dissenting:
If a well-intentioned motive to foster economic development in the state were the controlling constitutional standard for evaluating House Bills 1005 and 1009, I would have little hesitation in concluding that both bills pass constitutional muster. The well-intentioned motive of lawmakers, however, is not a surrogate for objective constitutional norms applicable to legislative enactments. While there is a presumption of constitutionality attaching to a statute, I am satisfied that the statutory scheme under consideration violates the constitutional proscription against special legislation in Article V, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. Furthermore, because House Bills 1005 and 1009 establish economic incentives that are peculiarly tailored to grant a special privilege to United Airlines, I am unable to conclude that these bills satisfy the public-purpose doctrine which is applicable not only to governmental grants to a corporation, Colo. Const, art. XI, § 2, but also to a legislative appropriation to a corporation for industrial purposes, Colo. Const, art. Y, § 34. I accordingly dissent from the court’s opinion and would declare House Bills 1005 and 1009 unconstitutional.
*897I.
A general law is one that operates uniformly “upon all in like situation.” People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 264, 94 P. 294, 302 (1908); accord, Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 337, 14 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1932). A special law, in contrast, is one that is enacted for an individual case and singles out a particular person, entity, or selective group of persons or entities for special treatment to the exclusion of other persons or entities within the same class. See, e.g., Morgan County Junior College Dist. v. Jolly, 168 Colo. 466, 470, 452 P.2d 34, 36 (1969); In re Constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 293, 21 Colo. 38, 40-41, 39 P. 522, 523 (1895); see generally 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 40.04 (4th ed. 1986). Article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing a special law in twenty-three enumerated cases including, as critical here, a special law “granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.” This constitutional provision also states that in all other cases “where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.”1 The purpose of article Y, section 25 is to protect against legislative enactments that either benefit or disadvantage a particular person, entity, or artificially created group. Denver v. Bach, 26 Colo. 530, 533, 58 P. 1089, 1090 (1899).
If, of course, the subject matter of proposed legislation does not fall within the prohibited list of enumerated cases, then the General Assembly may enact a special law to address the particular problem as long as a general law cannot be made applicable to the case. E.g., Morgan County Junior College, 168 Colo. at 470, 452 P.2d at 36. Although the decision whether a general law can or cannot achieve the purpose sought to be accomplished is for the legislature to make, it remains the constitutional responsibility of this court to thwart any legislative effort, however bona fide, to evade the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. E.g., Coulter v. Board of County Commissioners, 9 Colo. 258, 260-61, 11 P. 199, 200-01 (1886). The fact that the inclusion of a legislative grant of special privilege to a corporation is within the prohibited list of twenty-ihree enumerated cases means simply that any law granting such privilege must be by general law.
Neither the Governor nor the General Assembly disputes the fact that the creation of a business incentive fund and the allocation of aviation fuel tax revenues to that fund are matters which can be addressed by general laws. Furthermore, the General Assembly has made no determination that general laws could not adequately address these matters, nor did it enact House Bills 1005 and 1009 as special laws. The critical issue before us, therefore, is whether House Bills 1005 and 1009 are special laws. If they are, then it neces*898sarily follows that they violate the constitutional proscription against the legislative enactment of a special law which grants a special privilege to a corporation.
The determination of the status of a bill as a general or special law turns ultimately on the purpose of the legislative enactment. There is no more revealing source for determining legislative purpose than the official remarks of the Governor in convening the extraordinary session of the General Assembly and the comments of legislators during committee hearings on the bills. In resolving the question before us, we should not limit ourselves to the statutory language employed by the General Assembly. We recognized as much in In re Senate Bill No. 95, 146 Colo. 233, 361 P.2d 350 (1961), where we invalidated a statute that authorized a city or city and county surrounding a town of less than 640 acres to annex the surrounded town. While the bill in that case was written in general terms, this court emphasized that as judges we may not close our eyes to facts which “we conclusively know to be true” and which were known to every member of the legislature and to every other interested person when the bill in question was enacted. 146 Colo. at 238, 361 P.2d at 353. In striking down the bill as special legislation uniquely tailored to provide for the annexation of Glendale by the City and County of Denver, we stated:
Having twice attempted, without success, to annex Glendale under provision of the existing law, those advocating annexation (no doubt with the best of motives) seek by the proposal in question to accomplish by compulsion, powered by this special act, that which they have been unable to accomplish by application of the general law upon the subject.
This is exactly what the constitution forbids in plain language. Senate Bill No. 95 was unquestionably conceived, cut, tailored and amended to accomplish a particular purpose with reference to a particular area, to-wit, Glendale. Once having accomplished that particular purpose the act would die before it could possibly accomplish a like purpose in any another place. The thin veneer of language used to “get around” the constitutional prohibition, and to give the measure a mask of general application, falls from the face of the bill when considered in the light of common knowledge of which we may take judicial notice.
146 Colo. at 239, 361 P.2d at 354. In answering the Governor’s interrogatory, therefore, we should properly take notice, at a minimum, of those matters known to and expressed by the Governor in calling the extraordinary session for passage of these bills and those matters known to and expressed by the members of the General Assembly in enacting the legislation in question.
II.
An examination of the legislative record surrounding House Bills 1005 and 1009 leads me to conclude that these bills were conceived by the Governor as an economic incentive uniquely tailored to obtain a commitment from United Airlines to operate a maintenance facility in the Denver area and were enacted by the General Assembly to achieve that purpose and no other. The statutory scheme under consideration was enacted by the General Assembly at a special session convened by the Governor pursuant to article IV, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution. In his proclamation, the Governor described the purpose of the session as follows:
Concerning incentives for employers who establish or commence construction of a new business facility on or before July 1, 1994 in an enterprise zone in a Metropolitan Statistical Area that will employ at least 3,000 new employees at an average annual salary of at least $45,000 or in an enterprise zone in a non-Metropolitan Statistical Area that will employ at least 1,500 new employees at an average annual salary of at least $45,000, and the financing of such incentives.
Concerning the allocation of revenues attributable to taxes imposed on aviation fuel, and, in connection therewith, providing for the use of such moneys, and making an appropriation in connection therewith.
*899The Governor’s proclamation, although in general terms, was more precisely informed by his address to the General Assembly. In that address the Governor left no doubt that the purpose of the special session was to respond to the proposal of United Airlines to operate a maintenance facility in the Denver area in return for sufficient economic incentives from the state. The Governor specifically told the General Assembly that “[w]hen we look at this particular issue on the table, namely the MOC [maintenance] facility and the United proposal, it has a uniqueness because it relates to a very critical piece of infrastructure in this state, and that’s a transportation hub.” (Tape recording of Governor’s Message to Joint Session of General Assembly, First Extraordinary Session, June 4, 1991). The Governor described the United Airlines offer as “a thirty year deal” and stated that “[i]n reference to our commitment of resources to this job opportunity and this airport, we are looking at a present value of somewhere around 150 to 200 million.” Id. He then acknowledged that the United Airlines offer “was worth our paying the price,” stating:
I was very pragmatic about it. It is a piece of infrastructure_ Now therefore we have a question on our table. [I]s it worth it to us to spend that kind of money to do this[?] Now let me quickly add, I don’t like to do that. I was not happy when that price came to me and I said that publicly. But you’ve got to look at where we are in the world, we are in a world in which airlines have options, and they surely do and they are playing these options with a tough hand. I don’t like it, but it’s the world. And it is probably what anyone would do who is running that kind of an airline. They are going to say ... we’re going to go where we get the best value and that’s what we’re in. Therefore, as a person who has been representing you in economic development for five years, I looked at this deal, I looked at it very closely, and I said yes, it’s worth it.
Id.
The Governor then urged the General Assembly to consider the following statutory scheme:
Take that revenue stream from the fuel tax, put it in a fund, dedicate that fund to do two things, one, to finance the incentive that we need to finance with United to make that airport that much better in terms of its traffic and its business and its job creation, and at the same time take care of the obligation to rural Colorado, but with two exceptions or additions. For rural Colorado you may need to add more money if you find that you need all of the aviation fuel tax in order to constitutionally cover yourself with United....
* * * * * *
This is a deal that ought to be made, this is a deal that ought to work.... I’d love to have you come and pay me the kind of incentive that we’re talking about paying United, I’d love it. But you shouldn’t do it because I don’t need it. I was here anyway. Or I would have come here anyway.... But if you’re in a marketplace where everybody wants that maintenance facility you may have to and you do have to bring some incentives to the table. So I would like to say to you that I think that we can together work out these distinctions, I think that we can together find a way that this deal makes sense and we ought to be entrepreneurial about it.
Id.
Similar comments were echoed by members of the General Assembly. When House Bill 1005 was considered by the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Owens expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to bring “United Airlines to Colorado.” (Tape recording of Senate Finance Committee Hearings on House Bill 1005, First Extraordinary Session, June 7, 1991). Senator Mendez during the same hearing expressed concern that there was only one company, United Airlines, “that really is seeking” the incentive package. Id. Senator Trujillo was opposed to House Bill 1005 precisely because, in his words, “the level of payment, the level of employees, the *900sunset date,” relate only to the United Airlines offer to operate a maintenance facility in the Denver area. Id. In addressing these concerns, Senator Strickland, the President of the Senate, left no doubt about the special character of the proposed legislative package. Speaking to the concern about whether or not House Bill 1005 was designed for United Airlines, he stated, “There has never been anybody that I know of that has ever denied that.” Id. Senator Fenlon, the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, corroborated these remarks by stating:
[Y]ou know, I know, the media knows, everybody in this room knows that we are here to take advantage of United Airlines and their effort to come here, we want that benefit here. We’re trying to do it in a way that meets constitutional muster, so the bill has been drafted to do just that.2
III.
Although the statutory scheme is written in general terms, the operative effect of the legislation is to provide United Airlines, and only United Airlines, with a $115,000,-000 incentive for locating its airline maintenance facility in the Denver metropolitan area. This is obvious from a review of the structure of the legislation.
The declared purposes of House Bill 1005 are to develop and expand employment opportunities in the state and to stabilize the state’s economic base. § 24-46.5-101. The bill ostensibly seeks to accomplish those objectives by creating the Colorado Business Incentive Fund, which consists of moneys generated by sales and use taxes on Denver airport aviation fuel, § 24-46.5-102, which moneys would otherwise have been transferred from the aviation fund to the City and County of Denver pursuant to section 43-10-110. The aggregate amount of monies available to any one business entity cannot exceed $115,000,000. § 24-46.5-103(5).
House Bill 1005 authorizes the State of Colorado to enter into an intergovernmental agreement with a local government, such as the City and County of Denver, or the Colorado Housing and Finance Authority, or both, pursuant to which monies from the “Colorado Business Incentive Fund shall be expended for economic development purposes.” § 24-46.5-103(l)(a). Any intergovernmental agreement must be conditioned upon an agreement between the local government and the business entity establishing a new business facility that the business entity will operate the new facility for not less than thirty years and will employ not less than 3,000 employees by July 1 of the tenth year following the effective date of the agreement at an average annual salary for all employees of at least $45,000. § 24-46.5-103(2)(a) & (b). The bill also requires that “[t]he terms of the intergovernmental agreement shall provide that the entity shall employ no less than a total of 2,000 employees at ancillary facilities within Colorado to the facility by July 1 of the tenth year following the effective date of such agreement for the operation of said facility” at an annual average salary for all employees of at least $22,500. § 24-46.5-103(2)(c). Under the statutory scheme, the Colorado Business Incentive Fund serves as the conduit for dispersing the $115,000,000 to the business entity.
That the purpose of House Bill 1005 is to provide a $115,000,000 economic incentive to United Airlines for its decision to locate a maintenance facility in the Denver area is obvious from House Bill 1009. Section 43-10-110(2) provides that if an intergovernmental agreement is entered into pursuant to the provisions of section 24-46.5-103(1), which relates to the intergovernmental agreement for expenditure of the moneys from the Colorado Business Incentive Fund, then the portion of the sales and use tax revenues that would otherwise be transferred to the governmental entity “op*901erating the largest airport in the state [i.e., the City and County of Denver] shall be transferred to the Colorado Business Incentive Fund created in section 24-46.5-102, C.R.S.” This section further provides that “[i]f such an intergovernmental agreement is entered into, moneys shall be transferred by the state treasurer, beginning July 1, 1991, for the length of the intergovernmental agreement.”
Given the fact that the Governor informed the General Assembly that United Airlines’ offer to operate a maintenance facility would require a “thirty year deal” as well as state incentives amounting to “around 150 to 200 million” dollars, there remains no doubt that the legislative decision to cap the Colorado Business Incentive Fund at $115,000,000 for any one entity was intended as a legislative response to the “United deal.” Indeed, neither the Governor nor the General Assembly dispute the fact that the so-called “United deal” would consume all the money available under the Colorado Business Incentive Fund. I thus view the Governor’s remarks to the General Assembly and the several comments made by legislators during committee hearings on House Bill 1005 as unimpeachable proof that the statutory conditions relating to the Colorado Business Incentive Fund — the $115,000,000 incentive package, the duration of the intergovernmental agreement, the number of employees employed at the maintenance facility, and the salary of those employees — were fashioned for no purpose other than to provide United Airlines with a sufficient economic incentive to locate its airline maintenance facility in the Denver metropolitan area.
In upholding the constitutionality of the statutory scheme, the majority acknowledges that the constitutional prohibition against special legislation is “more than a redundant equal protection clause,” and then reasons that “if an act is challenged as special legislation, and an enumerated prohibition is implicated, the threshold question is whether the classification adopted by the legislature is a real or potential class, or whether it is logically and factually limited to a class of one and thus illusory.” Maj. op. at 886. In my view, a statutory scheme may logically and factually limit a class to one person or entity and not necessarily be illusory so long as the class remains open to admission of other members. See Darrow v. People ex rel. Norris, 8 Colo. 417, 418-19, 8 P. 661, 662 (1885). Having said as much, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislation under consideration actually creates genuine and reasonable classifications between persons or business entities. Maj. op. at 887-888.
The classifications identified by the majority are lacking in substance. The first classification to which the majority refers is between “aviation-related entities and all other entities.” Maj. op. at 887. The Colorado Business Incentive Fund created by House Bill 1005, however, is limited to moneys transferred to the fund from revenues in the aviation fund. Because moneys in the aviation fund must be used exclusively for aviation purposes, and because no other monies are identified for funding non-aviation business incentives, the purported classification between aviation-related entities and all other entities has no foundation in the historical circumstances out of which the statutory scheme emerged. As evidenced by the statements of various legislators during committee hearings, House Bill 1005 has been tailored to fit the pattern designed by the Governor in his address to the General Assembly. Pursuant to that design, all moneys available from the Colorado Business Incentive Fund are intended for United Airlines only. So considered, House Bill 1005 must be viewed as nothing less than special legislation.
The majority next identifies a classification between “entities establishing new businesses in Colorado that will operate a facility for at least thirty years and employ at least 3,000 people paid an average of $45,000 per year, and all other businesses.” Maj. op. at 887. The two components of this classification, however, as manifested in the remarks of the Governor to the General Assembly, the legislative history of House Bill 1005, and the design and *902operation of the statutory scheme are, on the one hand, United Airlines, the only business entity to which the $115,000,000 incentive package is directed, and, on the other hand, all other businesses. Since no incentive funding is identified or available for the other businesses, the suggested classification is an inadequate foundation for supporting the conclusion that House Bill 1005 satisfies the requirements of a general law.
The majority’s effort to salvage House Bill 1005 on the basis of a purported classification between “the establishment of new facilities and expansion of existing facilities” is similarly misplaced. Maj. op. at 887. Subsection (2)(b) of section 24-46.5-103 requires the terms of the intergovernmental agreement to provide that the business entity operating the new business facility shall employ 3,000 persons at an average annual salary of at least $45,000, while subsection (2)(c) of this section states that the terms of the intergovernmental agreement require the entity to employ no less than a total of 2,000 employees “at ancillary facilities within Colorado to the facility” at an average annual salary of at least $25,000. It is not axiomatic from this statutory terminology that subsection (2)(c) contemplates a business entity other than United Airlines operating a facility “ancillary” to the new business facility. The ordinary meaning of the term “ancillary” is subordinate or auxiliary to something — in this case the “something” is the new business facility. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 80 (1986). See Black’s Law Dictionary 78 (5th ed. 1979). The language of subsection (2)(c) is aimed at “the [business] entity” described in subsection (2)(b) and at a facility “ancillary” to that business entity’s new business facility. If subsection (2)(b) is directed to United Airlines — a fact that the General Assembly does not dispute — the import of subsection (2)(c) would seem to be that the General Assembly also intended United Airlines to operate the ancillary facility.
The General Assembly, however, reads subsection (2)(c) differently and, after conceding in its brief that subsection (2)(b) is intended to benefit United Airlines for its decision to locate and operate the new business facility in the Denver area, argues that in order to placate “potential criticisms of legislation which appeared to benefit only one airline,” it defined “the class more broadly” to include an “aviation-related economic development which could benefit other business firms.” I find this argument devoid of merit. Even if the statutory text of subsection (2)(c) might be stretched to include a business entity other than United Airlines, the absence of any identifiable funds for such an enterprise renders the purported classification gossamer-like at best and inadequate to the task of dispelling the “special law” character of the overreaching statutory scheme, the paramount purpose of which is to award all Colorado Business Incentive Fund moneys to United Airlines.
Finally, the majority extracts from House Bill 1005 a classification between a business entity establishing a new business facility pursuant to subsection (1) of section 24-46.5-103 and some other non-aviation business entity establishing a new business facility pursuant to subsection (3) of the statute. Maj. op. at 887. I acknowledge that section 24-46.5-103(3) purports to authorize local governments to enter into intergovernmental agreements with non-aviation business entities. Article X, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution, however, requires that revenues from aviation fuel taxes “be used exclusively for aviation purposes,” and thus constitutes an insurmountable barrier to using aviation fuel tax revenues as an incentive to a non-aviation business entity. In light of the patent lack of any statutory funding source for an intergovernmental agreement between a local government and a non-aviation business entity, the purported classification between an aviation-related business entity and a non-aviation business entity represents an ineffective legislative effort to provide an ostensible semblance of generality to a bill that is fundamentally “special” in conception, design, and effect.
Viewed from the perspective of historical fact, the use of generic language in House Bills 1005 and 1009 represents a legislative *903effort to sidestep the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. As this court stated in In re Senate Bill No. 95, “[t]he thin veneer of language used to ‘get around’ the constitutional prohibition, and to give the measure a mask of general application, falls from the face of the bill when considered in the light of common knowledge of which we may take judicial notice.” 146 Colo, at 239, 361 P.2d at 354. I view the majority’s analysis of House Bills 1005 and 1009 as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. The majority’s “classification” rationale is nothing but a parade of supposedly objective criteria that mask what in reality is a legislative grant of special privilege to one corporation, United Airlines. The result of the court’s holding, in my view, is to allow the clever use of generic statutory terminology to effectively dispatch the constitutional prohibition against special legislation in Article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution.
IV.
Because I am of the view that House Bills 1005 and 1009 violate the constitutional prohibition against special legislation granting a corporation a special privilege, I am also convinced that both bills fail to satisfy the public-purpose doctrine and thus violate the constitutional prohibition against state aid to a corporation, Colo. Const. Art. XI, sec. 2, and the constitutional proscription against making an appropriation for industrial purposes to a corporation, Colo. Const, art. V, sec. 34. The public-purpose doctrine is not the equivalent of the rational-basis standard of review applicable to due process analysis, for if the existence of any legitimate governmental interest can effectively insulate a statute from the Anti-Donation and Private Appropriation Clauses of the Colorado Constitution, then the constitutional proscription against special legislation would be utterly “nugatory and valueless.” Colorado Central R.R. v. Lea, 5 Colo. 192, 196 (1879).
In Americans United for Separation of Church and State Fund, Inc. v. State of Colorado, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo.1982), we upheld the Colorado Student Incentive Grant Program against a constitutional challenge that the program constituted an appropriation of state funds to an educational institution not under the absolute control of the state for educational purposes in violation of Article V, Section 34, of the Colorado Constitution. In concluding that the statutory incentive program satisfied a public purpose in conformity with the Colorado Constitution, we added this caveat:
We do not mean to imply that because a public purpose may be presumed from the passage of a legislative enactment, any statutory appropriation would pass muster under Article V, Section 34. On the contrary, the legislation must evince a discrete and particularized public purpose which, when measured against the proscription of Article V, Section 34, preponderates over any individual interests incidentally served by the statutory program.
648 P.2d at 1086 (footnote omitted).
I fully endorse the proposition that the development and expansion of employment opportunities in the state and the stabilization of the state’s economic base are legitimate governmental objectives. It is conjectural at best, however, whether most, some, or even any of the 3,000 jobs at the “new business facility” or the 2,000 jobs at the “ancillary facility” will be filled by Colorado residents. The resulting uncertainty of employment prospects for Colorado residents militates against the legislative declaration that “the public purpose served by the passage of this article outweighs all of the individual interests.” § 24-46.5-101. Added to that fact are the Governor’s remarks to the General Assembly, the available legislative history of House Bill 1005, and the design and operative effect of the statutory scheme, all of which demonstrate quite conclusively that the paramount and clearly preponderating purpose of the legislation before us is to provide sufficient economic incentives to satisfy the individual interests of United Airlines.
I therefore would hold House Bills 1005 and 1009 violative of the constitutional proscription against special legislation, Colo. *904Const, art. V, § 25, the constitutional prohibition against a state grant in aid of a corporation, Colo. Const, art. XI, § 2, and the constitutional proscription against an appropriation to a corporation for industrial purposes, Colo. Const, art. V, § 34. I accordingly dissent.
ROVIRA, C.J., joins in this dissent.. Article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution states in its entirety:
Section 25. Special legislation prohibited. The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated case's, that is to say; for granting divorces; laying out, opening, altering or working roads or highways; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds; locating or changing county seats; regulating county or township affairs; regulating the practice in courts of justice; regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables; changing the rules of evidence in any trial or inquiry; providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases; declaring any person of age; for limitation of civil actions or giving effect to informal or invalid deeds; summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries; providing for the management of common schools; regulating the rate of interest on money; the opening or conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting; the sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors or others under disability; the protection of game or fish; chartering or licensing ferries or toll bridges; remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures; creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers; changing the law of descent; granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks; granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.
. The extraordinary session of the General Assembly generated such a media blitz that it would be disingenuous to say that a Colorado resident with a modicum of curiosity about matters of public interest would not know that the sole purpose of the session was to enact legislation designed to provide United Airlines with sufficient economic benefits to induce it to locate its maintenance facility in the Denver metropolitan area.