concurring specially.
I concur because the requirements for permissive joinder in this case were not present. In the words of OCGA § 9-11-20 (a), there was no “question of law or fact common” to both of the occurrences, four months apart, which arose so as to justify the joinder.
The alleged commonality was indivisibility of plaintiff’s psychological injuries, a question of fact. There was no commonality in the injury which was to be tried, although there was evidence that the second occurrence exacerbated these injuries. That is shown by exam*870ining the record and confirmed by what transpired at trial. The evidence at trial from the medical experts was essentially the same as it was in the depositions and thus the separability was determinable before trial. Although plaintiff’s treating neurologist deposed that he could not differentiate what was caused by one collision as opposed to the other, another of her treating physicians deposed and testified that her depression always led back to the first accident; in his deposition he testified that it seemed like “the epicenter of her affect” came from the first accident. He just could not divide up the portions. There was other pre-trial evidence that the injuries were separable from the outset. The point is that the pre-trial evidence of the psychological injury was that it was caused by the first incident and increased in severity or duration by the second. That does not make it “common” for the purpose of joinder.
At trial, plaintiff withdrew her request for a charge on joint liability for indivisible or non-apportionable damages. The court gave a charge only on apportionment; the jury was not instructed to consider joint liability. In instructing on possible verdicts, the court gave three options, and three options only, in the event the jury found in plaintiff’s favor: against both defendants “and apportion the damages, that is the money, accordingly”; against one defendant in a certain amount; or against the other defendant in a certain amount. Joint liability was not an option. As instructed by the court, the verdict against each defendant was returned separately.1
Thus there was no reason to require Brinks to have its liability tried with that of Cowling because of a tenuous relationship between two disparate vehicular collisions, distanced by time and location and dissimilar in circumstances. Between them a relationship existed only by a thin thread of plaintiff’s continuing depression. The jury had no discernible trouble apportioning the damages against the separate defendants. Indeed, the court had instructed that it should find against each defendant only for the amount the jury was “able to rationally apportion between the two defendants the extent of plaintiff’s injuries caused by each defendant.”
It was inconsistent to join the two defendants as “joint tortfeasors” when the jury was not to decide if there was any joint liability. For this reason I agree that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse severance.
To the extent that appellant must show prejudice before we require a new trial for it, Brinks has demonstrated that it was harmed *871in a number of ways by the participation of Cowling and the presence of his evidence. Not only plaintiff but also Cowling was aligned against Brinks, and Cowling attempted to prove and argued that the sole cause of plaintiff’s injuries and the sole defendant liable for recoverable damages was Brinks.
It is entitled to a trial as the sole defendant, with respect to the collision of December 31, 1990.
This gives rise to the problem of the enforceability of the separate verdict against a non-resident defendant. Motor Convoy v. Brannen, 194 Ga. App. 795 (391 SE2d 671) (1990), aff'd 260 Ga. 340 (393 SE2d 262) (1990). Since Cowling did not appeal, that issue is not before us.