I dissent. One year ago, in another politically sensitive case, I quoted Learned Hand as follows (People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 538 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328]): “‘When we ask what Congress [or another legislature] “intended”, usually there can be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete occasion.’ (United States v. Klinger (2d Cir. 1952) 199 F.2d 645, 648.) The distinguished justice added, ‘He who supposes that he can be certain of the result, is the least fitted for the attempt.’”
How might this salary case have been decided if each of us on the court had projected himself conscientiously into the 1964, 1969, 1972, and 1976 positions of those legislators who “uttered the words” that are contained in the legislative measures pertinent here? In 1969, for instance, what if a legislator in debate (or the Legislative Counsel, in his summary) had stated, “Interested observers have noted that (1) for incumbent appellate judges, increases based on the Consumer Price Index will irrevocably be guaranteed until those judges’ terms expire, and (2) for some incumbents the terms will not expire until 1982”?
*549What if a legislative committee chairman had advised: “For each judge you are being asked to approve an ‘employment contract’ and to endorse his or her ‘promised compensation’ [ante at pp. 538, 539], The bill as now drafted means you are about to adopt ‘agreements of employment. .. [that] are binding and constitutionally protected’ [ante, p. 538]. Its ‘full cost-of-living provision’ would require our State to pay all judges ‘the represented compensation [including full cost-of-living increases] for their terms of office’; that is, for some judges until 1982—more than 12 years from now [id.]. Further, regardless of the salaries that, in future years, laws will set for all other state officers and employees, the Legislature may never impair the contracts with judges that this bill would adopt unless there is some ‘“emergency” serving to protect “a basic interest of society”’ [ante, p. 539].”
In brief summary, I dissent here because I am persuaded that no evidence whatever suggests that the California Legislature ever intended (1) to promise judges anything, (2) to adopt any formally recognized “agreements of employment” [ante at p. 538], or (3) to preclude modification by statute of cost-of-living adjustments that demonstrably were experimental and tentative.
If this court’s 1980 views had been forecast by anyone, if slide-rule projections of the now grotesquely swollen and embarrassingly out-of-line salaries—cultured anachronically in the medium of the Consumer Price Index plan—had been reported, if the pay scales that now have won the majority’s blessing had earlier been arrayed in full Winchester Mystery House splendor,* I think it is inconceivable that the legislators would have enacted and left unchanged the pending proposals—in 1969, for unrestricted use of the Consumer Price Index and, in 1972, for rigidifying by Assembly Constitutional Amendment not only the salaries of elected state officers but also (as hindsight now seems to counsel) the unique salary-adjustment-formula for incumbent judges.
*550Finally, as will be explained, I think my colleagues have failed to answer several arguments ably set forth in the Court of Appeal opinion in this case (by Fleming, J., with Roth, P. J., and Beach, J., concurring).
I. Contractual and vested rights
Does the 1976 amendment to Government Code section 68203 impair contractual or vested rights? If so, prior to the amendment exactly what contractual rights did the section vest in the judges who took office before January 1, 1977?
The section then read, “[Ojn the effective date of the 1969 amendments to this section and on September 1 of each year thereafter the salary of each justice and judge. . .shall be increased by that amount which is produced by multiplying [etc.].” (Italics added.) The justices and judges referred to were those “named in Sections 68200 to 68202.” The names appearing in those sections were “the Chief Justice... and each Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,” the “[presiding justice or associate justice of a court of appeal division,” each “[j]udge of the superior court,” and each “[j]udge of a municipal court.” Did the Legislature mean the incumbents only? Obviously not. Those who took office after the original enactment and after amendment were included too.
However, with regard to each individual justice and judge did the Legislature express or imply any intent as to “term of office”? I think not. The statute nowhere mentions anybody’s term. Instead it specifies “each year thereafter.” Until when? I submit that “each year thereafter” meant each year until the statute was amended or repealed, with no extra years to be set by terms of office.
Public officers and employees may, of course, enter into salary and wage agreements with the state; and by statute the Legislature may articulate the terms of the agreements. But section 68203 is not that kind of statute. The majority of the legislators never would have approved the law, I believe, had they been advised that its words created a contractual right to cost-of-living increases that would survive amendment or repeal. There was no contract because there was no offer or acceptance. “[E]ach year thereafter” was designed as a legislative, not a contractual, phrase.
Salary and wage contracts that bind employers, including public employers, typically contain definite dates. Is it not startling for the *551majority here to rule that a statute referring only to “each year thereafter [indefinitely]” nonetheless creates a binding contract to pay certain salaries during particular terms of office? I believe there was no binding contract, and thus I identify no rights that could have been impaired.
Indeed, it was the absence from salary statutes of vested rights to compensation for services not yet rendered that necessitated the constitutional prohibition of reductions in elected officers’ salaries during their terms of office (art. Ill, § 4). It is neither necessary nor fitting for this court to add to that constitutional protection a judicially contrived right, purportedly contractual, that is not enjoyed by the thousands of other public officers and employees who serve indefinite tenures.
As to (1) pensioners, and (2) the judges who took office on or after January 1, 1977, I am persuaded by these excerpts from Justice Fleming’s opinion: “[T]he rights of judicial pensioners are directly tied to those of sitting judges and take the form of a floating pension proportionate to the comparable current judicial salary. We have heretofore concluded that, absent any reduction in the dollar amount of the pension, judicial pensioners’ rights are dependent upon sitting judges’ rights to salary, and, if a prospective increase in salary for sitting judges does not materialize, the pensioners have no independent grounds for complaint. Any contractual rights for future increases in judicial salary and any vested or accrued rights to future increases in judicial salary are not the rights of the pensioners. Consequently, any impairment or infringement of such rights only indirectly and secondarily affects judicial pensioners and gives them no separate cause to complain. (Cf. Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 64, 73 [82 P. 674].) The pensioner floats in water whose origin is the current judicial office, and like water his rights cannot rise above their source.
“Newly-elected Judges. Nor do newly-elected or newly-appointed judges have cause to complain of prior legislative change in the future salary of the office to which the judge has been elected or appointed. Such judges did not serve under the old dispensation and could have no legitimate expectation of the continuance of cost-of-living increases in salary under the old law, in that the law had already been changed prior to their assumption of office.”
*552II. The constitutional mandate
The next question is whether the 1976 amendment to section 68203 conflicts with the constitutional prohibition of reductions in salaries; The question is difficult. I believe that it is answered correctly in Justice Fleming’s opinion as follows: “Before discussing this constitutional issue we first note the general considerations that lead to constitutional prohibitions against reductions in the salaries of judicial officers during their term of office. The key objective is to create and maintain an independent judiciary, and the key factors thought to bring this about are security of tenure and security of subsistence. Both factors appear in the federal Constitution, which declares that judges shall hold office during good behavior and receive a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (U.S. Const., art. Ill, § 1.) As observed by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245, 252 [64 L.Ed. 887, 892, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519], in turn quoting Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 79, ‘[a] power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.’ That court further noted the constitutional premise that protection of a judge’s subsistence is not so much for the benefit of the judge as it is for the public interest in the preservation of an independent judiciary. (Evans v. Gore, supra, at pp. 248-254 [64 L.Ed. at pp. 890-893].)
“These basic constitutional premises find expression in the California Constitution, which gives judges the protection of relatively-long fixed terms (appellate judges, 12 years; trial judges, 6 years (art. VI, § 16)) and which prevents reductions in judges’ salaries during their term of office (art. Ill, § 4).
“Factually, reductions in judicial salary may come about in four different ways:
“(1) Reduction in dollar amounts of judicial salaries.
“(2) Increased specific deductions against judicial salaries.
“(3) Increased general deductions against all salaries.
“(4) Reduction in purchasing power of all salaries.
“Clearly, if the Legislature had undertaken to reduce the dollar amounts payable as salaries to judges (item 1), or had undertaken to *553deduct increased amounts from judicial salaries for pension contributions or the like and thereby brought about an absolute reduction in judges’ salaries (item 2), the constitutional prohibition against reduction in salary during a judge’s term of office would come into play. (Cf. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438, 451 [326 P.2d 484].) Neither of these events has occurred. Nor has any complaint been made of reduction in judicial salaries as a consequence of a general tax imposed on all salaries (item 3), which was the issue in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245 [64 L.Ed. 887, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519], the case which exempted the salaries of federal judges from the then newly-imposed general income tax. The reduction complained of here is related to the loss in purchasing power for all salaries (item 4). Plaintiffs do not directly complain of loss of purchasing power in judges’ salaries as a result of inflation and the depreciating value of the dollar, the issue unsuccessfully raised in Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, cert, denied (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718], but they present the point in indirect form by arguing that removal during an inflationary period of statutory protection against increases in the cost-of-living constitutes a reduction in salary contrary to article III, section 4 of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs argue that sitting judges during 1969 to 1976 had a legal expectation of annual increases in salary commensurate with increases in the cost-of-living as shown by the California consumer price index, a legal expectation that constituted a valuable part of their compensation, and that any diminution in the amount of such increases during their term of office effected an unconstitutional reduction in salary. Plaintiffs conclude that article III, section 4, which forbids reduction in salary during a judge’s term of office, likewise forbids modification of future salary increases called for under an automatic cost-of-living formula.
“Of equal general importance to this cause is another provision of the California Constitution, article VI, section 19, which authorizes the Legislature to prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record. That provision confers on the Legislature ‘the fullest measure of control, direction, ordination, and dictation over the matter of the amount and payment of judicial salaries. . . .’ (Sevier v. Riley (1926) 198 Cal. 170, 175 [244 P. 323].) Absent some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the salaries of all public employees, including judges, may be modified by legislative action. No officer or employee of the State of California has an immutable vested right to any specific salary. (Butterworth v. Boyd (1938) 12 Cal.2d 140, 150 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838]; Miller v. Kister (1885) 68 Cal. 142, 144 [8 P. 813]; *554cf. Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 813 [135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970].)
“Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the 1976 amendment to section 68203 asserts that article III, section 4, which prohibits any reduction in the salaries of elected state officers during their term of office, not only qualifies the Legislature’s plenary power to adjust current judicial salaries but prohibits legislative adjustment during a judge’s term of office in the cost-of-living formula established in 1969 by section 68203. In opposition, defendant argues that the legislative attempts in 1964 and 1969 to solve the perennial controversy over judicial salaries by adopting a cost-of-living formula to determine future judicial salaries, did not bind the Legislature to maintain indefinitely any particular cost-of-living formula for future judicial salaries. The constitutional issue posed is whether the 1976 modification of prospective cost-of-living increases in salary constituted a reduction in salaries as that term is used in the Constitution.
“A. The History of Article III, Section 4, Does Not Support Plaintiffs’ Interpretation of Its Meaning.
“Plaintiffs assert that article III, section 4, was expressly intended by the Legislature to prohibit revision of the prospective cost-of-living adjustments contained in section 68203. In support of their assertion plaintiffs submitted to the superior court materials which related to the background of the enactment of article III, section 4.
“From these materials it appears that in 1971 the then Governor attempted to prevent the 1970 cost-of-living increase for judges from coming into effect by a line-item veto of a budget appropriation which covered the increase in judicial salaries. The Attorney General gave an opinion to the Controller which concluded that ‘Section 68203 does not, of itself, appropriate funds necessary to support the increase required by Section 68203. . .,’ that although judicial salaries remained payable at the new and higher rate, they could not be paid except to the extent funds for the payment of judicial salaries had been appropriated. Thus, if the Governor were to adhere to his position, judicial salaries would be paid at the increased rates, but the funds appropriated to pay such salaries would become exhausted before the close of the fiscal year. On an annualized basis the veto would become effective to prevent full compliance with section 68203. Push did not come to shove, however, and the potential future fiscal crisis was averted when the Governor withdrew *555his line-item veto. Thereafter, the chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission personally drafted an amendment to the constitutional revision then under consideration in the Legislature, an amendment which added the second sentence to what is now section 4 of article III. ‘Salaries of elected state officers may not be reduced during their term of office. Laws that set these salaries are appropriations' (Italics ours.) This additional sentence remained in the final legislative version of the Constitution adopted by the electorate in November 1972.
“From this incident plaintiffs argue that the proponents of article III, section 4, expressly intended to prevent modification of prospective salary adjustments under section 68203—that is, to forbid future legislative modification of the automatic cost-of-living formula then contained in that section, even for future years and for future salary levels. This speculation seems wide of the mark. Plainly the proponents and draft-men of article III, section 4, meant to prevent a repetition of the line-item veto incident, a goal achieved by the second sentence of article III, section 4, which converts a salary law such as section 68203 into an appropriation and renders unnecessary a separate budget appropriation which a governor could veto. But it is one thing to view article III, section 4, as protective of salary increases that have become due and payable, and another to argue, as do plaintiffs, that it also prevents modification of all prospective salary adjustments. We find nothing in the legislative history of article III, section 4, and nothing in the 1971 veto incident to support that argument.
“Nor can plaintiffs derive support for their interpretation of article III, section 4, from the ballot arguments presented to the voters at the time of the adoption of the constitutional revision in November 1972. The arguments in the ballot pamphlet submitted to the voters were not only devoid of any disclosure of intent and purpose to prevent modification of prospective judicial salary adjustments, but to the contrary they suggested the absence of any such purpose. Insofar as they related to article III, section 4, the ballot arguments stated:
“‘A provision would be added to prohibit any reduction in the salaries of elected state officers during their term of office and to provide that laws setting those salaries are appropriations. This would eliminate the existing requirement that there be a specific appropriation enacted in the Budget Act, or otherwise, to pay salaries.'1
*556“‘The various revisions and deletions of existing language in the State Constitution proposed by this amendment will not result in any cost or revenue changes.'2
“‘Proposition 6 also protects elected State officers in all three branches of government by providing that their salaries can’t be reduced during the term for which they were elected and makes salary statutes appropriations. This will not increase the cost of government or cost the taxpayers more, but will strengthen the independence of all three branches of government.’3 (Italics added.) No reference was made to section 68203 or, indeed, to any aspect of the cost-of-living adjustment issue, other than the general statements that adoption of article III, section 4, ‘will not increase the cost of government or cost the taxpayers more’ and ‘will not result in any cost or revenue changes.’
“In short, the history of article III, section 4, indicates it was directed against a perceived evil—attempts by veto of appropriations to prevent payment of increased judicial salaries after cost-of-living adjustments had gone into effect and become due and payable. The materials before the court suggest that those who drafted article III, section 4, those who voted to put it on the ballot, and those who voted in its favor, never considered or intended that adoption of article III, section 4, would freeze into the constitutional landscape the statutory experiment in judicial cost-of-living salary adjustments set out in section 68203.
“B. Prospective Cost-of-Living Increases Are Not Salaries Within the Meaning of Article III, Section 4.
“Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 1976 amendment to section 68203 raises the question whether prospective cost-of-living increases—that is, increases which have not yet gone into effect—are salaries within the meaning of article III, section 4 of the Constitution. Two settled principles of constitutional law are relevant. The first is the presumption of constitutionality to which all legislation is entitled. (See, e.g., California *557Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594 [131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193].) The second is the canon that ‘where the Legislature has by statute adopted a reasonable construction of a constitutional provision its action has strong persuasive force and will ordinarily be followed.’ (Woodcock v. Dick (1950) 36 Cal.2d 146, 148 [222 P.2d 667]; see also Lundberg v. County of Alameda (1956) 46 Cal.2d 644, 652 [298 P.2d 1]; San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1920) 183 Cal. 273, 279 [191 P.26].) At bench, the Legislature’s implicit construction in 1976 that the word salary in article III, section 4, does not include prospective cost-of-living increases, was reasonably contemporaneous with its approval of article III, section 4, in 1972.
“Section 68203, as it existed when article III, section 4, was drafted and adopted, provided that on September 1 of each year ‘the salary of each justice or judge shall be increased’ by an amount determined by multiplying the ‘then current salary’ by the percentage increase in the California consumer price index. The use of the future tense ‘shall’ and the reference to ‘then current salary’ indicate that the Legislature did not view a prospective cost-of-living increase as part of a judge’s salary until that increase became due and was added to ‘then current salary’ to become the salary payable for the next 12 months. Likewise, salary is defined in the Judges’ Retirement Law (Gov. Code, § 75003) as ‘the compensation received by a judge as the emolument of the office of judge’ (italics added). This definition obviously does not embrace compensation payable in the future after cost-of-living adjustments have been made; clearly, under section 75003 a judge’s salary is the compensation he is currently being paid.
“In Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 69 [82 P. 674], the California Supreme Court, in a somewhat related context, refused to treat a prospective salary increase as included within the term salary. That case involved a constitutional provision entitling justices of District Courts of Appeal to the same salaries as justices of the Supreme Court. In 1905 the Legislature raised the annual salaries of Supreme Court justices from $6,000 to $8,000. However, due to the then constitutional prohibition against increases in the salaries of judges during their term of office, no Supreme Court justice was eligible to claim the higher salary until 1907, when two justices would begin to serve new terms. *558Plaintiff, a justice of a District Court of Appeal, claimed that because he had been appointed after the effective date of the 1905 increase, he was entitled to the higher salary under the constitutional provision making the salaries of District Court of Appeal justices the same as those of Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court rejected this claim stating: 'What, then, are the salaries of the justices of the supreme court to which those of the district court justices must for the present conform? Clearly not the salaries which may hereafter be payable under the amended statute when a new term of some of the justices of the supreme court shall have begun, but the present salaries now allowed and paid by them by law.’ (Harrison v. Colgan (1905) 148 Cal. 69, at p. 72; italics added.) In other words, even though Supreme Court justices might have a future right to an increase in compensation, until the increase became effective it could not be considered salary within the meaning of the provision entitling District Court of Appeal justices to the same salary as Supreme Court justices. The salary of a Supreme Court justice was what he was then being paid. So here. The salary of an elected state officer is the amount he is presently being paid. For example, if in January 1976 the Legislature in its wisdom had passed a law making the salary of a Court of Appeal justice for the calendar year 1977 the same as that of a Supreme Court justice, and had then repealed the law in February 1976, thus returning future Court of Appeal salaries to their original amounts, under the reasoning of Harrison the prospective increase which never materialized could not be considered salary, and no reduction in salary would have occurred by reason of the repeal. Although former section 68203 provided that judges would receive annual cost-of-living increases, those future increases did not become salary within the meaning of article III, section 4, until they had become payable as current salary.
“To conclude the point, salary is present pay, not future pay.
“C. Elimination of a Prospective Increase in Salary Is Not a Reduction in Salary.
“Although no California court has decided the precise issue, three New Jersey cases have rejected the argument that elimination of a prospective increase in salary constitutes a reduction in salary. (Greenway v. Board of Education (1943) 129 N.J.L. 461 [29 A.2d 890, 145 A.L.R. 404]; Offhouse v. State Board of Education (1944) 131 N.J.L. 391 [36 A.2d 884]; Kopera v. Bd. of Ed. of Town of West Orange, *559Essex Co. (1960) 60 N.J.Super. 288 [158 A.2d 842, 846].) In Green-way, supra, a New Jersey statute prohibited local school boards from reducing teachers’ salaries. A local board’s existing teachers’ salary schedule, which provided future incremental salary increases for teachers, was repealed by the local board as an economy measure during the depression. A teacher contended that the repeal of the prospective increase by the local board constituted an impermissible reduction in salary contrary to the state statute. The New Jersey court disagreed, holding that increments do not become part of a teacher’s salary until they accrue, and that until accrual their modification does not constitute a reduction in salary. (29 A.2d at p. 891.) In Offhouse, supra, the court made the same point: ‘Only accrued increments under a valid and subsisting regulation of the local board are beyond repeal. Unaccrued increments do not take the classification of ‘salary’ within the intendment of [the statute].’ (36 A.2d at p. 887.) And in Ropera, supra, the court said: ‘The failure to receive an increase of salary does not constitute a reduction.’ (158 A.2d at p. 846.)
“Plaintiffs seek to distinguish these cases on the ground that they deal with a mere statutory prohibition against salary reductions and not with a constitutional prohibition. Such a suggestion misconceives the issue. The New Jersey statute, like the constitutional provision at issue here, prohibited salary reductions; the issue there, as here, was whether repeal by a subordinate body of prospective increases it had previously authorized constituted a reduction in salary within the meaning of the statutory prohibition. The New Jersey courts held it did not, stating: ‘Until the accrual, the modification or repeal of the rule providing for increments does not constitute a reduction of salary within the intendment of [the statute], A regulation providing for increments is a mere declaration of legislative policy that is at all times subject to abrogation by the local board in the public interest.’ (Offhouse v. State Board of Education, supra, 36 A.2d at p. 887.) The New Jersey cases thus furnish valuable precedent for resolution of the issue at bench.
“Apart from precedent, however, other fundamental considerations must be taken into account. The Constitution gives the Legislature ultimate responsibility for fixing judicial salaries (art. VI, § 19) nd for fixing other governmental salaries as well. In 1964 the Legislature first experimented with a system for automatically adjusting judicial salaries to the cost-of-living. By 1976, however, that experiment, viewed from the legislative perspective of state salaries as a whole, had produced an *560imbalance as a result of a salary structure which provided full cost-of-living adjustments for only one group of officers of only one branch of government. Obviously, the Legislature might have responded to imbalance by raising all state salaries to meet the pressures of inflation. For reasons of political economy it chose not to do so. Such concerns are the responsibility of the legislative branch, whose task in salary setting is difficult, delicate, and troublesome. The complexity of its task counsels judicial caution in construing article III, section 4 of the Constitution so broadly that any experiment with a new mechanism for determining future salary increases becomes cast in constitutional stone....
“Plaintiffs’ interpretation of article III, section 4, if accepted, would seriously cripple the power of the Legislature to take effective action in an important and sensitive area of its concern—its fixing of judicial salaries pursuant to article VI, section 19, of the Constitution. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation the Legislature would become a kind of sorcerer’s apprentice—able to turn on the money spigot but never able to shut it off. It is one thing to insist, as the Constitution does, that a present salary, once established, may not be reduced during a judge’s term of office; it is another to argue that a legislative experiment to find a better mechanism for setting judicial salaries has been transmuted into an irreversible economic grant. Our constitutional tradition, exemplified by such decisions as Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, cert, denied (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718], entrusts to the Legislature broad authority and responsibility over increases in judicial salaries. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 19.) We reject plaintiffs’ argument that article III, section 4 of the California Constitution precludes adjustment of future salary increases throughout a judge’s term of office.”
III. Disqualification of judges
Questions as to who should have adjudged this lawsuit were notably more troubling than Justice Clark’s brief discussion of the Rule of Necessity implies {ante, p. 537).
On January 16, 1978, counsel for plaintiffs (Messrs. Levit and Chernick) and defendant (Mr. Falk) stipulated as follows: “The parties waive their right to make any motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 as to judges Harry L. Hupp and Ernest J. Zack if *561this action is assigned to either of such judges but reserve their right to make any motion permitted by law if the case is assigned to any other judge.. . . ”
That reference to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 was significant. It is the section that governs the imperative challenge of a trial judge. Its potential impact was documented in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148]; cf. Martini, Legislators Urged to End Affidavit of Trial Judges, The Los Angeles Daily Journal (Dec. 12, 1979) page 1; letter from Maynard Craig, id., (Jan. 10, 1980) page 4. Since January 16, 1978 (the date the stipulation was filed), imperative challenges seem not to have been an issue in this case.
On November 22, 1978, Messrs. Levit and Chernick filed plaintiffs’ brief in the Court of Appeal. They stated: “Respondents offered to stipulate that the case be assigned to a judge pro tern (for example, a retired federal judge, a law school dean or professor, or the like) so that no judge who was affected by the litigation would be required to decide the matter. (C.T. 17-18.) Appellant declined such offer, but in any event (as Appellant concedes (C.T. 303)), under the Rule of Necessity, no California judge is disqualified from hearing this case. That rule has been uniformly recognized to operate to permit and require judges to determine causes in which all judges are financially interested in order to preserve access to the courts. In other words, if all judges are disqualified, none are.” (Italics added.)
Notwithstanding counsel’s contention that “it is not susceptible to doubt that...[the Court of Appeal, 2d District] is qualified, authorized, and required to decide the instant case,”1 Justices Lillie, Thompson, and Hanson on March 13, 1979, requested “that Division One be relieved of any and all further action in the within appeal.” (See their letter appended here as Annex A.) On March 20, an order signed by Acting Chief Justice Tobriner transferred the cause from Division One of the Court of Appeal to Division Two.
*562The Lillie-Thompson-Hanson letter (Annex A) is noteworthy because for the first time in this case, apparently, Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision 1 was mentioned. It appears to disqualify a justice or judge from sitting in any action when she or he is “a party” or is “interested.” (Because so many lawyers and judges recently seem to have discussed section 170 without evident awareness of its exact words, I append it here as Annex B.) Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to the “rule of necessity” in the code section, Justices Lillie, Thompson, and Hanson observed that it “... no doubt would permit us to sit and act on this appeal”.
On June 11, 1979, the opinion of Division Two of the Court of Appeal (Justices Fleming, Roth, and Beach) was issued; and matters pertinent to disqualification were disposed of as follows: “Members of this court may adjudicate the cause even though each is financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. Ordinarily, a justice may not pass judgment on any cause in which he has a personal interest, but when all justices in the state are, or may be, financially interested in the outcome, any of them may sit. (Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245 [64 L.Ed. 887, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519]; Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, 1035-1040, cert. den. (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718]; Caminetti v. Pac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 344, 366 [139 P.2d 908]; Brenkwitz v. City of Santa Cruz (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 812, 818 [77 Cal.Rptr. 705]; Bar-kin v. Board of Optometry (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720 [75 Cal.Rptr. 337]; Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 400, 404-405 [71 Cal.Rptr. 255].) In such instances... disqualification of all judges disqualifies none. The application of this rule has been discussed at length in Atkins v. United States, supra, a class action on behalf of all federal judges to recover additional compensation for their services as judges, and the exhaustive discussion of the issue in Atkins (pp. 1035 to 1040) makes further discussion here unnecessary. Under the rule of necessity this court, to which the cause was transferred by the California Supreme Court, is both qualified and obligated to decide the cause [italics added].”
*563Plaintiffs’ counsel then wrote the letter of July 20, 1979, to Chief Justice Bird and Justice Tobriner, that is appended here as Annex C. The next-to-last paragraph reads, “It is respectfully submitted that the above circumstances [see paragraphs 3 to 6 of the letter] suggest the appearance of possible bias and prejudice on the part of the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner with respect to the basic issues involved in this case, and that they therefore should disqualify themselves.”
Annex C first discusses Annex D here, which the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner wrote on June 16, 1978, as Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Annex C then recites that “Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Esq., the principal attorney for the defendant and appellant herein, is acting as co-counsel for the Chief Justice in a matter now pending before the Commission on Judicial Performance.” That “matter,” of course, was the 1979 partly public, partly private investigation of all seven Supreme Court justices.
In three letters dated September 24 and 26, 1979 (Annexes E, F, and G here), plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that Acting Chief Justice Manuel and Acting Justices Brown and Racanelli withdraw from the case.2 Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner, they did not recuse and, instead, participated in oral argument and in the calendar conference and have signed the majority opinion.
*564In sum, no trial judges but five appellate judges recused themselves in this case—three of them even though there was no challenge. Three others refused to recuse after challenge. An unfortunately unanswered question is whether the justices who did recuse did so for reasons regarding impartiality that in fact seem more compelling than every judge’s conceded interest concerning the amount of her or his monthly salary.
By participating in this case the seven justices here have respected the rule of necessity. Yet the majority opinion cites only Atkins, supra, 556 F.2d 1028. The most informative discussion I know of the perplexities and scope of the rule appears in section 12.04 of Professor Davis’ Administrative Law Treatise (plus his supplements) (hereafter Davis Treatise). His conclusions are etched by these introductory comments in section 12.03, which deals with “Interest”; “One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either way is disqualified by reason of interest to participate in the exercise of judicial functions. Most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to judges and to administrative adjudicators. [Fn. omitted.] The overshadowing and almost overwhelming fact about the law of disqualification for interest is that, as we shall see in the ensuing section, most of that law is largely defeated by the rule of necessity.” (Italics added.)3
Is it possible that my colleagues overlooked or ignored a corollary to the rule of necessity that might well have had a significant impact? That corollary is that judges who but for the rule would have been disqualified should exemplify a bend-over-backwards stance; that is to say, they should approach the proffered legal issues with both marked and exceptional care. (See the Davis Treatise at p. 166: “Whatever the principles . . . for ordinary cases, the extraordinary cases which impel courts to resort to the rule of necessity may often deserve extraordinary scrutiny....” See also pp. 358-359 of Davis, Administrative Law: Cases—Text—Problems (6th ed. 1977): “The easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is recognized in typical judicial opinions, for grave injustice may result from allowing disqualified officers to adjudicate cases. . . .[An] escape *565route. . .is. . .to review both more broadly and more intensively when the rule of necessity is invoked than when no bias gives rise to use of the rule of necessity.”) Is it perhaps regrettable that the words of the majority opinion disclose no honoring of that approach here?
A. For what reasons should judges be disqualified?
In California the law governing disqualification includes (1) Code of Civil Procedure sections 170 (Annex B here) and 170a to 170.8, plus a few unrelated statutes (e.g., Prob. Code, § 703; Gov. Code, §§ 11512, subd. (c) and 87101); (2) certain clauses in the state and federal Constitutions; (3) certain canons of judicial conduct and comparable rules; and (4) countless written opinions of courts and other adjudicative bodies. (A brief bibliography is appended here as Annex O; see too Annex K.)
Interestingly, counsel in Annexes C, E, F, and G do not stress that law. It is surprising that, in so many California cases where disqualification issues have arisen, lawyers and judges have proceeded to argue and decide the issues without appropriate search and citation. Disqualification law is perhaps less complex than tax law, say, or corporate securities law; but by no means is it accurately portrayed in judges’ and law professors’ folklore, news commentators’ assumptions, or lawyers’ untutored assertions. “Bias,” “prejudice,” “fair and impartial,” “interest,” and related words are like so many words in our state’s laws. For enlightenment, legal research is essential. The chances are that reliable guidance only rarely will be found in newspaper and TV editorials, speeches at bar meetings, and common catechisms.
B. Should a judge continue to sit even when she or he would like to withdraw from a case?
The oath of office requires that each judge “well and faithfully discharge the duties” of judging. That means, I believe, that none of us should recuse herself or himself merely because a litigant so requests. Nor should a judge recuse merely because she or he thinks there is too much other work to do, or wants to get off the hot seat, or is fearful that participation and relevant rulings might inspire criticism, ridicule, or political attack.
Prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 (the procedure for imperative challenges of a trial judge), this court de*566dared: “Under the Constitution of this state a superior judge has certain powers and duties to perform. Upon assuming his office he takes and subscribes to an oath that he will support the state and federal Constitutions and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of his office as a judge of the superior court to the best of his ability.... One of those duties is to hear and determine causes presented to him unless in a particular cause he is disqualified or unable to act. He may not evade or avoid that duty. In proceedings too numerous to need citation of authority a superior judge has been required to discharge that duty when no good cause appeared to justify a refusal to act.” Austin v. Lambert (1938) 11 Cal.2d 73, 75 [77 P.2d 849, 115 A.L.R. 849] (italics added).
Those words, I submit, still govern every appellate judge and, absent a proper imperative challenge, every trial judge. (See also Swan v. Talbot (1907) 152 Cal. 143, 144 [94 P. 238].)
Also pertinent are these widely known comments of Justice Rehnquist in 1972: “Every litigant is entitled to have his case heard by a judge mindful of [the federal] oath. But neither the oath, the disqualification statute, nor the practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantees a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with his understanding of the Constitution and the law. . . . ” (409 U.S. at p. 838 [34 L.Ed.2d at p. 61].) Further, “. . .1 conclude that the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualification in this case. Having so said, I would certainly concede that fair-minded judges might disagree about the matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of disqualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself simply because I do regard the question as a fairly debatable one, even though upon analysis I would resolve it in favor of sitting. [II] Here again, one’s course of action may well depend upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification. Those Federal Courts Of Appeals That Have Considered The Matter Have Unanimously Concluded That A Federal Judge Has A Duty To Sit Where Not Disqualified Which Is Equally As Strong As The Duty To Not Sit Where Disqualified.” (409 U.S. at p. 836 [34 L.Ed.2d at p. 60]; italics his, capitals mine; see Note, Justice Rehnquist’s Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum (1973) 73 Colum.L.Rev. 106; cf. Aryeh Neier’s review of The Brethren in The Nation (Feb. 2, 1980) pp. 118, 120: “At the time Douglas recused himself, my view was that he wanted to avoid casting the deciding vote upholding flag desecration while the effort to impeach *567him was still smoldering. A controversy over the flag could have ignited it again. I would have been happy to find another view in The Brethren instead of misinformation that could have been easily avoided.”4)
Concluding Remarks
Part III of this opinion reflects a hope that further discussion of recusal and disqualification may be nurtured. My intent is to imply no criticism of any judge. Like Justice Rehnquist (quoted above), I note that, “fair-minded judges might disagree.” Yet I believe strongly that the troubling issues should be aired and that precedential rulings should not be entombed in unpublished orders and other papers available only in court clerks’ offices.
I have not yet discussed procedures for disqualification. The rules are complex. Not enough is known about them or their history in California, especially as to appellate judges. Appropriate analysis requires the untangling of a morass of precedents and practices that unjustifiably would lengthen my comments here. (See the brief discussion of Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6 at the beginning of my Part III, above; cf. the 2d par. (et seq.) of subd. 5 of § 170 (Annex B here), which governs trial judges only.)
New law on the role of substitute courts and the rule of necessity that could have great procedural impacts was indorsed in Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 482 [159 Cal.Rptr. 494, 601 P.2d 1030] (“where... all the Supreme Court justices were ultimately disqualified, the Chief Justice is empowered to make the assignment [of pro tern justices] under the rule of necessity”). (Cf. Kleps, Disqualifications, *568Substitute Courts and Assigned Judges, L. A. Daily Journal (Oct. 3, 1979); and see the last paragraph of Annex P here; also Annex Q.5)
For full awareness of the innumerable rules that do affect the well and faithful discharge of judges’ duties, not only our consciences but *569also both substantive and procedural requirements will have to be searched and researched with much care. Temptations to recuse and formal motions for disqualification are likely to multiply because (1) more and more lawyers may decide to exploit challenges as newly honed weapons of advocacy, and (2) challenges inevitably will be part of the now-recognized and disturbing politicization of many judicial concerns. (Cf. fn. 3, ante-, People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 545-546 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328].) California will benefit, I suggest, if its judges respond to those problems as they do to the many other problems involving law that often confound us sorely but impede us not.
The petition of appellant Cory for a rehearing was denied May 30, 1980. Bird, C. J., and Tobriner, J., did not participate therein. Brown (G. A.), J.,* and Racanelli, J.,* participated therein. Newman, J., and Racanelli, J.,* were of the view that the petition should be granted and then rendered the following separate opinions dissenting to the denial of rehearing.
NEWMAN, J.Dissenting. On May 30, 1980, five justices concluded (1) that in this case there should be no rehearing, and (2) that nonetheless their “opinion” must be modified. I set forth here (in Part I) the reasons for my belief that a rehearing is needed and also (in Part II) the modifications of my earlier opinion that, because of the majority’s modifications and because of facts and arguments that seem to me to appear only in the rehearing documents, I now regard as essential. I dissent:
Part I. Why is a rehearing needed?
The California Constitution in article VI, section 14 distinguishes between “opinions of the Supreme Court” and “[decisions of the Supreme Court.” As to opinions, the only express commands in the Constitution are (1) that the Legislature provide for prompt publication of those the court deems should be published, and (2) that the opinions so selected be available for publication by any person.
The command that affects decisions is notably more comprehensive. Whenever decisions “determine causes [they] shall be in writing with reasons stated.” There are no exceptions. Yet what has happened in this *570case, apparently, is that the majority while purporting to modify their opinion have in fact modified their decision. Have they stated any reasons? The answer is No. Therefore it seems that they have acted unconstitutionally. (See too Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(a): “. . . Where an opinion is modified without change in the judgment. . . such modification shall not postpone the time that the decision becomes final. ..; but if the judgment is modified. .. the period specified herein begins to run anew, as of the date of the modification.”)
In what critical respects has the decision here been altered? The majority now decide first, that judges serving protected terms should not get a salary that “will continue after 1 January 1977 to increase in proportion to the CPI” (see the first sentence in fn. 9 of their original opinion, which is being deleted); and second, that a judicial pensioner must suffer correspondingly (i.e., the base for his or her benefit after the expiration of a protected term may not reflect a salary that has increased in proportion to the Consumer Price Index).
Also, certain judges and pensioners will be affected by the new holding that a protected term, even when it has not expired by running its course (“in the case of trial judges, no later than the first Monday in January 1981 and, in the case of appellate justices, no later than the first Monday in January 1987”), nonetheless will be deemed terminated “by death of the incumbent, by retirement, by election or removal to another office, or by other departure from office.” (See the majority’s new fn. 10. ) Inexplicably, that is so notwithstanding the phrase “a judge elected to an unexpired term serves the remainder of the term” that appears in article VI, section 16, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.1
*571No reasons have been put forth to justify those alterations. Thus the Constitution’s command that “[decisions. . .be in writing with reasons stated” has been disregarded.
Further, this court still does not know exactly who among the judges and pensioners may adversely be affected by the alterations. Yet many of them have not been heard, within the meaning of due process requirements, because they received no notice of any intent so to modify the initial decision. To accord the opportunity to be heard is a compelling reason why rehearing should be granted. We should not pretend that the majority’s modifications are inherently or demonstrably uncon testable.2
In addition we should not pretend that the briefs and other papers received here since March 27 merely restate arguments that were considered by the court prior to issuance of the initial opinions. On the contrary the new focus on practical complexities and inequities, which indeed are troubling, requires thorough reanalysis of the majority’s original assumptions and presumptions regarding legislative intent.3
*572Part II Modifications of the dissenting opinion
1. The last paragraph commencing on page 231 of 27 Cal.3d is deleted; and these two paragraphs are added on page 234, immediately following the first two lines:
By participating in this case the seven justices here have respected the rule of necessity. Yet the majority opinion cites only Atkins, supra, 556 F.2d 1028. The most informative discussion I know of the perplexities and scope of the rule appears in section 12.04 of Professor Davis’ Administrative Law Treatise (plus his supplements) (hereafter Davis Treatise). His conclusions are etched by these introductory comments in section 12.03, which deals with “Interest”: “One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either way is disqualified by reason of interest to participate in the exercise of judicial functions. Most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to judges and to administrative adjudicators. [Fn. omitted.] The overshadowing and almost overwhelming fact about the law of disqualification for interest is that, as we shall see in the ensuing section, most of that law is largely defeated by the rule of necessity.” (Italics added.)3
Is it possible that my colleagues overlooked or ignored a corollary to the rule of necessity that might well have had a significant impact? That corollary is that judges who but for the rule would have been disqualified should exemplify a bend-over-backwards stance; that is to say, they should approach the proffered legal issues with both marked and exceptional care. (See the Davis Treatise at p. 166: “Whatever the principles. . for ordinary cases, the extraordinary cases which impel courts *573to resort to the rule of necessity may often deserve extraordinary scrutiny....” See also pp. 358-359 of Davis, Administrative Law: Cases—Text—Problems (6th ed. 1977): “The easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is recognized in typical judicial opinions, for grave injustice may result from allowing disqualified officers to adjudicate cases. . ..[An] escape route... is... to review both more broadly and more intensively when the rule of necessity is invoked than when no bias gives rise to use of the rule of necessity.”) Is it perhaps regrettable that the words of the majority opinion disclose no honoring of that approach here?
2. Footnotes 2 and 3 are inverted, and “2” substituted for “3” on p. 233.
3. The paragraphs that follow are substituted for the paragraph that introduces the opinion beginning on page 219 of 27 Cal. 3d:
I dissent. One year ago, in another politically sensitive case, I quoted Learned Hand as follows (People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 538): “‘When we ask what Congress [or another legislature] “intended”, usually there can be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete occasion.’ (United States v. Klinger (2d Cir. 1952) 199 F.2d 645, 648.) The distinguished justice added, ‘He who supposes that he can be certain of the result, is the least fitted for the attempt.’”
How might this salary case have been decided if each of us on the court had projected himself conscientiously into the 1964, 1969, 1972, and 1976 positions of those legislators who “uttered the words” that are contained in the legislative measures pertinent here? In 1969, for instance, what if a legislator in debate (or the Legislative Counsel, in his summary) had stated, “Interested observers have noted that (1) for incumbent appellate judges, increases based on the Consumer Price Index will irrevocably be guaranteed until those judges’ terms expire, and (2) for some incumbents the terms will not expire until 1982”?
What if a legislative committee chairman had advised: “For each judge you are being asked to approve an ‘employment contract’ and to endorse his or her ‘promised compensation’ [ante at pp. 538, 539]. *574The bill as now drafted means you are about to adopt ‘agreements of employment. . [that] are binding and constitutionally protected’ [ante, p. 538], Its ‘full cost-of-living provision’ would require our State to pay all judges ‘the represented compensation [including full cost-of-living increases] for their terms of office’; that is, for some judges until 1982—more than 12 years from now [id.]. Further, regardless of the salaries that, in future years, laws will set for all other state officers and employees, the Legislature may never impair the contracts with judges that this bill would adopt unless there is some ‘“emergency” serving to protect “a basic interest of society”’ [ante, p. 539].”
In brief summary, I dissent here because I am persuaded that no evidence whatever suggests that the California Legislature ever intended (1) to promise judges anything, (2) to adopt any formally recognized “agreements of employment” [ante at p. 538], or (3) to preclude modification by statute of cost-of-living adjustments that demonstrably were experimental and tentative.
If this court’s 1980 views had been forecast by anyone, if slide-rule projections of the now grotesquely swollen and embarrassingly out-of-line salaries—-cultured anachronically in the medium of the Consumer Price Index plan—had been reported, if the pay scales that now have won the majority’s blessing had earlier been arrayed in full Winchester Mystery House splendor,* I think it is inconceivable that the legislators would have enacted and left unchanged the pending proposals—in 1969, for unrestricted use of the Consumer Price Index and, in 1972, for rigidifying by Assembly Constitutional Amendment not only the salaries of elected state officers but also (as hindsight now seems to counsel) the unique salary-adjustment-formula for incumbent judges.
Finally, as will be explained, I think my colleagues have failed to answer several arguments ably set forth in the Court of Appeal opinion in this case (by Fleming, J. with Roth, P. J. and Beach, J. concurring).
*575RACANELLI, J.*—Dissenting.
I join in the separate dissenting opinion Part I of Justice Newman. The failure to grant rehearing and to permit intervention by those petitioning classes of judges and pensioners treated unequally under our original decision works a manifest injustice to such discriminated classes who have been effectively foreclosed from independently asserting their respective interests. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (b).) Moreover, the sensitive institutional policy questions raised by that decision mandate rehearing in order that such unresolved issues may be fully considered and determined.
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See the letter of May 13, 1980, addressed to Acting Chief Justice Manuel by counsel for petitioners Kirkpatrick et al.: “[We] have just received a copy of the amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor.... [¶] The Governor agrees with petitioners’ basic position that this Court’s opinion creates unequal and unreasonable levels of compensation for judges on the same court and improperly establishes salary levels for some members of lower courts which are greater than the compensation paid to some members of higher courts. The Governor’s brief... argues that the Opinion has ‘created an administrative nightmare’ for both the Controller’s office and the Judges’ Retirement System based upon the ‘fortuitous dates the terms of office of their successors began and ended.’... [¶] We thoroughly agree with these comments....”
"Excerpt from the ballot pamphlet entitled, ‘Detailed Analysis by the Legislative Counsel.’
"Excerpt from the ballot pamphlet entitled, ‘Cost Analysis by the Legislative Analyst.’
"Excerpt from ‘Argument in Favor of Proposition 6,’ signed by Judge Bruce W. Sumner, Chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission, Senator Nicholas C. Petris, and Assemblyman Robert G. Beverly.
Footnote 3 of plaintiffs’ brief reads: “See e.g., Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245; Miles v. Graham (1925), 268 U.S. 501; O'Malley v. Woodrough (1939), 307 U.S. 277; Atkins v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1977), 556 F.2d 1028, 1035-1040, cert, denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 718. The same rule has been applied in California, and it is not susceptible to doubt that this court is qualified, authorized, and REQUIRED to decide the instant case [capitalization added], Cf. Brenkwitz v. City of Santa Cruz (1969), 272 Cal.App.2d 812, 77 Cal.Rptr. 705 (Rule of Necessity Applied to city council engaging in reassessment procedure); Barkin v. Board of Optometry (1969), 269 *562Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720, 75 Cal.Rptr. 337 (statutory application of rule); Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley (1968), 265 Cal.App.2d 400, 404-405, 71 Cal.Rptr. 255 (rule is well settled that where an administrative body has a duty to act upon a matter before it and is the only entity capable of acting in the matter, the fact that members may have personal interest in the result of the action taken does not disqualify them from performing their duty).”
ln cases that arguably were politically sensitive one law firm involved here has seemed uniquely alert as to the possibilities of removing justices. See, e.g., page 6 of the letter dated March 14, 1978 in State of South Dakota v. Brown (1978) 20 Cal.3d 765 [144 Cal.Rptr. 758, 576 P.2d 473] (“It would be appropriate for this Court in effect to withdraw from the case...”); also the footnote reading as follows on page 5 of the statement and declaration filed on May 14, 1979 in In re Governorship (1979) 26 Cal.3d 110 [160 Cal.Rptr. 760, 603 P.2d 1357]: “Neither Sections 170 and 170a nor the cases decided thereunder provide clear guidance as to whether the members of this Court appointed by Governor Brown. . .should be recused in a case involving that same Governor’s powers of appointment vis-a-vis those of a Lieutenant Governor who is from an opposing political party. It would seem clear that the public’s confidence in the process by which a decision is reached in this case, in the decision itself, and in the judiciary, could only be strengthened by withdrawal of those justices from the deliberations in this case....”
Cf. the Chief Justice’s remarks on August 11, 1978, at the Amador argument (appended here as Annex H). On December 28, 1979, erroneous news stories re Brown v. Curb reported that “Bird disqualified herself because she was appointed by Brown.” (See, e.g., the A. P. dispatch on p. 1 of the Contra Costa Times.) My understanding is that she recused herself because she chairs the Commission on Judicial Appointments and was therefore a party to the action. Note too Justice Tobriner’s reply to Judge Arabian regarding that case (Annex N here); also the comments on possible disqualification because of campaign contributions in The Robed Politician, 2 L. A. Law. (Mar. 1979) pages 10, 30.
Regarding the parameters of “interest,” the Davis conclusion is that “[a]n affidavit charging bias is properly ignored when it alleges ‘an impersonal prejudice’.” (Treatise at p. 146.) Further, “The case law is clear and consistent that an attitude about law or policy or facts is not ‘personal’ unless it involves animosity toward a party, as distinguished from issues, or favoritism toward an opposite party.” {Id.)
“[M]ust [judges] yield to every imagined charge of conflict of interest, regardless of the merits, so long as there is a member of the public who believes it? No. Surely there can be some objective content to any inquiry into whether the ‘appearance of justice’ has been compromised in a given case. The complaining party or the public must have a reasonable fear that judicial impartiality is in jeopardy. Courts can handle such an inquiry despite its subjective qualities, since they deal all the time with concepts of reasonableness—enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, for example, or basing civil liability on whether a driver or pedestrian behaved reasonably under the circumstances.” (Mackenzie, The Appearance of Justice (1974) p. 240.)
With regard to the disqualification of appellate judges by their colleagues, footnote 2 of the Mosk case opinion reports that, on motion by the Commission on Judicial Performance, “this court subsequently found and declared [on Sep. 19, 1979] that Justice Newman was disqualified from participating in this case.” (25 Cal.3d at p. 480.) There is no mention of the fact that on August 6, 1979, the same court, except for one member not yet appointed, at its first conference filed a formal and public order denying that commission’s motion to disqualify (Newman not participating). Annex J here is the September 19th disqualification order of the four justices who wrote neither an opinion nor an explanation. The unpublished dissenting opinions of Justices Miller and Hopper are appended as Annexes K and L. (Cf. Kleps, Should Judges Use Lawsuits To Raise Judicial Issues? L. A. Daily J. (Nov. 8, 1979) at p. 2.)
The views of my twelve colleagues (six Supreme Court and six Court of Appeal justices) regarding which Court of Appeal justices ought to be excluded from the 1979 substitute court might to astute observers appear perplexing. The first order declared that “replacement by lot [of the six Supreme Court justices who recused]” should not result in the assignment of “Justice Bertram D. Janes.. .and the four members of Division Two of District Two, all of whom are party litigants.” The second order, issued after Justice Jefferson’s withdrawal, ensured that his name would not again be selected. The third order, following Newman’s disqualification, also excluded “Justices.. .Alar-con and Thompson.” I do not know why they were named. Nor do 1 know why Justice Racanelli was not named since, though he had withdrawn from the Judicial Performance Commission’s Supreme Court inquiry, he still was a member of the commission and thus arguably a party litigant.
That not just Supreme Court but also Court of Appeal justices might someday be affected by commission proceedings opened to the public seems to have concerned no one. Nor did the 11 justices who prescribed the various “by lot” selections evidence any concern regarding certain Court of Appeal justices whose very strong views on public vs. private proceedings were known.
Is it worth mentioning that the four justices who finally disqualified Newman seemed unconcerned that their unprecedented order, accompanied by no opinion or explanation, might later affect even them personally, as potentially it might affect every Court of Appeal justice?
On August 6, 1979, Justice Jefferson stated: “I deny that I possess any interest, bias, prejudice, or other mental attitude which would preclude me from acting objectively, fairly and impartially in the above entitled matter. Nevertheless, I have no desire or wish to sit on this case in which a party thereto has expressed a belief that I will not be able to objectively, fairly and impartially determine the issues involved. Consequently, I am herewith withdrawing as one of the justices selected to sit in this matter....” He may have had good reasons; but I believe that a litigant’s mere expression of a belief does not itself justify the recusal of an appellate judge, ever. (Cf. the Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp letter of Aug. 2, 1979, attached here as Annex M.)
Uniquely intriguing are the statements of recusal filed by at least 11 Court of Appeal justices in McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1977) 19 Cal.3d Spec.Trib.Supp. 1 [138 Cal.Rptr. 459, 564 P.2d. 1 ]. The Supreme Court apparently decided against recusal in McComb v. Superior Court (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 89, 99 [137 Cal.Rptr. 233] (“application for a hearing.. .denied”).
Assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
What docs the majority mean, 1 wonder, by these words: “If salary benefits are diminished. . .during the unexpired term of a predecessor judge (see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16; Gov. Code, §§ 71145, 71180), the judge is nevertheless entitled to the contracted-for benefits during the remainder of such term” {ante, at p. 539)?
Note too the majority's deletion of “for the office” from the last two paragraphs of the opinion (26 Cal.3d at pp. 686-687: “judicial pensioners whose benefits are based on. . .the salary for the office of such a judge”).
By no means does that deletion resolve uncertainties created by the phrase “salary of the judge or justice occupying that office” that completes the introductory sentence of the majority’s new CONCLUSION. For instance, what if nobody occupies the office?
Also puzzling are the words “incumbent,” used at least three times in the majority opinion, and “particular judicial office,” used at least four times. The phrases “office to which the retired or deceased judge was last elected or appointed” and “the office formerly occupied by the retired or deceased judge” also appear. (See 26 Cal.3d at pp. 681-682.)
*571I have not discussed the majority’s second “Modification of Opinion” (filed today), which also alters the March 27th decision and states no reasons. Apparently it was inspired by the petition of plaintiffs “For Further Modification of Opinion” that was filed on June 3, 1980.
Compare this excerpt from the letter of April 14, 1980, to Acting Chief Justice Manuel by the Chairman of the Presiding Judges’ Association of Los Angeles County: “Up to now we thought our interests were being looked out for by the attorneys representing the named plaintiffs in said case. Since the decision has come down, however, we have found that the decision itself has created numerous conflicting interests which make it impossible for the attorneys to fairly represent all of us. Some wish to let the decision stand while others of us are strongly in favor of the granting of a Petition to Reconsider and/or a Petition for Intervention. The attorneys representing the entire class find it impossible to fairly represent all of us. . . . [11] 1 urge you in the strongest terms possible to permit every judge in the State of California the opportunity to be properly heard and represented in this matter if he so elects. This should be done either through a Petition For Reconsideration, a Petition For Intervention or by some other proper means at your disposal. In the absence of such due process has no meaning.” (Cf. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams (1942) 19 Cal.2d 463, 476: On rehearing, “if reasonable opportunity to be heard is afforded the litigants. . .no federal constitutional guarantees are violated.”)
See Kleps, The Judicial Salary Disaster, Los Angeles Daily Journal (Apr. 18, 1980) at page 3: “Justice Newman makes a point with which your commentator (as one who discussed the legislation with legislators in 1964 and 1969) can agree fully. 'The majority of the legislators would never have approved the law, I believe, had they been advised that its words created a contractual right to cost-of-living increases that *572would survive amendment or repeal.’. . . [H] One would not urge a court to reconsider its decision on the basis of a threatened adverse popular reaction. In a case of this sort, however, where the issue is so fundamental and where the consequences can be so grave, a further look might not be amiss. Any doubt that exists in any justice’s mind should be resolved in favor of the Legislature’s power to control judicial salaries, particularly in light of current economic conditions.”
Cf. Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 319: “We are persuaded by the claim that the Legislature intended to treat all local government employees and officers in a uniform manner, and that to distinguish in the application of the condition between employees who had a contractual right to a wage increase and those who did not, or between employees of charter cities and counties and those operating under general laws would violate that intention.”
See the letter of May 13, 1980, addressed to Acting Chief Justice Manuel by counsel for petitioners Kirkpatrick et al.: “[We] have just received a copy of the amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor. ... [H] The Governor agrees with petitioners’ basic position that this Court’s opinion creates unequal and unreasonable levels of compensation for judges on the same court and improperly establishes salary levels for some members of lower courts which are greater than the compensation paid to some members of higher courts. The Governor’s brief.. .argues that the Opinion has ‘created an administrative nightmare’ for both the Controller’s office and the Judges’ Retirement System based upon the ‘fortuitous dates the terms of office of their successors began and ended.’... [H] We thoroughly agree with these comments.... ”
Assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.