dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was a material change of condition which was shown to have had a material effect on the child’s well being in this case.
At the time of their divorce in 1989, Daniel Rayford Joyce and Laura Joyce Woodall agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their two and one half year old son. That the child would ultimately reach school age was certainly known to the parties at the time the original custody agreement was made. The parties abided by the complex terms of the settlement, mutually agreeing as necessary to deviations such as providing transportation to school, for almost five years. The juvenile court entered an order finding “[A] material change of conditions since the time of the divorce decree in that the child is being transferred back and forth between the two parent’s homes, under circumstances which cause the child confusion and distress with the frequency of changing homes.” I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the shuttling of the child back and forth between the parents’ homes, however, represents a material change in condition. This was precisely the arrangement contemplated by the parties at the time of the divorce and had been the practice for most of the child’s life. I fail to see how the continuation of an on-going practice constitutes a material change in condition. See Arp v. Hammonds, 200 Ga. App. 715, 718 (409 SE2d 275) (1991).
Further, the record indicates that the child continued to excel in school, and there is no evidence, other than occasional sleep disturbances, which may or may not have been related to this issue, suggesting that the practice was causing the child “confusion and distress.” “[A] showing of changed conditions of [a parent], without a showing of its material effect on the child, is insufficient to warrant a change in custody.” Robinson v. Ashmore, 232 Ga. 498, 502 (III) (207
*782Decided November 30, 1994 Reconsideration denied December 19, 1994 J. Russell Phillips, for appellant. Lynn F. Haywood, for appellee.SE2d 484) (1974). It would have been better had the parties .agreed to retain joint custody, and modify the physical custody provisions of the agreement. But I do not see evidence of a material change in circumstances in the father’s home which adversely affected the child’s welfare so as to deprive him of joint custody of his son.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.