dissenting.
I dissent from the conclusion of the majority in this case with respect to the plain meaning of I.C. § 20-605 and the duty it places on a city whose officers arrest violators of state motor vehicle laws. One does not have to read that statute “in a vacuum” to conclude that the majority’s extremely narrow interpretation of the city’s duty to pay the costs of confining such violators could not have been intended by the legislature when I.C. § 20-605 was passed in 1973.
Indeed, I agree that I.C. § 20-605 must be read in the context of other statutory provisions governing the allocation of the costs of enforcing state and local laws. Of critical importance to this analysis, however, is I.C. § 19-4705, which the majority *296completely ignores. It was enacted in 1969 and amended in 1971, just two years prior to the enactment of I.C. § 20-605. Subsection (c) of I.C. § 19-4705 directly addresses the allocation of money to the cities when their officers make the initial arrest of violators of state motor vehicle laws. I.C. § 19-4705(c) reads:
“19-4705. Payment of fines and forfeitures — Satisfaction of judgment — Disposition — Apportionment.
“(c) Fines and forfeitures remitted for violation of state motor vehicle laws, for violation of state driving privilege laws, and for violation of state laws prohibiting driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, shall be apportioned ten per cent (10%) to the state treasurer for deposit in the state general account, forty-five percent (45%) to the state treasurer for deposit in the highway distribution account, twenty-two and one-half per cent (22V2%) to the district court fund and twenty-two and one-half per cent {22lk%) to the state treasurer for deposit in the public school income fund; provided, however, that fines and forfeitures remitted for violation of state motor vehicle laws, for violation of state driving privilege laws, and for violation of state laws prohibiting driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, where an arrest is made or a citation is issued by a city law enforcement official, shall be apportioned ten per cent (10%) to the state treasurer for deposit in the state general account and ninety per cent (90%) to the city whose officer made the arrest or issued the citation.
By this enactment, the legislature expressly acknowledged the role that the cities play in the enforcement of state motor vehicle laws. Having turned over a substantial portion of the revenue from fines raised through city enforcement of state motor vehicle laws, the legislature took the next logical step and required the cities to pay the costs of confining those same violators who were generating this revenue. Thus, when the changes in I.C. § 20-605 were enacted in 1973, the legislature is assumed to have acted with full knowledge of the 90% allocation scheme it had set up just two years before. Since the city’s role in motor vehicle law enforcement is specifically acknowledged in both provisions, they must be read together in order to ascertain legislative intent.
This intent confirms the reading of I.C. § 20-605 based on its plain and ordinary language. As this Court noted in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 191 P.2d 359 (1948), “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover.” Id. at 192, 191 P.2d at 366; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, 105 Idaho 471, 475, 670 P.2d 878, 882 (1983). I am concerned that although my colleagues in the majority obviously exhibit an acute and powerful intellect, they have interpreted I.C. § 20-605 in a curious and unnecessarily narrow manner.
I would agree with the opinion of the Attorney General of Idaho, who said,
“The City should, logically, be responsible for jail costs of enforcing its ordinances. Aside from the lack of interest counties have in the enforcement of city ordinances, the logic of the statute’s cost provisions is enhanced when read beside the statutes pertaining to revenue generated by fines and forfeitures: cities receive 90 percent of the fines and forfeitures remitted for violation of city ordinances. Idaho Code Section 19-4705. Cities also receive 90 percent of fines and forfeitures resulting from their enforcement of state motor vehicle laws, therefor [sic], they bear the cost of imprisoning such offenders in the county jail.3 Idaho Code Section 20-605. While the sheriff, for reasons discussed below, cannot refuse to accept city prisoners for failure of the city to pay for its prison*297ers, the county would be justified in taking legal measures to recoup its charges, should the city refuse to pay for its prisoners as required by law.
“Inasmuch as cities provide police officers who assume responsibility similar to the sheriff’s in enforcing the state’s penal laws within that area of the county which lies within city limits, the legislature has apparently deemed it fair to apportion to the city 90 percent of any fines and forfeitures arising out of state criminal violations where an arrest is made by a city police officer. Idaho Code Section 19-4705.” Idaho Attorney General Opinion No. 84-4, at 44.
The Attorney General went on to explain in footnote 3 that,
“While Idaho Code Section 20-605 by itself might give the impression that cities are responsible only to counties other than the one in which they are located for costs of prisoners they have charged with motor vehicle violations, such a conclusion is illogical and unwarranted when Idaho Code Section 20-605 is read in the context of companion statutes. For instance, Idaho Code Section 19-604 [sic] allows a judge to commit an offender to ‘any county or municipal jail or other confinement facility within the judicial district in which the court is located,’ [emphasis supplied in the Opinion], and the city will be liable therefor for the cost of its prisoners.” Id. at 44 n. 3.
Although opinions of the Attorney General are not binding on this Court, they should, nevertheless, be accorded considerable weight, particularly where they concern the construction of statutes. Goodin v. Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 14, 601 P.2d 88, 91 (Okl.1979); Moore v. Panish, 32 Cal.3d 535, 543, 652 P.2d 32, 37, 186 Cal.Rptr. 475, 480 (1982).
The state has given the cities a considerable amount of money to help enforce state motor vehicle laws. Jailing violators is inherently a part of the enforcement of those laws. Therefore, it seems eminently logical to me, as it no doubt did to the 41st and 42nd legislatures, that the cities should pay the county in which violators arrested by city officers were ordered jailed. The city suggests it would be “manifestly unfair” to ask city residents to pay the jail costs which arise incident to the arrest of state motor vehicle law violators by city officers. Yet, this argument rings most hollow in light of the fact that each time a fine is paid by a violator arrested by a city officer, the state has allowed the city to retain 90%. If there is any unfairness in this case, it is in the curiously narrow meaning of § 20-605 inferred by the majority of the Court today which would have the county bear the full cost of jailing these violators unless they are fortuitously sent to another county’s jail.
It should be noted that the statute speaks in terms of paying the county, not the jail facility directly. The city’s duty under the statute is to reimburse the county where the court entered its order. Once fulfilled, it becomes the county’s task to pay the prisoner’s bill, whether that be in its own facility or that of another county. There is no provision making the city’s duty to pay contingent on where the court may send the prisoner.
There are many factors that enter a district court’s determination of where to send a prisoner. The fact that he was arrested by a city officer is irrelevant to that determination. Hence, it seems ironic that such a determination should, in turn, prove to be the critical event in preserving or relieving the city of its duty to pay. The city’s responsibility to pay is determined by three specifically enumerated factors: (1) who arrests the prisoner; (2) for what charge he was arrested; and (3) in what county the court issues its order. I disagree with the majority that a fourth factor should be implied into this duty to pay, i.e., where the court happens to send the prisoner to be housed.
As a result of today’s opinion, district judges may tend to send violators of state motor vehicle laws to jails outside the county where they sit, regardless of available space in the county’s own facility. Keep*298ing these violators in what will often be the most logical and convenient jail will be discouraged because the city, which was originally responsible for bringing them to justice, will not otherwise be forced to pick up the tab. This is an absurdly circuitous and administratively wasteful way to operate our local judicial system. The law was changed in 1971 and 1973 to make judicial administration by cities and counties more efficient, not more complicated. The extremely narrow reading of I.C. § 20-605 by the majority is unwarranted and will no doubt force the legislature to address this question once again. In the meantime, an allocation of costs inconsistent with the intent of I.C. §§ 20-605 and 19-4705 will be needlessly perpetuated in the cities and counties of Idaho.