concurring specially.
I fully concur in Divisions 1, 2, 5, and 6 and in the judgment. However, because I cannot agree with Divisions 3 and 4,1 write separately.
1. Although Division 3 (b) recognizes that Esposito failed to make a sufficient proffer of evidence in support of the proposition that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment, Division 3 (a) extensively discusses the issue.
“A statute is presumed to be valid and constitutional until the contrary appears. . . . (Cits.)” [Cit.] A presumption arises when a defendant is sentenced within the statutory limits set by the legislature that such sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Such presumption remains until a defendant sets forth a factual predicate showing that such legislatively authorized punishment was so overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense as to shock the conscience. [Cit.]
Burgos v. State, 233 Ga. App. 897, 902 (3), in. 2 (505 SE2d 543) (1998). This Court has repeatedly and recently upheld the constitutionality of the statutory provision for electrocution as a method of execution. Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 716 (15) (532 SE2d 677) (2000); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 703 (16) (532 SE2d 78) (2000); Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 863 (12) (524 SE2d 473) (1999); DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 786 (6) (493 SE2d 157) (1997). Because of the complete absence of any proffer, and in light of our very recent rulings on this issue, we do not have either jurisdictional or precedential authority to discuss this issue in this case.
2. Division 4 acknowledges that Esposito did not object to the *189procedure used for the jury view. Thus, Esposito acquiesced in that procedure. Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. at 861 (5). See also Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 817 (6) (525 SE2d 339) (1999). Therefore, the jury view procedure is not before us, and there is no issue on which we should express an opinion.
Decided October 30, 2000 Reconsideration denied November 30, 2000. Roy R. Kelly III, W. Dan Roberts, for appellant. Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney *190General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Karen A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.*189I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this opinion, and that Justice Hunstein joins in Division 2 and Justice Hines joins in Division 1.