dissenting.
Like Justice Cardine, I must dissent from the opinion of the court in this case. I agree with the perceptive comments of Justice Cardine with respect to the burden of proof. However, I have some additional concerns with the majority decision in this instance.
Even though Section 27-14-603, W.S.1977 (June 1991 Repl.), is not applicable, as the majority holds, we still have an historic requirement that there be medical testimony to establish a causal relationship between an occurrence on the job and the claimed injury. Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297 (Wyo.1970). Other cases suggest the necessity for establishing the nexus between the employment and the injury. Hampton v. All Field Service, Inc., 726 P.2d 98 (Wyo.1986); Matter of Jones, 702 P.2d 1299 (Wyo.1985); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874 (Wyo.1984). I am unable to find the evidence introduced by Dougherty in this case that would establish the relationship between his job and the injury. The case is very like Hampton in the sense that even Dougherty cannot describe any event on the job that seemed significant. His problem was that he had difficulty in the morning in attempting to tie his shoes. There was no expert medical testimony and, even if it were in evidence, the diagnosis on the receipt from John M. Tooke, M.D. has no reference to any event that may have induced a “Back m.m. spasm.”
While exceptional instances may occur in which it is not necessary to invoke medical testimony to establish the causal relationship, In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427 (1943), it is also clear that the finder of fact need not accept the statements of the claimant as to the causal relationship. Parkel v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 69 Wyo. 122, 237 P.2d 634 (1951). It is obvious from the record that Dougherty wanted to rely upon the testimony of Gail Brown to fill this gap and establish the causal relationship. Gail Brown is a licensed physical therapist, but she does not come within the statutory definition of a “health care provider.” The statute is limited in a rather precise way:
“ ‘Health care provider’ means doctor of medicine, chiropractic or osteopathy, dentist, optometrist, podiatrist or psychologist, acting within the scope of his license, licensed to practice in this state or in good standing in his home state; .... ” § 27-14-102(a)(x), W.S.1977 (June 1991 Repl.).
In determining whether a causal relationship is supported by competent medical authority, I would limit that class of witnesses to those who are identified as health care providers in the statutory definition. Absent the expertise to draw the conclusion of a nexus, the testimony of Gail Brown becomes hardly more than sheer conjecture and, certainly, nothing upon which the hearing officer was required to rely, even if it was admitted.
Reduced to salient matters, this record demonstrates that Dougherty worked at a job that involved strenuous physical labor. One morning he was unable to bend over to *557tie his shoes. He was unable to identify any event on the job that caused his injury, although he speculated about that. There is a diagnosis in the file made by a medical doctor, but it does not relate to any event that may have caused the injury. A physical therapist testified that she could not make a diagnosis, but she ventured an opinion that Dougherty’s injury was caused by his recent activities at work. That witness also stated that, “Based on my previous experience with low back injuries, they can be a chronic thing.” This testimony presents an interesting contrast with the assumptions of fact in the majority opinion. Even if the witness could be considered a “competent medical authority,” can such contradictory testimony really sustain a conclusion contrary to that of the hearing examiner that Dougherty met his burden of proof?
Apparently, because no specific event could be identified, and because Dougherty had told his supervisor that he had a sore back at times, the hearing examiner identified the injury as one that had occurred over a period of time, which was subject to the provisions of Section 27-14-603, W.S.1977 (June 1991 Repl.). As I have indicated, even if that were an erroneous ruling, this still is a case in which the nexus appropriately should be established by competent medical authority. I do not find that demand to have been satisfied.
I would affirm the decision of the district court in which the decision of the hearing examiner was affirmed.