concurring:
I think the Court’s opinion well justifies the holding that the verdict of the jury should be set aside. I think, however, there is additional ground for setting aside the verdict accepted by the trial court in this case.
As stated in the Court’s opinion, there are two verdicts. One was rejected by the trial court and the other was accepted and judgment rendered thereon. I prefer to designate these two alleged verdicts as “reports”, rather than verdicts.
This Court’s opinion approves the action of the trial court in rejecting the first report, but applying the well established rule that surplusage in a verdict may be disregarded, and judgment rendered thereon, when the verdict is in such language that a general finding is not affected by the unauthorized language, held that the second report was good as a verdict. See Bell v. Develop. & Gas Co., 106 W. Va. 155, 159, 145 S. E. 165; Coal & Coke Co. v. Fuel Co., 98 W. Va. 374, 127 S. E. 81; State v. McCoy, 95 W. Va. 274, 120 S. E. 597; Martin v. Ohio River R’d. Co., 37 W. Va. 349, 16 S. E. 589; Harvey v. Com’th., 23 Gratt. 941. For a general discussion of an attempted apportionment of damages in a jury verdict, see Annotation 108 A.L.R. 792; 8 A.L.R. 2d 862. As to *455the power of a trial judge to correct a verdict in the presence of the jury, see Lowther v. Oil and Gas Co., 88 W. Va. 650, 108 S. E. 276. “When the meaning, of the jury can be clearly collected from the verdict, it ought not tó be set aside for mere want of form in wording; and if the points in issue are substantially decided, the trial court should mould the verdict into proper form.” Colliery Co. v. Pinkney, 96 W. Va. 74, 122 S. E. 434.
I think that the cases decided that surplusage in a verdict may be rejected by a trial court are inapplicable to the instant case.
I would apply the rule to the second report stated in Lewis and Frazier v. Childers et al., 13 W. Va. 1, 9. “Verdicts of juries are to be favorably construed; and if the point in issue is substantially decided by the verdict, it is the duty of the court to mould it into form.” “Where the meaning of the jury can be clearly collected from the verdict, it ought not to be set aside for irregularity or want of form in its wording.” But, in the Frazier case, a verdict reading as follows: “‘We, the jury, find for the defendants, and fix the line as shown on the Sinnett map, from C. to D.’ ”, was set aside. True the verdict in the Frazier case was returned in an action of ejectment. But this Court, in setting it aside held that the language did not clearly show an intention on the part of the jury to find a general verdict for the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
An analysis of the language contained in the second report in the instant case, shows that the jury found for the plaintiff and against the defendants; and further found that the American Oil Company was responsible for Dale Mayfield, one of the joint defendants, and that the Appalachian Constructors, Inc., another joint defendant, was responsible for Victor Zeni, likewise a joint defendant. The language of the jury’s report is equivocal and indefinite, and furnishes a basis for a rational assumption that the finding of the jury discharged May-field and Zeni, two defendants, from responsibility for *456the payment of the amount found by the jury. If the defendants, Mayfield and Zeni, should be discharged on the basis of the jury’s finding, such action would contradict the general finding set forth in the second report of the jury. See Coal Co. v. Eary, 115 W. Va. 46, 174 S. E. 573.
In instances where the language of a purported verdict of a jury is equivocal, uncertain or indefinite, it should not be received as a verdict. On the contrary, it should be rejected or moulded by the court so as to be indefinite, certain form, and of undoubted meaning.