dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, probable cause existed to *72obtain a warrant to search for and seize the marijuana plant, but only the bald suspicion of Officer Lambert supported the search for narcotics, narcotics paraphernalia, and amphetamines. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that there was probable cause to search for and seize the plant and would concur in the trial court’s finding and ruling that probable cause did not exist to obtain a search warrant or to make an exploratory search of the entire apartment for anything else.
On the day that the search was made, Coon, who worked for a utility company in Fort Collins, was asked to repair the electric meter at 224 East Elizabeth Street. When he arrived, he saw a growing marijuana plant in the window. An occupant of the premises permitted him to enter after he identified himself, and no narcotics were seen by Coon inside of the house, except for one marijuana plant. Coon, who also served as an auxiliary police officer in Fort Collins, told Officer Lambert about the presence of one marijuana plant in the window of the house at 224 East Elizabeth Street. Lambert signed an affidavit which stated that Coon had seen three growing marijuana plants, when Coon had, in fact, told Lambert that he saw only one plant. The affidavit also contained Lambert’s conclusion that there was concealed within the house other narcotics, dangerous drugs and implements and paraphernalia involved in drug use. His only basis for the assertion that narcotics apart from one marijuana plant were present on the premises was his conclusion that the items which he specified could generally be found whenever narcotics were seized in the search of a house.
The narrow issue which is before us is whether the information presented to the police to establish probable cause justifies the issuance of a warrant which directs an exploratory search for narcotics. We have not previously been called upon to address the question of the manner or the limitations of the scope of a search that is conducted pursuant to a limited showing of probable cause. A search predicated upon probable cause should be geared to reasonable limitations. Probable cause cannot be predicated upon mere speculation or suspicion. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
The police, in executing the search warrant, were entitled to *73enter the premises, search for and find, if possible, the growing marijuana plant which Coon had seen and specifically identified. In this case, the police entered the defendants’ apartment and found the growing marijuana plant in the precise location that Coon had described. Having found the plant, they proceeded to search the bedrooms which the defendants occupied, opened a tackle box and generally searched every part of the apartment for narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia.
In their search, the police officers transgressed upon and invaded a zone of privacy which could not be justified on the basis of Coon’s information or Officer Lambert’s conclusions. The mere presence of a growing marijuana plant does not grant the police the right to make an exploratory search of everything that is contained within a house. Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 7; U.S. Const. amend. IV. See People v. McGahey, 179 Colo. 401, 500 P.2d 977 (1972); United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972). Compare Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The conclusion of Officer Lambert that narcotics paraphernalia and other narcotics could generally be found when a successful search was made for narcotics does not support the search warrant or the search which occurred in this case. The only basis for the assertion was the suspicion and conclusion that certain specified items were associated with and could be found whenever narcotics were seized in the search of a house. It is unreasonable to infer from the existence of one growing marijuana plant that the additional drugs and paraphernalia listed in the search warrant were present in the house. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969). See People v. Senkir, 26 Cal.App.3d 411, 103 Cal.Rptr. 138 (1972).
This conclusion does not suggest that the police could not have seized any contraband that they came across in reasonably executing the search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). If other narcotics had been observed in executing the warrant, a broader search could have been conducted. However, the discovery of the growing marijuana plant did not justify the exploratory search.
Even .though the search was overly broad, the seizure of the *74marijuana plant complied with constitutional standards and prevents the suppression of that evidence. United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440 (2nd Cir. 1974).
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order suppressing all evidence seized in the course of the exploratory search, except for the marijuana plant.
MR. JUSTICE GROVES joins me in this dissent.