessarily exhibit conduct or the appearance giving rise to articulable suspicion that they are without proper driving credentials. Thus, they would be immune from the ‘spot check’ to enforce a requirement deemed necessary by Congress for public safety on the District’s highways.” (290 A.2d at 582.)
See also State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
A routine license check and its concomitant temporary delay of a driver does not constitute an arrest in a legal sense where there is nothing arbitrary or harassing present. When the driver has produced his license and it is in proper form, he must be promptly allowed to continue on his way. It is only when the officer becomes aware of a reasonable probability of a law violation that the driver may be detained for further questioning.
In the case before us the officer observed the scales while lawfully making a driver’s license check. These scales were in plain view and the officer had reasonable cause to believe they were stolen property. The seizure of the scales and the subsequent search of the vehicle with Sandy’s consent were entirely proper. The trial court erroneously suppressed the evidence seized from the Sandy vehicle.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded.