concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion. However, I believe that the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument that “when the devil on trial [sic], have to go to hell to get witnesses,” was improper and unprofessional. DR 7-106 (C) (4) of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility states as follows:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not . . . assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant . . . ; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.
See also CPR EC 7-24. Here, the prosecutor asserted his opinion regarding the guilt of the defendant by referring to him as “the devil” and impugned the credibility of witnesses by implying that they were from “hell.” While prosecutors have wide latitude in their closing arguments, there are still some limitations on the scope of their arguments. Bell v. State, 263 Ga. 776, 777 (439 SE2d 480) (1994). As we stated in Bell, “Adherence to the limitation on the latitude of oral argument is . . . integral to legal professionalism.” Id., n. 1. However, since Billups failed to object to the statement at trial, I must concur with the majority opinion.