A jury convicted McArthur Tyson of violating Kansas City Ordinance Section 80-212(10) by operating a demolition debris landfill in a Kansas City residential yard without a permit. We reverse the circuit court’s judgment.
Tyson owned and operated TSC, Inc., a concrete construction business. After Tyson tried unsuccessfully to obtain a conditional use permit, his neighbors and a city inspector saw dump tracks with the TSC logo on their doors enter Tyson’s land and dump asphalt, concrete, and dirt. City prosecutors filed an information against Tyson, charging him with unauthorized use of the premises in violation of the city code.
The Municipal Division of the Jackson County Circuit Court entered judgment against Tyson. Tyson then applied for a trial de novo in circuit court, which also entered judgment against him.
Tyson presents several grounds for appeal, but we reverse Tyson’s conviction on the ground that the city did not make a 'prima facie case against him. Although this is a civil action involving violation of a municipal ordinance, it was gwm-criminal; hence, the city’s burden was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyson had violated its ordinance. City of Cape Girardeau v. Jones, 725 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Mo.App.1987).
Kansas City ordinance Section 80-212(10)a requires citizens to obtain a conditional use permit before maintaining demolition debris landfills on their property. The ordinance defines a demolition debris landfill as “a place designated for the disposal of used building materials resulting from the demolition, site clearance or waste materials from the construction of buildings or structures.” Section 80-212(10)a. The ordinance further defines *929“used building materials” as “any and all material requiring disposal resulting from the demolition, site clearance or construction of buildings.” Section 80-212(10)b.
The ordinance is ambiguous. It is beguiling in its declaration in Section 80-212(10)a, on the one hand, that a demolition debris landfill is “a place designated for used building materials resulting from the demolition ... of buildings or structures ”1 but, on the other hand, defining “used building materials” in Section 80-212(10)b as materials resulting from destruction of only “buildings” and not “structures.” We suspect that this ambiguity may have resulted from a drafting error. Regardless, the rule of lenity requires that we construe ambiguities in penal statutes against the government “and in favor of persons on whom such penalties are sought to be imposed.” J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Mo. banc 2000). Construing the ordinance in this manner, we deem the city’s burden to prove that Tyson dumped materials that came from the destruction, site clearance, or construction of buildings, as opposed to all structures.
Amy Buford, the city inspector who investigated this case, testified that the trucks that she saw dumping on Tyson’s land were dumping dirt, concrete, and asphalt. Photographs of the debris showed only dirt and what appeared to be large chunks of asphalt or concrete. The city introduced no evidence that the debris came from the destruction, site clearance, or construction of buildings, as it was required to do. It was not enough to infer that the materials came from the construction or destruction of a structure — the city needed to establish that the debris came from buildings. This it failed to do.
Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment convicting Tyson of violating the city’s ordinances.
PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge, concurs. JAMES M. SMART, JR., Presiding Judge, concurs in a separate opinion.. We added the emphasis.