dissenting.
In my opinion, the City’s Domestic Partnership Benefits Ordinance is unconstitutional because it is in direct conflict with state law, and the trial court correctly so held. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
The City is authorized to provide insurance benefits to its employees’ dependents. OCGA § 36-35-4 (a). The City has no authority, however, to define “dependents” in a manner which is inconsistent with state law. City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 164 (2) (454 SE2d 517) (1995). “ ‘[I]t may be said in general terms that a “dependent” is one who looks to another for support, one dependent on another for the ordinary necessities of life. . . Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Jordan, 56 Ga. App. 449, 452-453 (1) (193 SE 96) (1937). The City’s ordinance does not comport with this definition, but defines a “dependent” as one who relies upon its employees “in order to maintain his or her standard of living” and who complies with the City’s domestic partnership registry ordinance. Thus, the City’s ordinance does not purport to provide insurance coverage only for those who must rely upon its employees for their “support” or “the ordinary necessities of life,” but to furnish such coverage for those who have entered voluntarily into a “domestic partnership” with its employees and who have agreed to a combination of resources for their mutual support.
In Georgia, a municipality “may not enact ordinances defining family relationships. The Georgia General Assembly has provided for the establishment of family relationships by general law. [Cits.]” City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 164 (2). The City’s “domestic partnership” ordinance defines in detail a new relationship which is very similar to marriage. See OCGA §§ 19-3-1; 19-3-2. In City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 163 (1), this Court upheld the constitutionality of the City’s registry ordinance because “we construe[d] [it] as creating *591only a registration system and not any legal rights.” (Emphasis supplied.) In a clear departure from this prior holding, the majority today views the ordinance as creating much more than a mere registration system. Contrary to the letter, spirit and intent of City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra, the majority now construes the ordinance as creating a legal right to insurance coverage as a “dependent” under OCGA § 36-35-4 (a). However, the Georgia Constitution clearly precludes the City from doing so. With regard to the creation of legal rights arising from domestic relations, the general state law of marriage and divorce preempts the municipal domestic partnership benefits ordinance. Georgia Const, of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a); OCGA § 36-35-6 (a); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 164 (2). The Municipal Home Rule Act, OCGA § 36-35-1 et seq., “indicates that the state does ‘ “not wish to give our cities the power to enact a distinctive law of contract.” ’ [Cit.]” City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 164 (2). “[C]ities in this, state may not enact ordinances defining family relationships.” City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 164 (2). Thus, the City has no authority, through its ordinance, to create a contract, comparable to that of marriage, and to confer upon the parties to that contract the same rights and responsibilities, such as the right to mutual support, as are enjoyed by those who enter into a marriage sanctioned by the state.
The City’s ordinance disclaims the creation of marital relationship and the intent to alter or affect Georgia laws regulating private or civil relationships. However, phraseology cannot save a municipal ordinance which is unconstitutional. The “special laws” provision of the Georgia Constitution, which prohibits a municipality from enacting an ordinance defining a family relationship, “would he nullified if by play upon words and definitions the courts should hold valid a special law when there existed at the same time of its enactment a general law covering the same subject-matter.” (Emphasis supplied.) City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 623 (1) (19 SE2d 508) (1942). Here, by utilizing the same type of semantic maneuver rejected in Hudgins, the City seeks to create a legal right to insurance coverage for those who enter into a domestic partnership with its employees. In City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 163 (1), we clearly held that the creation of such a legal right would be unconstitutional and I dissent to the majority’s failure to adhere to that controlling precedent, which mandates the affirmance of the trial court’s holding that the City’s Domestic Partners Benefits Ordinance is unconstitutional.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.
*592Decided November 3, 1997. Clifford E. Hardwick, Kendric E. Smith, Robin J. Shahar, for appellant. Robert J. Proctor, David J. Reed, for appellee. Harry H. Harkins, Jr., J. Patrick McCrary, Mary Ann B. Oakley, amici curiae.