specially concurring:
I agree that the testimony of Candy Hurst was properly admitted by the trial court, but my reasons for that conclusion differ from those expressed in the majority opinion. The majority holds the testimony admissible as lay opinion testimony pursuant to C.R.E. 701. In my view, the testimony relating to the “several stages of emotional adjustment” victims go through after a traumatic experience went beyond the type of personal observation testimony admissible under C.R.E. 701 and People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920 (Colo.1982). However, this testimony was admissible under C.R.E. 702, which permits a witness to express opinions regarding “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact” if the trial court concludes that she is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”
The majority concludes that Hurst was never accepted as an expert, so C.R.E. 702 does not apply. Admittedly, the record is not clear as to exactly when Hurst was accepted as an expert. As I read the record, however, the trial court did accept Hurst as an expert. The People called Hurst as a witness and elicited her testimony as to how the victim’s reaction compared to that of a typical rape victim. On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired into Hurst’s training and background. The prosecutor objected on the ground that he didn’t intend to offer her as an expert, but the court overruled the objection. Hurst testified that she had bachelor degrees in psychology and sociology and had received extensive training as part of her job. At this point, a brief discussion, which was not recorded, was held at the bench out of the hearing of the jury.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the court held, again out of the presence of the jury, that:
with regard to the bearing and attitude of a rape victim, the Court does find that the witness [Hurst] does have special experience pursuant to the requirement of the Colorado Rules of Evidence and did accept that witness as an expert and specifically overruled the defendant’s objection.
At the close of the defendant’s case, the court restated its holding in chambers:
the Court has further specifically found that with regard to the expertise as to demeanor of a rape victim that the wit*960nesses’ [sic] testimony was acceptable as an expert because she testified that she counselled some thirty victims and therefore under the Colorado Rules of Evidence did have special experience and expertise and the testimony was properly admitted as expert testimony.
This court has stated that the determination of whether a witness qualifies as an expert is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on review unless that discretion has been abused. People v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Colo.1982). Accord White v. People, 175 Colo. 119, 123, 486 P.2d 4, 6 (1971); Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Colo. 582, 586, 346 P.2d 571, 573 (1959). On the basis of Hurst’s testimony about her experience and training the court did not abuse its discretion. The fact that the trial court ruled on Hurst’s qualifications as an expert out of the hearing of the jury did not prejudice the defendant. The substance of Hurst’s testimony was properly limited to the scope of her expertise, which was the “demeanor” or “bearing and attitude” of a rape victim, and provided evidence that could have assisted the jury in evaluating the victim’s behavior following the assault.