I dissent. It is a maxim of jurisprudence that “For every wrong there is a remedy.” (Civ. Code, § 3523.) Today, the majority purport to fabricate an exception for violations of the equal protection clause of article I, section 7, of the California Constitution. In such a labor I cannot, and will not, join.
I
In Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 586-587 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916], we concluded that “an accused is denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by article I, section 7, of the California Constitution when prosecution is by indictment and he is deprived *50of a preliminary hearing and the concomitant rights which attach when prosecution is by information.”
The basis of our holding was that there was a “considerable disparity in the procedural rights afforded defendants charged by the prosecutor by means of an information and defendants charged by the grand jury in an indictment. The defendant accused by information ‘immediately becomes entitled to an impressive array of procedural rights, including a preliminary hearing before a neutral and legally knowledgeable magistrate, representation by retained or appointed counsel, the confrontation and cross-examination of hostile witnesses, and the opportunity to personally appear and affirmatively present exculpatory evidence.’ [1] In vivid contrast, the indictment procedure omits all the above safeguards . . . .” (22 Cal.3d at p. 587, italics in original, fn. and citations omitted.)
In Hawkins, we further concluded that the “appropriate remedy for the constitutionally infirm treatment of indicted defendants is not to eliminate or alter radically the general indicting function of the grand jury; indeed, that function is explicitly sanctioned in the California Constitution and specifically implemented by the Legislature. Until such time as the Legislature may prescribe other appropriate procedures, the remedy most consistent with the state Constitution as a whole and least intrusive on the Legislature’s prerogative is simply to permit the indictment process to continue precisely as it has, but to recognize the right of indicted defendants to demand a post-indictment preliminary hearing prior to or at the time of entering a plea. . . .
“The state constitutional provision recognizing the grand jury’s indicting function—article I, section 14—is no bar to our holding herein. It provides, ‘Felonies shall be prosecuted as provided by law, either by indictment or, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, by information.’ The term ‘law,’ of course, encompasses judicial decisions as well as legislative enactments. Thus, while the Constitution authorizes the use of grand juries to indict criminal defendants, it leaves to the Legislature and the courts the task of developing procedures, consistent with other state constitutional provisions, for implementing that mode of initiating prosecutions.” (22 Cal.3d at pp. 593-594, citations omitted.)
At the June 5, 1990, Primary Election, the voters approved an initiative constitutional amendment and statute that was designated on the ballot as Proposition 115—the self-styled “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.”
Section 2 of the measure added section 14.1 to article I of the California Constitution: “If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment preliminary hearing.”
*51Section 3 of the initiative purported to add the following relevant text to section 24 of article I of the state charter: “In criminal cases the right[] of a defendant to equal protection of the laws . . . shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States . . . .”
Section 5 of the initiative added section 30 to article I of the state charter, to provide in subdivision (b) thereof that hearsay may be admitted at preliminary examinations, as prescribed by regular legislation or popular initiative.
Section 8 of the measure added section 1203.1 to the Evidence Code, to provide that section 1203 of that code, generally allowing the cross-examination of hearsay declarants, is not applicable at preliminary examinations.
Section 16 of the initiative amended section 866 of the Penal Code on three points relevant here. First, on the People’s request, the defendant at a preliminary examination must make an offer of proof as to the expected testimony of a witness, and may subsequently call the witness only if his testimony would be reasonably likely to negate an element of a crime, impeach a prosecution witness or declarant, or establish an affirmative defense. Second, the preliminary examination may not be used for discovery. Third, the taking of depositions is not compelled or authorized.
Section 18 of the initiative, in pertinent part, added a new subdivision (b) to section 872 of the Penal Code, which allows hearsay at preliminary examinations if given by a law enforcement officer who satisfies certain requirements.
II
On January 10, 1991, the Grand Jury of the County of Alameda, on behalf of the People, handed up an indictment to the superior court against petitioner Robert Bowens. In separate counts, it accused Bowens of selling heroin, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, on December 4 and 7,1990. It separately alleged that he had suffered a prior conviction of possession of narcotics for sale within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(3) (ineligibility for probation or suspension of sentence) and Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) (enhanced punishment).
At arraignment, Bowens moved the superior court for a postindictment preliminary examination or any other appropriate relief to remedy the violation of his state constitutional right to equal protection, as construed in *52Hawkins, arising out of the deprivation of such an examination prior to indictment. He was unsuccessful.
He then petitioned the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition against the superior court, and requested a stay. There too he was unsuccessful, meeting with summary denial.
Thereupon, he petitioned this court for review and requested a stay. Here, he was successful. We limited the issue to “whether in light of Proposition 115 a defendant is entitled to a post-indictment preliminary examination or any other remedy.” We then directed issuance of an alternate writ of mandate. The writ issued.
Ill
As I shall explain, the superior court erred by denying Bowens’s motion and the Court of Appeal erred by refusing his petition. Even after Proposition 115, there is a violation of the equal protection of the laws under article I, section 7, of the California Constitution when some defendants are prosecuted by information after a preliminary examination and others are prosecuted by indictment without any such examination. A violation of this sort can obviously be avoided. If not avoided, however, it must be remedied. A postindictment preliminary examination is no longer available for the purpose, but other mechanisms are.
The initial question to be addressed is whether, after Proposition 115, there remains the violation of the state constitutional right to equal protection found by Hawkins. The answer is affirmative.
Recall that at the time of Hawkins, there was a “considerable disparity in . . . procedural rights” (22 Cal.3d at p. 587) between defendants prosecuted by information and those prosecuted by indictment. The former were entitled, inter alia, to “a preliminary hearing before a neutral and legally knowledgeable magistrate, representation by retained or appointed counsel, the confrontation and cross-examination of hostile witnesses, and the opportunity to personally appear and affirmatively present exculpatory evidence.” (Ibid,., internal quotation marks omitted.) By contrast, the latter enjoyed none of these safeguards.
After Proposition 115, this considerable disparity in procedural rights survives. The initiative gives nothing whatever to defendants prosecuted by indictment. Moreover, it takes little away from defendants prosecuted by information. Such defendants are still entitled to a hearing before a neutral *53and legally knowledgeable magistrate. Here, the measure makes no change. Such defendants are still entitled to representation by retained or appointed counsel. Here too, the measure makes no change. Such defendants are still entitled to confront and cross-examine hostile witnesses. True, the measure somewhat limits their rights in this regard by relaxing the rules involving hearsay. But the relaxation it effects is itself quite limited. (See Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072-1075, 1082 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262].) Finally, such defendants are still entitled to personally appear and affirmatively present exculpatory evidence. As to appearance, the measure yet again makes no change. As to evidence, it does little more. Certain restrictions and conditions are indeed imposed. But none appreciably affects exculpatory evidence.
To be sure, after Proposition 115 the preliminary examination may not be used for discovery. But the availability vel non of discovery did not constitute any significant aspect of the considerable disparity in procedural rights that we discerned in Hawkins. There, we simply observed that the preliminary examination “serves a number of pragmatic functions for the accused,” among them discovery, and that the grand jury inquiry is not comparable in this regard. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 588-589.) A dissenting justice read our observation to “suggests that the preliminary examination serves an essential secondary function of providing the accused with pretrial discovery regarding the case against him.” (Id. at p. 619 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).) It did no such thing.
In conducting my analysis, I have not overlooked sections 2 and 3 of Proposition 115. Apparently, these two provisions amount to an attempt to overrule Hawkins in its entirety. Section 3 was intended to effectively abrogate the state constitutional right to equal protection and, as a result, to remove the violation we had found and to eliminate the remedy we had ordered. Section 2 had a different purpose. Recall that in Hawkins we stated that the Legislature and the judiciary had broad authority under the state charter to prescribe procedures for prosecution by indictment, including the power to require or allow postindictment preliminary examinations. Section 2 was intended to withdraw that authority as to such examinations.
Proposition 115’s attempt to overrule Hawkins in toto was unsuccessful. It appears that section 2 is valid. Henceforth, neither the Legislature nor the judiciary seemingly has authority to require or allow postindictment preliminary examinations. But it is unquestionable that section 3 is not valid. We so held, unanimously, in Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 349-355 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077], Therefore, the state constitutional right *54to equal protection has not been abrogated. It follows that the violation we found in Hawkins remains. But through the operation of section 2, the remedy we ordered therein is no longer available.
The majority conclude to the contrary. They rest on the premise that Proposition 115 “plainly contemplated” the overruling of Hawkins in its entirety. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 45.) True, the promoters of the initiative may have intended that result. But as Raven teaches, they failed in that regard.
The majority effectively construe the words of Proposition 115’s apparently valid section 2 to contain the substance of its unquestionably invalid section 3. Such a construction is insupportable. It ignores the independent purpose and effect of the two related provisions. It would also render section 2 redundant in pertinent part to section 3. Section 3, if valid, would have abrogated the state constitutional right to equal protection and would thereby have removed the violation and eliminated the remedy. Section 2 would then abrogate a right already abrogated, remove a violation already removed, and eliminate a remedy already eliminated. An interpretation yielding redundancy should be avoided. (City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935].) I recognize that section 2 makes the remedy we ordered in Hawkins no longer available. But contrary to the majority’s repeated, bald assertions, the unavailability of this particular remedy—which we viewed in Hawkins to be neither permanent nor necessary—does not itself abrogate the constitutional right or remove the constitutional violation.
The next issue to be considered is: Can a violation of the state constitutional right to equal protection be avoided? Yes, obviously so. The People may prosecute all defendants by indictment. Or they may prosecute all by information. Or they may choose to prosecute some by indictment and some by information if the Legislature makes the two procedural modes substantially similar—as by giving defendants subject to grand jury inquiry rights similar to those enjoyed by defendants facing preliminary examination. It might even be enough if the indictment process was simply opened. True, there would not be a neutral and legally knowledgeable magistrate to preside over the grand jury inquiry. But defendants could be allowed representation by retained or appointed counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of hostile witnesses, and an opportunity to personally appear and affirmatively present exculpatory evidence.
The issue that follows is this: If not avoided, must a violation of the state constitutional right to equal protection be remedied? Again, yes and obviously so. As noted, “For every wrong there is a remedy.” (Civ. Code, *55§ 3523.) This principle seems peculiarly applicable when, as here, the wrong is of constitutional dimension.
The final question concerns remedies. After Proposition 115, a postindictment preliminary examination is no longer available. Moreover, it appears that any substantial equivalent to such a procedure is impliedly barred. But notwithstanding the majority’s implication, other constitutionally permissible mechanisms are surely available. For the future, I would leave the choice to the Legislature in the first instance. For the case at bar, I would require a form of relief that is consistent with this opinion.
IV
For all the reasons stated above, I conclude that the superior court erred by denying Bowens’s motion and the Court of Appeal erred by refusing his petition.
I would therefore reverse the order of the Court of Appeal with directions to cause the issuance of a peremptory writ as prayed.