After a jury had been impaneled to try Anthony McGee for driving under the influence, the trial court sua sponte granted a mistrial. McGee moved for discharge and acquittal, arguing that any subsequent trial was barred by double jeopardy. The trial court *840denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Because we agree that the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial before considering less drastic alternatives, we reverse.
The relevant facts demonstrate that McGee was arrested and charged with two counts of driving under the influence. On Monday, February 12,2007, a jury was impaneled and sworn for McGee’s trial, which was scheduled to begin on Wednesday, February 14, 2007. However, late in the day on Tuesday, the trial judge conducted a conference call with McGee’s lawyer and the prosecutor, informing them that no courtroom was available for the trial. According to McGee’s counsel, the judge then told both attorneys he “desire [d] to declare a mistrial if the case could not be worked out to a plea.” He then asked if counsel “had anything to say about it,” and McGee’s attorney objected, announcing that he was ready to try the case.1 There is no evidence that any alternatives to mistrial were discussed.2 Nonetheless, the trial court declared a mistrial. McGee then moved for discharge and acquittal. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which time McGee proffered evidence that a mistrial was unnecessary because a courtroom became available Wednesday afternoon and two courtrooms were available on Thursday after 10:00 a.m. Notwithstanding this testimony, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the unavailability of a courtroom made conducting the trial impossible.
McGee appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing that the trial court erred: (1) to the extent it found it was physically impossible to try him; (2) in ruling, over McGee’s objection, that manifest necessity required a mistrial be granted; (3) by ordering a mistrial without giving McGee an opportunity to be present at a critical stage in the proceedings; and (4) by declaring a mistrial without having any facts or evidence to support its sua sponte decision to declare a mistrial.
1. Once a jury has been impaneled and sworn, a defendant has a constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to be tried by that jury.3 This right should not be abridged lightly.4 And although a trial court has discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be *841granted, an appellate court has a corresponding duty to satisfy itself “that the trial judge exercised ‘sound discretion’ in declaring [such] mistrial.”5
“A trial is improperly terminated if there was no manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial.”6 And manifest necessity requires “urgent circumstances.”7 As we have held,
[w]hen determining whether such urgency is present, a trial court must scrupulously exercise its discretion in weighing the defendant’s right to have his trial completed before the particular tribunal against the interest of the public in having fair trials designed to end in just judgments; and the decision must take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances. It should give careful, deliberate, and studious consideration to whether the circumstances demand a mistrial, with a keen eye toward other, less drastic, alternatives, calling for a recess if necessary and feasible to guard against hasty mistakes.8
Here, there simply is no evidence that the trial court considered any alternative to declaring a mistrial for what, essentially, was a scheduling error. Rather, the evidence shows that the trial court presented the defendant with only two options: plead guilty or a mistrial would be declared. Moreover, the facts of this case do not raise the inference that urgent circumstances existed. There is no suggestion that the courtrooms were unavailable due to lengthy trials. Indeed, the record shows that the courtroom that was unavailable on Wednesday morning became available on Wednesday afternoon and that courtrooms were available after 10:00 a.m. on Thursday.9 And given that the case involved driving under the influence, there is minimal danger that the jurors would have been exposed to any prejudicial information during a continuance. Under these circumstances, where the record is devoid of evidence establishing urgent circumstances, the court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial without first considering altérnatives that would have pre*842served McGee’s valuable right to be tried by the originally impaneled jury.10
From a procedural standpoint, there is a question as to who bears the burden of suggesting alternatives. Here, there is no evidence that either the defense or the State suggested any alternatives to the proposed mistrial.11 The State argues that it is the defendant who bears the burden of presenting alternatives to mistrial. Our case law does not provide a clear answer to this question.12 But where, as here, the trial court sua sponte grants a mistrial without giving the parties advance notice of its intent, it is fundamentally unfair to penalize the defendant — or defense counsel — for not immediately countering with alternatives to the drastic action of mistrial. Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial — and abridging McGee’s constitutional right to be tried by the originally impaneled jury — without first considering less drastic alternatives.13
The dissent asserts that our ruling in this case stems from a simple disagreement “with the court’s discretionary decision.” This assertion misses the mark as it is the procedure we find flawed, not the result.14 Our holding in this case does not categorically require a trial court to grant a continuance under similar circumstances, merely that the court consider it as an alternative to declaring a mistrial. Here, the record reveals that the trial court told defense counsel that if McGee did not plead guilty, he would declare a mistrial.15 It is this type of truncated decision-making process — undertaken with little or no heed to McGee’s constitutional rights —• that constitutes the abuse of discretion.
2. In view of this ruling, we need not address McGee’s remaining enumerations of error.
*843 Judgment reversed.
Barnes, C. J., Andrews, P. J., Smith, P. J., and Miller and Bernes, JJ., concur. Blackburn, P. J., dissents.Although the State argues that McGee’s attorney acquiesced to the mistrial, McGee’s attorney testified that he objected and, in its order, the trial court expressly found that McGee objected.
In its brief, the State asserts that “the Judge allowed both sides to give their positions and considered whether any alternatives existed.” This assertion is simply not supported by the record.
See Perez v. State, 266 Ga. App. 82, 84 (596 SE2d 191) (2004).
See Cooke v. State, 230 Ga. App. 326, 327 (496 SE2d 337) (1998).
Spearman v. State, 278 Ga. 327, 330 (2) (602 SE2d 568) (2004).
Jefferson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 8, 9 (479 SE2d 406) (1996).
(Punctuation omitted.) Id.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id.
Although McGee’s attorney testified that the courtroom was available after 12:30 p.m., the court took judicial notice in its order that the courtroom would not have been available until 3:30 p.m.
See Jefferson, supra at 10; Bradfield v. State, 211 Ga. App. 318, 320 (439 SE2d 100) (1993).
Compare Jefferson, supra at 9; Spearman, supra.
See Jefferson, supra (State suggested continuance); Spearman, supra (State proposed several “options” to mistrial, but defendant suggested no alternative); Bradfield, supra (where trial “court did not afford the defense any opportunity to suggest alternatives short of a mistrial”).
See Jefferson, supra.
See, e.g., Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 179 (563 SE2d 847) (2002) (trial court abused its discretion in truncating inquiry into juror bias).
We are also troubled by the trial court’s decision to conduct this conversation outside the presence of the defendant. See Buckner v. State, 253 Ga. App. 294, 296 (2) (558 SE2d 823) (2002). (“ ‘[A] defendant on trial must be present when the court takes any action materially affecting his case.’ ”); Bagwell v. State, 129 Ga. 170 (1) (58 SE 650) (1907) (defendant had right to be present when mistrial declared). Indeed, this serves as the basis of McGee’s third enumeration of error. In view of our holding, we need not address this argument on appeal.