dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not agree with the majority’s position that one who is otherwise qualified to render an expert opinion should be disqualified merely because he or she is not a practitioner holding a valid state license to perform the treatment which is the subject of the expert opinion.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held in Avret v. McCormick, 246 Ga. 401 (271 SE2d 832) (1980), a case cited by the majority, that “[m]edical experts are persons possessing technical and peculiar knowledge, and any person learned in medical or physiological matters is qualified to testify as an expert thereon, even though he is not a medical practitioner.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 401.
Furthermore, this court held in In the Interest of S. T., 201 Ga. App. 37 (1) (410 SE2d 312) (1991), that “[a]n expert is one possessing, in regard to a particular subject or department of human activity, knowledge not acquired by ordinary persons. ... It is not essential that [an expert] should be actively engaged in the practice of medicine. Nor is it essential that one who really has a scientific education on the subject should . . . have a license to practice from any medical board. . . . Accordingly, a person who is neither a physician nor surgeon can express an opinion on a medical question, when the matter inquired about lies within the domain of the profession or calling which the witness pursues.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 38.
“[F]or an affiant to constitute ‘an expert competent to testify’ under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), the affiant’s expertise must include knowledge of the standard of care applicable to the defendant-physician as to at least one of the matters on which the plaintiff’s malpractice claim is based.” Chandler v. Koenig, 203 Ga. App. 684, 685 (417 SE2d 715) (1992).
In the instant case, Wyatt alleged in her complaint that Dr. Rig-gins “failed to give appropriate directions regarding therapy upon discovering that the ken nail was bent. . . .” Accordingly, in order for Dr. Wright to qualify as an expert in this case, there must be some evidence to show his education, training, or experience as a professor *857of applied biomechanics in surgery, would likewise demonstrate his knowledge of the standard of care applicable to surgeons treating patients with biomechanical devices such as the ken nail. Chandler, 203 Ga. App. at 687.
Decided December 5, 1994 Reconsideration denied December 20, 1994 Allen & Peters, Jonathan C. Peters, Gary R. McCain, for appellant. Doffermyre, Shields, Canfield & Knowles, Robert E. Shields, R. *858Hutton Brown III, for appellee.*857Dr. Wright’s affidavits show he is a tenured professor of applied biomechanics in surgery at Cornell University Medical College, where he teaches medical students and residents the appropriate standards of care involving the installation and use of orthopedic implant devices such as the ken nail. He further states that based upon his training, education, and experience, he is an expert on the proper design, installation, and use of devices such as the ken nail used in this case, including the generally accepted standard of care among physicians and surgeons relating to instructions to patients and appropriate physical therapy when such devices are installed. Although Dr. Wright was not a practitioner, his credentials and statements establish he is an expert on biomechanics and a surgeon’s standard of postoperative care for patients with biomechanical devices such as the ken nail. There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest the methods of care he teaches to his students, and within his expertise, are any different from those practiced by orthopedic surgeons.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope, Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Beasley join in this dissent.
On Motion for Reconsideration.
In appellee’s motion for reconsideration, she argues that this court overlooked the controlling authority of Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183 (442 SE2d 233) (1994). However, the trial court did follow the mandates of Hewett, supra, by allowing the plaintiff to present a second affidavit supporting the competency of her OCGA § 9-11-9.1 expert. Although the defendant’s motion was entitled a motion to dismiss, it was actually treated as a motion for summary judgment by the trial court’s allowance of additional evidence and a hearing. Our decision found that the “trial court erred in determining Dr. Wright was competent to testify as an expert in the present case.” Therefore, our holding was correct even in light of Hewett.
Motion for reconsideration denied.