specially concurring.
I concur with the result reached here, but write separately concerning the difficult parent/child and religious aspects of this case.
In 1982, after the victim, then 23 years old, had completed a year of study in California, she was in the process of returning to her home in Sweden when she was befriended by members of the Unification Church and soon became a member of it. Thereafter, her parents unsuccessfully tried to persuade her to leave the church.
The evidence here indicated the Church aggressively seeks new members and is very assertive about inculcating its members with its values and ideas. Also, there is evidentiary support for defendants’ claim that the Church dominates and controls the personal lives of its members, including the victim.
Many religions purport to be the one true religion and thus, the only way for a person to obtain salvation. The choice by a child of a religion different from that of the parents is viewed by some parents as a disastrous mistake by the child. Therefore, the estrangement of an adult child from the family in this way may cause extraordinary feeling of concern, loss, and anger.
Here, the Church was undoubtedly offensive to the parents, both because of its impact on their daughter and its unorthodox methods and beliefs. The parents suffered greatly both from losing their daughter and their worry about her situation. Such concern and anguish has, however, been experienced by generations of other parents whose children have not followed and accepted their secular and religious views. See L. Rosten, Religions in America (1963).
Until their children reach majority, parents have several legally imposed obligations. See, e.g., §§ 14-5-103, 14-6-110, 14-6-101, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B). With these responsibilities there is a right, within limits, to control the child and an opportunity to transmit religious and secular values from parent to child.
After their children reach majority, parents retain the right to persuade their adult children as to what they consider the proper religious and secular values, through discourse and other legally accepted methods. The parents, however, are not permitted to kidnap their adult children or otherwise illegally coerce them into changing their religion, lifestyle, or associates.
The freedoms of religion, speech, and association are protected against government control or influence by the First Amendment. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The right of an adult to choose a religion, friends, or lifestyle which significantly differs from his or her parents’ is an integral part of a free society. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). The right to pursue these objectives is protected through the enforcement of our criminal and civil laws. See Note, Cults, Depro-*681grammers, and the Necessity Defense, 80 Mich.L.Rev. 271 (1981).
Religions often command great allegiance from their followers. To people who stand outside the religion, the demand for this allegiance can appear domineering and destructive. Indeed, the evidence here, if believed, indicates the victim may have been controlled and directed to an extreme degree by the seemingly unorthodox practices of the Church. The right, however, of this adult woman to make her own decisions about religion and lifestyle far outweighs her parents’ claimed right to protect her from the folly of her ways.
It is possible that in certain extreme cases, religious and secular practices would be so imminently destructive to an adult individual that the choice of evils instruction would be viable for a defendant who committed criminal acts in attempting to save such person. For example, under appropriate factual circumstances, a religion that practices human sacrifice or which physically restrains or assaults its members might well warrant intervention that would be ostensibly criminal in nature.
The evidence in this case, however, does not create a picture of such imminent physical or severe mental harm. But see Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn.1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S.Ct. 1742, 68 L.Ed.2d 227 (1981). Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that, for some individuals, membership in a “cult” is psychologically beneficial, whereas deprogramming is harmful. See Note, Cults, Depro-grammers, and the Necessity Defense, 80 Mich.L.Rev. 271 (1981).
I, therefore, agree with the majority’s conclusion that, here, there was not, as a matter of law, sufficient evidence of imminent physical or severe psychological harm to justify this kidnapping.
Furthermore, if the choice of evils defense is permitted in cases such as the one at issue, the degree of religious orthodoxy will become a major aspect of the trial. Kidnapping charges should not be resolved by a jury on such a basis.
Excessive judicial inquiry into religious beliefs may itself constrain religious liberty. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944). A choice of evils defense, thus, should not be used as a vehicle to legitimize, in part, parental efforts to regain control over their adult children.
Although I agree with much of the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the majority I take exception to one part of the opinion. The majority states:
“However, the common law necessity defense is not available as an instrument for jury nullification of unpopular laws or for jury condonation of crimes committed against persons who espouse or adhere to unorthodox or unpopular causes that pose no threat of immediate injury.”
Since this statement is not necessary to the holding of this case, it is dicta. Furthermore, in my view, the application of the choice of evils statute to other circumstances, including “unjust causes,” should be considered by us only when it is the focus of specific factual circumstances.
Although not referenced in the majority opinion, in my view, the victim’s rights of freedom of religion, association, and speech are important implicit factors underlying this decision. The extreme nature of the offense, i. e., kidnapping, is also of significance. Furthermore, the facts here do not demonstrate an emergency situation in which injury was imminent. A case without these countervailing factors might result in a different conclusion as to the applicability of the choice of evils statute. Thus, the applicability of the choice of evils statute to a particular case depends on the social, political, and factual circumstance that underlie it.