dissenting.
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, Soto v. Roswell Townhomes, 183 Ga. App. 286 (358 SE2d 670) (1987), was not decided on the basis of the “equal or superior knowledge rule” frequently applied in premises liability cases. The holding in Soto was that “ ‘a finding is demanded that [appellant’s] fall resulted from a defective and unsafe condition of the premises of which she was aware; and (she) is therefore barred from recovery by reason of her failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety.’ Taylor v. Boyce, 105 Ga. App. 434-435 (2) (124 SE2d 647) (1962). See also Wade v. Roberts, [118 Ga. App. 284, 287 (163 SE2d 343) (1968)].” Soto, supra at 288. In both the Taylor and Wade cases, cited in support of the holding in Soto, the plaintiffs were denied recovery on the basis of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. Accordingly, Soto was decided on the basis of those traditional negligence principles and made no attempt to apply the “equal or superior knowledge rule” to “shield trespassers from negligence liability” as contended by the majority.
The present case is also one controlled by application of the same related negligence principles of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk applied in Soto, supra. Before applying these principles to the present facts, it is important to recognize that the case before this court is a personal injury case for damages suffered by Ms. Girone when she fell attempting to traverse a patio she knew to be slippery. The appalling trespass of raw sewage onto the Girones’ property forms the basis for a separate claim for damages against the City and the egregious facts of that claim should not obscure the negligence analysis applicable to the present case. Regardless of the offensive nature of the slippery substance in which Ms. Girone fell; regardless of whether the City breached a duty to properly maintain the sewers or to remove the raw sewage, and regardless of the seriousness of the resulting injury, there can be no recovery for any negligence of the City unless it was a proximate cause of the injury to Ms. Girone. Leonardson v. Ga. Power Co., 210 Ga. App. 574, 576-577 (436 SE2d 690) (1993).
The issue here is whether Ms. Girone was negligent in attempting to walk across an obviously slippery, sewage-covered concrete patio and, if so, whether her negligence in doing so was the sole proximate cause of her injuries, despite the existence of any concurring negligence on the part of the City.
The following principles apply. “As a matter of contributory negligence, it is the rule in this state that, if the plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the accident, he is denied recovery. OCGA § 51-11-7; [cit.]” Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy, 258 Ga. 263, 267 (367 SE2d 796) (1988). The rationale in contributory negligence cases is that “the plaintiff’s negligent actions or failure to use *827ordinary care to avoid the defendant’s negligence is regarded as the sole proximate cause of the injury even though such negligence may concur with the negligence of the defendant. Wright v. The Concrete Co., 107 Ga. App. 190, 198 (129 SE2d 351) (1962).” Leonardson, supra at 576. However, under Georgia’s comparative negligence rule, “if the plaintiff’s negligence was less than the defendant’s, the plaintiff is not denied recovery although his damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the degree of fault attributable to him. [Cit.] Thus, a tort plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence is greater than or equal to the negligence of the defendant. OCGA § 51-11-7; [cit.]” Union Camp Corp., supra at 267.
“The related but separate defense of assumption of the risk is applied where a plaintiff assumes the risk of a danger he knows and appreciates. Assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it, while lack of ordinary care for one’s own safety, or contributory negligence, is a matter of some fault or departure from the standard of reasonable conduct. The two may coexist, or either may exist without the other. The difference is frequently one between risks which were in fact known to the plaintiff or so obvious that he must be taken to have known of them, and risks which he merely might have discovered by the exercise of ordinary care.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Leonardson, supra at 576-577. “Assumption of the risk is a complete defense and arises when, even if defendant is negligent, plaintiff himself is negligent in such a way that his own negligence is the sole proximate cause. [Cits.]” Menendez v. Jewett, 196 Ga. App. 565, 566 (396 SE2d 294) (1990). “A person cannot undertake to do what obviously is a dangerous thing, even if he is directed by another, without assuming the risks incident thereto and without himself being guilty of such lack of due care for his own safety as to bar him from recovery.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Meriwether Mem. Hosp. Auth. v. Gresham, 202 Ga. App. 535, 536 (414 SE2d 694) (1992). Of course, in electing to confront a known dangerous condition, the plaintiff’s actions must be voluntary and not coerced by any compelling circumstances or emergency. See Moore v. Svc. Merchandise Co., 200 Ga. App. 463, 464 (408 SE2d 480) (1991); compare Kitchens v. Winter Co. Builders, 161 Ga. App. 701, 702-703 (289 SE2d 807) (1982); Hull v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 269 (235 SE2d 601) (1977).
Clearly, there is evidence that the City’s negligence caused or contributed to the accumulation of slippery raw sewage in the Girones’ basement and on the concrete patio adjacent to the outside door to the basement. In her deposition testimony and affidavit, Ms. Girone stated that she hired a cleaning service to clean and sanitize the basement and that when the cleaning crew arrived, she needed to show them where to clean up in the basement. She admitted that *828when she approached the concrete slab to enter the basement through the outside door, she could see that the slab was covered with a layer of raw sewage and that it was “very slippery.” She also stated that there was another entrance to the basement inside her house by which she could have avoided the slippery slab, but she chose not to use the inside entrance because she did not want to let the cleaning crew in her housé when her husband was not home. There was no evidence that the presence of the cleaning crew itself posed a danger which foreclosed use of the alternative route.
Decided December 5, 1994 Reconsideration denied December 20, 1994 Love & Willingham, Robert P. Monyak, Jane L. Sams, for appellants. Dennis, Corry, Porter & Gray, R. Clay Porter, Craig P. Siegenthaler, Ronald G. Polly, Jr., D. Jeffrey Grate, Mary P. Vilmos, for appellee.The facts of this case are more closely aligned with the principle of assumption of the risk than with contributory negligence. This is not a case where the plaintiff was required by some compelling circumstances or emergency to traverse the slippery area. In fact, an alternative route to the basement was available. This is a clear case where the plaintiff is barred from recovery because she knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of injury by choosing to walk across the slippery patio. In other words, even if the City was also negligent, Ms. Girone’s negligence exceeded that of the City and was such a preponderating cause of her injury that it severed any legal causal connection between the City’s negligence and her injury, leaving Ms. Girone’s negligence as the sole proximate cause of her own injury. This case is controlled by Soto, supra and other cases finding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury complained of. Leonardson, supra; Taylor v. Schander, 207 Ga. App. 627 (428 SE2d 806) (1993); Roberts v. Carter, 214 Ga. App. 540 (448 SE2d 239) (1994).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.