OPINION
Opinion by
Chief Justice CORNELIUS.Dorothy Chandler, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her son, Jessie Chandler, Jr., sued Dr. Jack Cash, Dr. Vera Reed, and the Harrison County Hospital Association to recover damages for the death of Jessie Chandler allegedly resulting from the negligence of Dr. Reed. Dr. Reed was an emergency room physician at the Marshall Memorial Hospital who examined Jessie Chandler on July 1, 1995, and released him. Jessie Chandler died the following day. Dr. Cash had contracted with the hospital to provide staffing of physicians for the hospital emergency room. Dr. Cash engaged Dr. Reed as one of the emergency room physicians.
The trial court severed the case against Dr. Cash from Mrs. Chandler’s other claims, and in response to Dr. Cash’s motion, rendered summary judgment denying Mrs. Chandler’s claims against Dr. Cash. Mrs. Chandler appeals, contending that summary judgment was improper because there is a genuine fact issue on her claim that Dr. Cash is liable for Dr. Reed’s alleged negligence under the doctrine of respondeat supenor.
Mrs. Chandler pleaded that the “defendants, through their agents, servants, or employees,” departed from standard medical care by (1) failing to refer Jessie Chandler to a proper specialist for diagnosis, (2) failing to admit Jessie Chandler to a hospital for evaluation and monitoring, and (3) failing to timely diagnose and treat Jessie Chandler.
In her pleadings and her response to Dr. Cash’s motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Chandler contended that Dr. Reed was negligent in her diagnosis and in her failure to refer and admit Jessie Chandler, and that Dr. Cash is liable for Dr. Reed’s negligence under the doctrine of responde-at superior because he retained such a right of control over the details of Dr. Reed’s work as to make her his employee or agent. She contends that Dr. Cash’s contract with the hospital obligated him to supervise and review the emergency room physicians’ work and ensure that all emergency room patients were properly evaluated, and that these obligations rendered Dr. Reed the legal employee or agent of Dr. Cash. Mrs. Chandler does not, however, plead or rely on a breach by Dr. Cash of his contract with the hospital, nor does she contend that Jessie Chandler was a third-party beneficiary of Dr. Cash’s contract with the hospital. Mrs. Chandler also contends this right of control was retained by Dr. Cash in his oral contract engaging Dr. Reed as an emergency room physician.
Dr. Cash’s contract with the hospital contains two clauses on which Mrs. Chandler relies to show an obligation on his part to control the details of Dr. Reed’s work. The first is Paragraph I.A., which provides as follows:
Dr. Cash agrees to provide continuous 24 hour physician coverage of Hospital’s Emergency Department (“Emergency Department”) under the terms and conditions herein provided. During the term of this agreement Dr. Cash shall
A. Physician Coverage. Arrange for qualified physicians (“Emergency Physicians”) to staff the Emergency Department, orient them to their duties, direct their *72activities, and supervise and review their work.
The second is provision III.A., which provides that:
A. Evaluation. Dr. Cash shall be responsible for the evaluation of every patient who comes to the Emergency Department to assure that the immediate medical needs of the patient are not jeopardized.
The construction of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law for the court. In construing a contract, the court considers the document as a whole and gives effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in all the contractual provisions. Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.1996). Unless a contract is ambiguous, the intention of the parties is to be drawn from the language actually used by the parties in the contract. Id. at 121. No party here contends that the contract between Dr. Cash and the hospital is ambiguous.
We conclude that the contractual provision obligating Dr. Cash to staff the emergency room with physicians and “orient them to their duties, direct their activities, and supervise and review their work” does not obligate Dr. Cash to control the details or the means and methods of the emergency physicians’ work so as to render the physicians his employees or agents. To destroy the independent contractor status and render a party liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor, the person engaging the worker must retain the right to control the details and the manner of performance of the contractor’s work. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.1998); Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 585-86 (Tex.1964); Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ). Where an employer has the right to control only the results or the end sought to be accomplished and the contracting party independently determines the details and means of accomplishing that result, an independent contractor relationship exists, and the rule of respon-deat superior has no application. Gladewater Mun. Hosp. v. Daniel, 694 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ); Daily Int’l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); First Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We conclude that the contractual provision concerning the orientation and direction of the physicians and the review and supervision of their work refers to a general supervision and review of the work to ensure satisfactory results, not to a right of control of the details of the work.
Likewise, we find that the contract provision obligating Dr. Cash to “be responsible for the evaluation of every patient” to assure that the immediate medical needs of the patients are not jeopardized is not an obligation to control the details of the physicians’ work or to personally evaluate each patient. Rather, considering the contract as a whole, we construe that provision to simply make Dr. Cash responsible for staffing the emergency room with physicians who will properly evaluate the patients. It should be remembered that the complete thrust of Dr. Cash’s contract was to obligate him to staff the emergency room with competent physicians. There is no contention here that Dr. Cash failed to staff the emergency room with physicians competent to properly evaluate the emergency room patients. Obviously, the contract did not contemplate that Dr. Cash would personally evaluate each emergency room patient.
The uneontroverted summary judgment evidence also showed that Dr. Cash’s oral contract with Dr. Reed made her an independent contractor, and not an employee or agent of Dr. Cash. Both Dr. Cash and Dr. Reed testified by deposition that Dr. Reed was an independent contractor and that Dr. Cash had no right to *73control the methods or means of her work. The summary judgment evidence shows that Dr. Reed made all her treatment decisions; she did not need Dr. Cash’s input or approval; Dr. Cash did not control any of the details of Dr. Reed’s diagnoses or treatments; Dr. Cash did not provide any tools or medical equipment for Dr. Reed; and, although Dr. Cash made a preliminary work schedule for Dr. Reed, Dr. Reed was free to change the schedule or not work at all. Dr. Reed was paid by the hour, Dr. Cash did not make any deductions for income tax or Social Security, and Dr. Reed provided all her own liability insurance. None of this evidence was contradicted, and Mrs. Chandler produced no summary judgment evidence to show a right of control on the part of Dr. Cash except the alleged contractual obligations contained in his contract with the hospital.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court properly rendered a take-nothing summary judgment against Mrs. Chandler.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.