(concurring).
I concur in the Court’s opinion and add these additional observations chiefly for exampled-tcagrten cmfwyp fwypwwwww emphasis.
One possible criticism of the present opinion will be based upon the historical precedent which permitted summary contempt in all cases. However, in Bloom v. Illinois,1 the United States Supreme Court undertook a review of the historical antecedents of the law of summary contempt, and found reliance thereon to support the summary power debatable in the early English courts:
Learned writers have interpreted Fox’s work as showing that until the late 17th or early 18th centuries, apart from the extraordinary proceedings of the Star Chamber, English courts neither had, nor claimed, power to punish contempts, whether in or out of court, by summary process. * * *2
Thus, historical precedent alone is not sufficient to exempt criminal contempt from constitutional guarantees. Moreover, as Justice White points out, “the ultimate question is not whether the traditional doctrine is historically correct but whether the rule that criminal contempts are never entitled to a jury trial is a necessary or an acceptable construction of the Constitution.”3
Nevertheless, I wish also to emphasize the indispensable necessity of maintaining in courtrooms that atmosphere of quiet orderliness so crucial to our adversary process. Therefore, I feel compelled to review the alternatives short of criminal contempt which are available to trial judges dn coping with disruptive courtroom tactics.4
Civil contempt is always available and should be used without hesitation where necessary. However, civil contempt power may be of limited utility in dealing with an incorrigible, a psychopath, or an accused bent on frustrating his trial. There are other means to cope with grave misconduct in the courtroom, whether that of the accused, his counsel, spectators, or others.
In every criminal trial there is more at stake than just the interest of the accused; the integrity of the process itself warrants a trial judge exercising his discretion to have counsel participating in the defense even when counsel is rejected by the defendant. A criminal trial is not á private matter; the public interest is so great that the presence and participation of counsel, even when opposed by the accused, is necessary in order to vindicate the process itself.
On the other side of the coin, the actions of an attorney which are calculated to disrupt the trial process must be similarly treated. The court has the power to summarily bar the attorney from the courtroom and to remove him from the representation of his client in the matter before the court. Additional sanctions for violation o.f the Canons of Professional Ethics are of obvious appropriateness.
Finally, there is a class of extremely petty contempts (where punishment is an appropriate fine) for isolated breaches of courtroom decorum not foreclosed by this case or by Baker v. City of Fairbanks.5
. 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed. 2d 522 (1968).
. Id. at 198 n. 2, 88 S.Ct. at 1481, 20 L.Ed.2d at 527 n. 2.
. Id. at 200 n. 2, 88 S.Ct. at 1481, 20 L.Ed.2d at 528 n. 2.
. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), charted the courses which are open to trial judges, and the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, “The Judge’s Role in Dealing with Trial Disruption” (Tentative Draft, May, 1971), has suggested the proper application of the various suggestions to maintain proper decorum.
.471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970).