dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It has been the law of North Carolina for more than one hundred years that
It is well recognized in this State that a will, properly executed, may so refer to another unattested will or other written paper or document as to incorporate the defective instrument and make the same a part of the perfect will, the conditions being that the paper referred to shall be in existence at the time the second will be executed, and the reference to it shall be in terms so clear and distinct that from a perusal of the second will, or with the aid of parol or other proper testimony, full *388assurance is given that the identity of the extrinsic paper has been correctly ascertained. The principle is sometimes referred to as “The doctrine of incorporation by reference,” ....
Watson v. Hinson, 162 N.C. 72, 79-80, 77 S.E. 1089, 1092 (1913).
The evidence in this case supports the finding of each of the requirements as set out in the Hinson opinion for the incorporation of the six typewritten pages as a part of the will of Lawrence Norton. The two-page codicil is a valid testamentary document, the Court of Appeals so held. No one has appealed from that holding. Under N.C.G.S. § 12-3(9), a codicil can be treated as a will. Therefore, documents can be incorporated by reference into a codicil. This is true whether they are attached or not. Further, N.C.G.S. § 31-5.8 provides that a will can be revived through an incorporation by reference. A duly executed codicil may incorporate a paper in the form of a will which was never properly executed as a will. Watson v. Hinson, 162 N.C. at 72, 77 S.E. at 1089. The conditions are that (1) the paper to be incorporated must be in existence at the time of the execution of the incorporating will and (2) the reference to the extraneous document must be in terms so clear and distinct that from a perusal of the second will or with the aid of parol or other proper testimony full assurance is given that the identity of the extrinsic paper has been correctly ascertained.
There is no argument but that the six typewritten pages were in existence at the time that the codicil was executed. No one disputes this point, and the evidence is overwhelming that the six-page document was prepared prior to 1977, and the codicil was executed in 1984.
I now turn my attention to whether the six-page document is sufficiently referred to in the codicil under the facts and circumstances of this case. The codicil refers to itself as a “Codicil to [Norton’s] Last Will and Testament.” The question is what is the will to which the testator so refers. The propounder argues that the “will” has to mean the will found and attached to the codicil; this seems reasonable to me. Under the facts of this case the six pages were stapled to a lightweight cardboard legal cover together with the two-page codicil. The legal cover had the title: “Will of Lawrence Norton and Codicil to the Will of Lawrence Norton.” The stapled papers were inside another legal envelope which bore the same inscription. The evidence further shows that the testator presented the two-page codicil and the six-page docu*389ment to his granddaughter and asked her to staple them together. He told his granddaughter that the six pages had to be attached to the will “if they were to be any good.” This could only mean that he intended the entire eight pages to be his will. At that time he was clearheaded and deliberate in his intention to incorporate the six pages into his will. Thereafter, Norton took the papers to his bank and placed them in his lock box. The lock box was not re-opened until after Norton’s death.
The trial judge erred in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be imposed unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery cannot be had by the plaintiff upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish. Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 329 S.E.2d 333 (1985); Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977). In looking at the parol evidence and the extrinsic document, it is apparent beyond any misapprehension that the testator intended that the entire eight pages be his last will and testament. The stapling of the six-page document to the duly executed codicil and the testimony as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the stapling of the documents and the placing of them in the safety deposit box of the testator give full assurance as to the identity of the extrinsic paper being incorporated.
The actions of the testator with respect to the incorporation by reference of the six-page typewritten document to his two-page codicil was done in accordance with Hinson, 162 N.C. 72, 77 S.E. 1089, and there was evidence sufficient to submit this issue to the jury. The jury found in favor of the propounder. I conclude that the trial judge erred in entering the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and that the Court of Appeals subsequently erred in affirming this action. My vote is to reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the verdict of the jury.
Chief Justice EXUM and Justice Frye join in this dissenting opinion.