dissenting.
People fall down. They are injured. Who pays?
The critical question in this appeal of a summary judgment is: What is it that the owner or occupier of the premises must know before the owner may be held liable for the injuries to an invitee onto the premises? This was the question that was the focus of a good portion of the oral arguments in this appeal. It was presented in the briefs. You would have expected the analysis of this issue to be the focal point of the opinion. But with a little slight of hand, the majority avoids analysis of the very issue this Court should analyze — what is it the owner/occupier must have knowledge of to impose liability?
Knowledge of the owner/occupier is the crucial issue. But knowledge of what? You will note in the Court’s discussion of issue one, it is presented simply as actual or constructive knowledge of a “condition.” Alger v. Brinson Ford, Inc., 169 S.W.3d 340, 344-45 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed). If you fast forward over to issue three, when discussing reasonable care, the cited cases are referencing whether or not the owner/occupier failed to take reasonable care to eliminate the unreasonably dangerous condition the owner/occupier knew existed or, by the exercise of reasonable care, would discover. Id. at 345-46.
This is the question this case turns upon and the majority appears to be taking great pains to avoid it.
*347Finding no evidence that Brinson Ford knew, or had any reason to know, of an unreasonably dangerous condition on the premises, I would affirm the judgment.
Maybe it would be helpful to the reader to understand that the “ramp” off of which Alger fell, was no more than 4 inches at any point along the “ramp.” Alger fell off a ramp that was shorter than a normal step, and the edge of the ramp was highlighted with yellow paint.
Conclusion
I find nothing in this record to show that Brinson was aware of an unreasonably dangerous condition. I would affirm the judgment. Because the majority does not, I dissent.