(Concurring in result):
I concur with the majority in result. Because all three of Cowart’s causes of action arise out of the disputed fee, I agree he is barred from a trial on those causes of action. However, I do not believe that all legal malpractice or Unfair Trade Practices claims are necessarily precluded by a client’s prior submission of a fee dispute to the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board.
The Fee Disputes Board does not have the authority to determine legal malpractice claims. It only resolves fee disputes. “The Board is authorized to receive, inquire into, take proofs, and make findings and final determination of disputes between attorneys and clients ... arising out of disagreements over fees, costs and/or disbursements.” Rule 416(4), SCACR (emphasis added). Further, “[u]pon consent of the client-applicant ... to be bound by the final decision of the Board, exclusive jurisdiction over the fee dispute vests in the Board.” Rule 416(9), SCACR (emphasis added). Even if the Board ordered a fee returned to a client, the amount returned would not include consequential damages.1
*367In this case, Cowart seeks as actual damages only the amount he paid Poore. Therefore the Board’s determination precludes him from pursuing a contract action to recover the disputed fees.
However, I also would affirm the dismissal of Cowart’s malpractice and UTPA claims. First, Cowart again only requests as damages the amount of the fee paid to Poore.
Additionally, the only reference to legal malpractice in Cowart’s complaint alleges Poore was negligent in attending the first meeting with the mortgage company and filing Co-wart’s answer and counterclaim without benefit of Cowart’s legal file from a previous attorney. Cowart has not alleged any facts or inferences proving proximate causation. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Cowart’s negligenceAegal malpractice claim for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Furthermore, “[t]o be actionable under the UTPA, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must have an impact upon the public interest.” York v. Conway Ford, Inc., 325 S.C. 170, 173, 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997). “Unfair or deceptive acts or practices have an impact upon the public interest if the acts or practices have the potential for repetition.” Crary v. Djebelli, 329 S.C. 385, 387, 496 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1998). The Act is not available to redress a private wrong where the public interest is unaffected. Mere breach of contract does not constitute a violation of the UTPA. South Carolina Nat’l Bank v. Silks, 295 S.C. 107, 367 S.E.2d 421 (Ct.App.1988).
The potential for repetition may be shown: 1) by showing the same kind of actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to occur absent deterrence, or 2) by showing the party’s procedures create a potential for repetition of the unfair and deceptive acts. Daisy Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Abbott, 322 S.C. 489, 473 S.E.2d 47 (1996). Cowart alleges Poore’s actions were “unfair and deceptive trade practices” and “subject to repetition as [Poore] was in the business of practicing law at the time ... this action arose *368and is still in business.” Cowart has not alleged any facts indicating the potential for repetition.2
. The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of a duty by the attorney; (3) damage to the client; and (4) proximate causation of the client’s damages by the breach. McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S.C. 332, 499 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.1998). The third element, damage to the client, may *367include consequential elements. See 7 AM.JuR.2d Attorneys at Law § 238 (1997).
. Cowart also argues Poore violated Rule 6(d), SCRCP by failing to serve a memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss prior to the hearing. This issue is not preserved for review. Cowart did not object to the memorandum at the hearing, but first objected in a motion for reconsideration. A party cannot use a motion to reconsider to present an issue that could have been raised prior to the judgment, but was not. Patterson v. Reid, 318 S.C. 183, 456 S.E.2d 436 (Ct.App.1995). Because Cowart’s objection was not timely raised at trial, this issue is not preserved for our review. Gurganious v. City of Beaufort, 317 S.C. 481, 454 S.E.2d 912 (Ct.App.1995).