concurring specially.
I concur only in the judgment of the majority’s opinion. A review of Ga. L. 1986, p. 982 supports Judge Cooper’s position in his dissent that the 1986 amendments to OCGA §§ 29-5-11 and 5-3-29 effected no change in the law regarding de novo appeals from probate courts in non-jury trial cases to superior courts. Nothing in Lee v. Wainwright, 256 Ga. 478 (350 SE2d 238) (1986) or Shockley v. Fayette County, 260 Ga. 489, 492, n. 1 (396 SE2d 883) (1990) supports a conclusion that Williams v. Calloway, 171 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (319 SE2d 500) (1984) and Mathews v. Mathews, 136 Ga. App. 833, 836-838 (2) (222 SE2d 609) (1975), as modified by this court in Russell v. Flynn, 191 Ga. App. 196, 197-198 (2) (381 SE2d 142) (1989), have been overruled. Contrary to the majority’s position, I find Russell to *870be still valid law and to control the result here. Accordingly, since under Russell, appellants were not precluded in superior court by the holding in Williams and Mathews from raising in their de novo appeal all issues which could have been raised in the probate court whether or not actually raised therein, I agree that the superior court erred by refusing to consider appellants’ newly raised issue of appellee’s unfitness to serve as Rogers’ guardian as a ground for his removal.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this special concurrence.