dissenting.
I dissent. With this opinion we exalt an anomaly in the Rules and ignore a circuit court judgment. We do so by failing to comply with the simple words of § 536.140.6, RSMo. (2000): Appeals may be taken from the judgment of the court as in other civil cases._
The majority fairly sets out the procedural posture which blushes “peculiar,” and fairly describes the utter failure of the Director’s brief to comply with the Rules. Indeed the Director’s brief is nothing more than a sounding brass of “There was substantial evidence,” unattended by facts or law — a meaningless conclusion. The majority further sets out several ways by which rule 84.05(e) and State ex rel. Riverside Pipeline Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 165 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. banc 2005), would no longer be anomalous.
It appears to me that statutory language that says “as in other civil cases,” means “as in other civil cases.” As such, the Director had an obligation to point out the error of law made by the circuit court, and the burden of persuasion before this Court. Indeed there is nothing in Rule 84.05(e) that says otherwise, parse and assume as we might. Thousands of cases per day are appealed to the circuit courts of this state pursuant to § 536.100, RSMo. (2000) — Rule 84.05(e) and judicial rule make this a meaningless way-stop if a circuit court judgment is ignored. Helpfully though, we make sure in our decretal language that we reverse the circuit court. The unending hours of docketing, motions, and hearings before the circuit courts are but legal ululation if the cant is “we review the action of the agency.” The judgment of the circuit court below in this case found for Mr. Glass and his company — today because of an “anomalous” rule, Mr. Glass is out of business.