(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not think that the legislative reaction to Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct.App.1986), is as broad as the majority’s interpretation of NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-24 (Repl.Pamp.1987). Specifically, I view Section 52-1-24 as a definitional section limited to eligibility for income benefits. As such, our prior definitions of “accidental injury” for purposes of coming within the Act, including gradual, stress-induced injuries, remain intact.
Under the Act, “impairment” is only used to define total or partial disability in NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-25 and -26 (Repl.Pamp.1987). “Total disability” and “partial disability,” in turn, are used to prescribe eligibility for income benefits under NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-41 and -42. The plain language of the statute therefore supports worker’s contention that Section 52-1-24 relates to income benefits and does not establish which injuries come within the Act as a whole. See Smith Mach. Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., 102 N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501 (1985) (legislative intent is determined, first and foremost, by reference to the language of the statute).
There is no indication that the legislature intended to equate “impairment” with “injury” for purposes of coming within the Act. As worker points out, the legislature could have precluded all gradual, stress-induced claims from coverage by simply including a definition of “accident” or “injury” in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-1.1 (Repl. Pamp.1987). This would be consistent with the approach taken in other jurisdictions. See IB Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, 42.23(b) (1991); Fla.Stat. § 440.02(1) (1988); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23.1021(7) (West 1990); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 102.01(c) (West 1990).
Instead, we are asked to interpret a statute that, on its face, appears to strike a balance between the duty of an employer to compensate workers who suffer an on-the-job injury with the need to limit potential fraud and contain costs. The majority has failed to point to anything in the Act that justifies departing from its plain meaning, other than the fact that the 1987 addition of an “impairment” definition in Section 52-1-24 was a response to Candelaria. See Jensen v. New Mexico State Police, 109 N.M. 626, 788 P.2d 382 (Ct.App. 1990). Even if we assume, for example, that lowering premiums was a central purpose underlying the 1987 amendments, a plain reading of the Act does not threaten a contrary result because (1) it is doubtful that a worker will fake a mental injury where no income benefits are available; and (2) medical benefits must still be reasonable and necessary. In short, there is very limited applicability. Accordingly, worker in this case was entitled to medical benefits because he met the threshold requirement of suffering an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.