dissenting.
A troublesome concern is that the Court would not be so quick to uphold the governmental conduct if, for instance, after the police netted Gascon at the roadblock they *936did not find any evidence whatever which tended to identify him as the bank robber, but did find cocaine or other drugs which evidenced criminal activity pertaining to the illegal drug industry. The authorities played out someone’s pure hunch that the bank robber would not lay low, but would flee the vicinity. That hunch panned out. Subtract such good luck from the equation, and this case parallels the earlier State v. Henderson1 roadblock case, and should result in the same conclusion, if there is to be any symmetry in the law, as will be succinctly explained.
I.THE ROADBLOCK DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF I.C. § 19-621 AND § 19-622.
The legislature has provided that a roadblock may be established only under certain circumstances:
19-621. Authority to establish road blocks. — The duly elected or appointed sheriffs, state policemen or policemen of cities of the first or second class of the state of Idaho are hereby authorized to establish, in their respective or adjacent jurisdictions, temporary road blocks upon the highways of this state or city streets for the purpose of apprehending persons reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for violation of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United States, and using such highways or streets.
19-622. Minimum requirements. — For the purpose of warning and protecting the traveling public, the minimum requirements to be met by such officers establishing temporary road blocks, if time and circumstances allow, are:
1. The temporary road block must be established at a point on the highway or street clearly visible at a distance of not less than 100 yards in either direction.
2. At the point of the temporary road block, a sign shall be placed on the center line of the highway or street displaying the word “stop” in letters of sufficient size and luminosity to be readable at a distance of not less than 50 yards, in both directions, either in daytime or darkness.
3. At the same point of the temporary road block, at least one (1) blue light, on and burning, must be placed at the side of the highway or street which shall be a flashing or intermittent beam of light, clearly visible to the oncoming traffic, at a distance of not less than 100 yards.
4. At a distance of not less than 200 yards from the point of the temporary road block, warning signs must be placed at the side of the highway or street, containing any wording of sufficient size and luminosity, to warn the oncoming traffic that a “police stop” lies ahead. A burning beam light, flare or reflector must be placed near such signs for the purpose of attracting the attention of the traffic to the sign.
(Emphasis supplied.) Before a constitutional issue may be reached on the establishment of a roadblock in Idaho, this Court is constrained to first inquire as to whether the statutory requirements for the roadblock were satisfied. Whether a roadblock was constitutionally permissible is of interest only where the statutory requirements have been satisfied. See, for example, Michigan State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (guidelines established for the operation of sobriety roadblocks were followed by the Michigan State Police).2
*937On the circumstances presented, the statutory requirements were not met by the roadblock at the Perrine Bridge. First, the statute unambiguously states that roadblocks may only be established “for the purpose of apprehending persons reasonably believed ... to be wanted for violation of the laws ... and using such highways or streets.” I.C. § 19-621. The bank robber was known to have left the bank on foot, after which he was not seen again. The Court of Appeals observed the obvious; there was aught but a possibility that the robber might attempt to flee and in so doing would use the highways and streets. Such was not sufficient information to justify throwing up the roadblock and stopping vehicular traffic exiting Twin Falls via the bridge.
Moreover, that roadblock did not conform to the I.C. § 19-622’s specifications. Although the State may argue that “time and circumstances” did not allow the officers opportunity to conform to the law, the record provides no information to determine whether the State did or did not have the time to conform. Only one inference may reasonably be drawn from the record: the officers did, have sufficient time to set up the roadblock in accordance with the statute, which follows from the actual undisputed fact that some time passed after an invisible roadblock was established before the visible roadblock was put in place.
The notion that this roadblock operation was a lawful exercise of the State’s police power because it was a “reasonable tactical response” does not withstand scrutiny. Such language does not appear in the applicable statutes, and for a court to read such language into the statutes is questionable, to say the least. The Court of Appeals in its opinion went along with the tactical response hypothesis:
An objective standard for measuring the reasonableness of such an intrusion is whether the officers have probable cause to believe a serious felony is being or has recently been committed, State v. Silvernail, supra [25 Wash.App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980), and the officers reasonably believe the perpetrator is using the highways or streets, I.C. § 19-621.
As noted, the officers here had probable cause to believe a serious felony had been committed. The officers knew the crime was a bank robbery where an alleged bomb had been displayed. The officers had a reliable, albeit general, description of the robbery suspect. Although the officers had no information indicating the suspect had access to a vehicle, their decision to establish a temporary roadblock at the Perrine Bridge was a reasonable tactical response.
119 Idaho at 927, 811 P.2d at 1107 (emphasis added). All that is necessary, then, if that is to be the law of Idaho is that at a later time, after the fact, an officer will step forward saying, “I reasonably believed____” No officer stepped forward to so say.
A majority of this Court’s treatment of the roadblock statutes compares favorably with the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the same issue, in that both treatments are unsatisfactory. First, the majority replaces a “reasonable tactical response” with “logistic realities.” The short passage is worth repeating: “To suggest that it was unreasonable for the police to suspect that the robber would attempt to flee the community in an automobile, using the Interstate highway, ignores the logistic realities which the local trial judge was in the best position to determine. We therefore find no violation of I.C. § 19-621.” 119 Idaho at 934, 812 P.2d at 241. There is no doubt but that the majority believes logistic realities are the base from which to build reasonable tactical responses. What is most astounding about this passage is that, unless my memory fails me, there is simply nothing in the statute which authorizes or suggests that the police obtain the beforehand advice of a local judge as to the propriety of establishing a roadblock. If the reference is to an after-the-fact, i.e. after the roadblock has been established, on the basis of one, or maybe more, police officers’ perceptions of the law, then, too, I am equally astounded that an after-the-fact appraisal is entitled to an unquestioning deference, because of a local judge’s stamp of approval. Difficult to imagine is how *938the police and the trial judge must have surmised that the suspect was going to leave Twin Falls at all, instead of laying low for awhile. But again, that must also be a part of logistic reality.
Second, today’s majority, in response to Gascon’s argument that the roadblock of the Perrine Bridge did not comply with the applicable statutes, states that “if the police have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed — as was the case here — and they have a basic description of the suspect — as was also the case here —§ 19-621 allows them to set up a roadblock on a likely escape route to apprehend the suspect.” 119 Idaho at 933, 812 P.2d at 240. The statutory list of the requirements for setting up a roadblock omits the need for the police to (at least) reasonably believe that the suspect they are searching for is using the highways and streets.3
As explained in State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988), a roadblock is a statutorily regulated tactic of the police, which may not be used just because it may catch somebody who is guilty of something. The roadblock netted Henderson only because he was found to be driving while under the influence, which unfortunately happens every day in Idaho with or without the use of roadblocks. The legislature has made the determination that a roadblock is intrusive enough to require specific information about a fleeing suspect as a condition precedent to erecting a roadblock. While there are many of us who do not experience any trauma on being delayed by a roadblock, we are not the legislature.
In this case, the roadblock was not established in accordance with the legislatively established minimum requirements, and such should be the end of all inquiry.
II. THE STOP OF GASCON’S CAR DOES NOT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER.
Although the decision to establish the roadblock does not pass statutory muster, and should be “enough said,” there remains the further problem of stopping Gas-con’s vehicle, and additional proceedings which ensued after he was neutralized. This Court’s opinion in Henderson stated that:
When a vehicle is stopped by a police officer and its occupants are detained, a seizure within the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution has occurred, even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. [Citations omitted.] Thus, at a minimum, precedent suggests that police have individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to stopping the driver of an automobile. [Citation omitted.] Significantly, all exceptions to the warrant requirement, including a limited Terry stop, require individualized suspicion.
Henderson, 114 Idaho at 295, 756 P.2d at 1059.
*939This statement is mirrored in the law pronounced by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 677 P.2d 522 (Ct.App.1984):
Cook concedes, and it is clear from the facts of this case, that the officers had the right to stop his car without a warrant and question him and his companion concerning their possible involvement in the robbery. Such an investigative stop is an ‘intermediate response’ that allows an officer, who lacks probable cause to make an arrest, to actively investigate possible criminal behavior. As the Supreme Court stated in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972):
A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be ... reasonable [under the fourth amendment] in light of the facts known to the officers at the time.
Moreover, if an officer who makes an investigatory stop ‘has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous, the officer is entitled to “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” ’ State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834, 838, 573 P.2d 153, 157 (1978) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). ‘The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence____’ Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923.
Cook, 106 Idaho at 214-15, 677 P.2d at 527-28.
The Court of Appeals decision in this case readily agreed that an articulable and reasonable suspicion is required for an investigatory stop. See 119 Idaho at 928, 811 P.2d at 1108. However, that requirement was deemed fixlfilled solely on “Gas-con’s conduct of leaning into the passenger’s side of his vehicle while approaching a visible roadblock [which] reasonably could have raised [the state police officer s] suspicions.” 119 Idaho at 929, 811 P.2d at 1109. Such a slim reed as that is not persuasive. All that the officers had was a general description of the bank robber, to wit, a man; plus he was approximately five feet four inches in height, and his hair was blond. A nondescript description of his clothing consisted of a baseball cap and a jacket. This simply was not enough. To believe that it was sufficient would defy all reason. Fortunately for law enforcement personnel, where reason was of no help, a hunch was.
In this case, Gascon was stopped and ordered out of his vehicle only because he was observed by the state police officer to be leaning over toward his right. In no way can it seriously be said that the officer who instructed the officers at the roadblock to stop Gascon’s car considered that he did so because the driver matched the description of the bank robber. The “leaning over,” one fact having nothing to do with the description, did not supply the articulable and reasonable suspicion required for an investigatory stop. Therefore, the stop of Gascon’s vehicle, unsupported by a warrant, probable cause, or even a simple reasonable and articulable suspicion, was unconstitutional.
A majority in this Court presents the issue, but deems it of no moment that the reason Gascon was stopped had nothing whatsoever to do with the information the police had of the bank robber and the bank robbery:
[Gascon] argues that the stop would only have been justified if the police were able to match their description of the suspect with the driver of the vehicle. We find this argument unpersuasive. The police knew a bank had been robbed; they had a general description of the suspect; and they were situated at a place likely for a suspect to make an escape. Officer Johnson ... observed Gascon lean over to the passenger side of the car at least two times and disappear from sight at least once. In light of the circumstances, the moves of the driver were aptly characterized as suspicious and *940gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon could have been involved in the robbery and that he may be armed and dangerous.
119 Idaho at 934, 812 P.2d at 241 (emphasis added). Although no longer a lawyer who at one time taught a class in criminal law and procedure, I can remember what was required for a passing grade. The analysis which I read today would not merit a high mark.
The issue is not whether Gascon’s actions were suspicious, because many actions can be, after the fact, labelled as suspicious in order to justify police action. The issue is whether the police reasonably believed that the person who was stopped and turned out to be Gascon fit the description of the bank robber. Or, put another way, this Court should ask itself whether the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person who they stopped and seized was the bank robber,4 given the information the police had at hand about the robbery and the robber before Gascon was stopped. This reasonable and articulable suspicion must be sufficient to support the investigatory stop of Gascon’s vehicle; otherwise the stop is constitutionally impermissible. The analysis of that issue is obvious — the police did not stop Gascon because they reasonably believed he fit the description of the bank robber. Instead, he was stopped, we were told, because he leaned over while driving, which is an innocuous activity.5
III. THE SEARCH OF GASCON’S CAR WAS UNLAWFUL.
Gascon was ordered out of his car and taken to the rear quarter panel of the car, far away from the passenger compartment. He was not frisked for weapons and he was not asked any questions. Instead, the officers immediately searched the passenger compartment of the car. The majority supports the actions of the officers by noting that a protective search of a car may be performed in certain circumstances in order to secure the officers from harm. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).
However, in these circumstances, with the defendant Gascon away from the vehicle, a number of officers in the immediate vicinity, and a state patrol car immediately behind Gascon’s vehicle, it was not constitutionally permissible for the officers to conduct the search. As the Michigan v. Long opinion requires, a reasonably prudent man or woman under these circumstances would not be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of others in the immediate area was in danger. If safety was a real concern, the officers should have and would have frisked the defendant. Anything less protective would have been irregular procedure meriting at the least a reprimand. Instead, Gascon was removed from the car and the car was searched. It was a search for evidence of *941crime. The officers, probably without thinking, reacted to a “tactical response.” It would have been far better, and legal, for one of the officers to go before a magistrate and obtain a search warrant. And even far better, Gascon’s car could have been stopped, Gascon could have been allowed to remain in his car while he was asked a few questions, and he could have been compared to the physical description of the bank robber, such as it was when furnished to the police.
Unlike the stop of the car and frisk of the driver in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), Gascon’s car was not lawfully detained, and the officers were without reason to believe Gascon posed a threat to their safety. In Mimms, the Court’s holding was a limited one, proclaiming only that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” 434 U.S. at 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 333. Although one sympathizes with law enforcement people when a remarkably good hunch which paid off goes for nothing because of lack of official perspicuity, the law is such that this Court this day should overturn the district court’s order denying Gascon’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the roadblock, and likewise the statements made by Gascon after his arrest should be suppressed as fruits of the unlawful stop and search of his car. See State v. Cook, supra (discussion of the independent sources for evidence that would not bar the evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree).6 As someone once said, “Far better that one person escapes than that the law be turned on its head so that he does not.”
. 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988).
. This Court’s continued reliance upon Henderson, even after the Sitz opinion was released by the United States Supreme Court, is proper. Sitz stands for the proposition that stopping all vehicles at roadblocks set up to deter drunk driving does not contravene the Fourth Amendment. Idaho now has the power, under the Fourth Amendment, to set up such roadblocks if all cars are stopped and some guidelines are promulgated for the police to follow. However, this Court’s holding in Henderson is based explicitly upon art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, which can afford the citizens of Idaho greater constitutional protection: ”[W]e base our decision today solely on art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The Idaho Constitution can, where appropriate, grant more protection than its federal counterpart." Henderson, 114 Idaho at 299, 756 P.2d at 1063 (citations omitted).
. The words "at least” are placed in parentheses to suggest that another justified reading of the language of I.C. § 19-621 would require the police not to just reasonably believe, but to know with reasonable certainty that the suspect is using the highways and streets before they would be justified in setting up a roadblock. This interpretation of I.C. § 19-621 results from simply reading the last clause of that statute as a separate and distinct requirement, which stands apart and alone from the other requirement in the statute. Added in brackets are the numbers one and two, which precede the two requirements for setting up a roadblock contained in I.C. § 19-621: "The duly elected or appointed [officials] ... are hereby authorized to establish ... temporary road blocks ... for the purpose of apprehending persons [1] reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for violation of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United States, and [2] using such highways or streets.” While it is conceivable that the legislature intended both requirements of this statute to be supported by just a reasonable belief, it is also plausible that the legislature intended what it actually wrote into the statute — roadblocks must be supported by [1] a reasonable belief that a certain suspect has committed a crime, and [2] a reasonable certainty or certain knowledge that the suspect is using the highways and streets.
No rule of statutory construction requires this Court to dispense with requirement [2] altogether, as the majority does today; and no rule of construction mandates that we apply the phrase "reasonable belief’ to all information required of the police to support their actions.
. The analysis is not, as the majority suggests, to ask whether the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon could have been the bank robber. Reasonable suspicions on what could or might be are numerous, and are also of absolutely no value from the standpoint of a court of law.
. In an unrelated matter, the Court of Appeals recently reversed the conviction of a man who had obviously been driving drunk, on the ground that the stop leading to the man’s arrest was not supported by a reasonable belief or articulable suspicion:
The evidence adduced by the officer [slow response to traffic signal; driving close to parked cars; driving in this manner at 2:40 a.m. Sunday morning] could just as easily be explained as conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior.
We conclude that the officer's observations regarding Emory’s driving pattern failed to give rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion that Emory was driving his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Although it later became apparent that Emory was indeed intoxicated, the suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective information available to the officer when he decided to make the stop, and cannot be bolstered by evidence gathered following the stop.
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 661, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Idaho Ct.App., 1991). Emory is an example of the price we all pay for personal liberty in this country, a price at least one member of this Court is willing to pay.
. A discussion of Gascon’s Miranda rights is put aside, as the Court has already decided to place its imprimatur on Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), which was relied upon by the Court of Appeals. In Barrett, the United States Supreme Court overturned the Connecticut Supreme Court’s determination that Barrett’s request for counsel was not honored, on the ground that Barrett’s invocation of his right to counsel was limited by its terms to the preparation of written statements to the police, and did not prohibit all further discussion with the police. Such an unprincipled restriction of Miranda after these many years is astonishing, and has to be lived with, but for only a while, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent reinvigoration of Miranda and its progeny. See Minnick v. Mississippi, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officers may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present). In this case, Gascon’s request for a lawyer was not honored before an FBI agent reinitiated interrogation, which is expressly forbidden by Minnick.