This is a criminal sentencing case. The appeal challenges a life sentence, with the first fifteen years fixed and the balance indeterminate. This sentence was given to a fourteen-year-old boy who pled guilty to the second-degree murder of his father.
We hold that the sentence is not unreasonable under our existing standards for reviewing sentences on appeal. We decline the invitation to develop a modified standard for reviewing the sentence of a child under the age of sixteen who is sentenced for murder as an adult. We also hold that the sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment under either art. 1, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution or the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
Jeremy Broadhead was fourteen years old when he shot and killed his father. Pursuant to the automatic waiver provision of our Youth Rehabilitation Act (I.C. § 16-1806A(l)(a)), Jeremy was charged as an adult with the crime of first-degree murder. Several months later, Jeremy pled guilty to an amended charge of second-degree murder. After receiving a presentence investigation report, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing.
The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing indicated that Jeremy’s parents were divorced when Jeremy was seven years old. Jeremy lived with his mother in eastern Idaho until he was thirteen, when he began living with his father in southwestern Idaho. Jeremy was an average student and an excellent athlete. He had no prior arrest record, although he had taken his father’s pickup truck without permission a few months before the murder and had driven to southeastern Idaho.
While he was living with his father, Jeremy and his father had some disputes concerning his performance at school and his social activities. His father grounded Jeremy for some periods and restricted his use of the telephone. During the days prior to the murder, Jeremy considered shooting his father and discussed this with his friends. After the murder, Jeremy informed some of his friends what he had done and showed .them his father’s body. Jeremy then took his father's credit cards, some money, and his father’s pickup, before spending the night with a friend.
Prior to sentencing Jeremy, the trial court considered the presentence report and the testimony of several experts who described Jeremy’s psychological circumstances before and after the murder. In sentencing Jeremy, the trial court specifically considered that Jeremy was only fourteen years old and that prison is not a good setting for him. The trial court stated that Jeremy would be helped best by a therapeutic environment and that Jeremy would be at risk from other inmates at the penitentiary because of his age. In addition to considering what was in Jeremy’s best interest, the trial court considered Jeremy’s rehabilitation, the protection of society, deterrence of Jeremy and others, and punishment or retribution. The trial court concluded:
Now, looking at these considerations, I think that the fact of the matter is that the defendant is not an evil person; the defendant is a person who did something evil. And there has to be a punishment component to this sentence.
The psychologists have been very honest with us, I think, very up front with us. They say, well, we don’t think that he is any more of a risk to society than any other person would be, but we don’t know that. All we do know is that he killed somebody before.
So I think that there has to be a consideration of protection of society from a *143person who has demonstrated by his own acts that he kills.
The issue of deterrence, people talk about for years — have talked about for a long time is, does a sentence deter a crime of violence of this type, a senseless crime of this type? And they suggest that it probably will never deter this type of crime. And so I really don’t think that deterrence is a factor that is a major consideration.
The last thing is the issue of rehabilitation. I look at that, the question of rehabilitation. I feel that a prison sentence is probably going to do — we’re talking just on that issue, the prison sentence is going to more harm than good.
But I just feel that it’s so important that this case is — that this type of a crime is so bad there’s no excuse for it. That the overwhelming considerations in this case are punishment and protection of society.
The trial court sentenced Jeremy to a life term, with the first fifteen years fixed and the balance indeterminate. The trial court explained this structure of the sentence:
So there will be a portion of this fixed and a portion indeterminate so that the State will be able to, at the end of the fixed portion of the sentence, better determine when it would be in the best interest of society for the defendant to be placed on parole and placed back into society.
I am going to give the State the maximum possible option so that they will have the maximum possible time to make that decision.
Jeremy has appealed the sentence on the grounds that it is unreasonable and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
II.
THE SENTENCE IS NOT UNREASONABLE.
Jeremy’s attorney asserts that the sentence imposed on him by the trial court was unreasonable and should be modified. We disagree.
Before embarking on an analysis of the reasonableness of the sentence, we believe it is important to distinguish our function in reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence from our function in deciding whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we are exercising our authority as an appellate court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-85, 582 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1978). In deciding whether a sentence is cruel and unusual, we must decide whether it is proportional. See part III, below.
In determining whether a sentence is excessive or is cruel and unusual punishment, we review all the facts and circumstances in the case and focus on whether the trial court abused its discretion in fixing the sentence. State v. Stormoen, 103 Idaho 83, 84-85, 645 P.2d 317, 318-19 (1982); State v. Seifart, 100 Idaho 321, 323-24, 597 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1979); Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 384-85, 582 P.2d at 730-31; State v. Prince, 97 Idaho 893, 894, 556 P.2d 369, 370 (1976); State v. Iverson, 77 Idaho 103, 111-12, 289 P.2d 603, 607 (1955).
In Wolfe, the Court restated the four objectives of criminal punishment: “(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing.” 99 Idaho at 384, 582 P.2d at 730. The Court pointed out: “Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. The Court also stated that the general objectives of sentence review are:
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
*144(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just.
99 Idaho at 384, 582 P.2d at 730 (quoting ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7 (Approved Draft 1968)).
In State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 724, 604 P.2d 737, 738 (1979), the Court succinctly stated the standard we must follow in reviewing sentences:
Sentencing is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge, and the defendant has the burden of showing a clear abuse thereof on appeal. In exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement.
(Citations omitted).
Exercising the appellate authority to review the reasonableness of sentences, this Court has on numerous occasions ruled that a sentence was unreasonable or was an abuse of discretion and has ordered the sentence modified. A review of some of these cases is contained in the dissent of Bistline, J. in State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 77-79, 577 P.2d 1123, 1125-27 (1978). There are a few others. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 651 P.2d 527 (1982); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982); State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 609 P.2d 657 (1980); State v. Miller, 65 Idaho 756, 154 P.2d 147 (1944); State v. Boyatt, 59 Idaho 771, 87 P.2d 992 (1939).
Justice Bistline’s dissent in Adams eloquently stated the prevailing view in the cases where this Court has modified a sentence:
In sum, since its earliest days, this Court has recognized a constitutional and statutory duty to peruse the record conscientiously and to modify the sentence imposed by the trial court whenever justice so requires. In modifying sentences, the Court has given great weight to the age of a defendant, his capacity for strict accountability for his conduct, his status as a first offender or a habitual criminal, his conduct when compared to others similarly charged and the impact of incarceration on the defendant, his family and the community at large.
99 Idaho at 79, 577 P.2d at 1127.
In Shideler, the most recent case in which this Court has modified a sentence on the grounds that it was unreasonable, the Court’s opinion reflected this “whenever justice requires” standard:
We conclude that the defendant’s character and the circumstances surrounding the case are compelling in nature, and sufficiently outweigh the gravity of the crime and the protection of the public interest to require us in the furtherance of justice to reduce the sentences of imprisonment from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years.
103 Idaho at 595, 651 P.2d at 529 (emphasis added).
In his dissent in Adams, Justice Bistline also noted that a second line of cases decided by this Court:
manifests a decidedly hands-off approach, puts upon the defendant the affirmative burden of showing a clear abuse of trial court discretion and then made that burden impossible to carry by saying that no such abuse will “ordinarily” be found so long as the sentence imposed is within the limits fixed by statute.
99 Idaho at 82, 577 P.2d at 1130.
Justice Bistline’s concern about the statement that a sentence that is within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be found to be unreasonable is well taken. While this statement has frequently been made by this Court and by the Court of Appeals, it really adds nothing to the analysis as to the reasonableness of the sentence. The Court dealt correctly with this subject in Wolfe when it said: “The ten year sentence was well within the fifteen-year statutory maximum. Therefore the sentence was not illegal.” 99 Idaho at 384, 582 P.2d at 730 (citation omitted). If the sentence is illegal, there is no reason to pursue an analysis as to its reasonableness. If the sentence is not illegal, the defendant has the burden to prove that it is *145unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion.
Since our Court of Appeals was instituted in 1982, most of the sentence reviews have been conducted by that court. In one of the first of these cases, Judge Burnett, writing for the Court of Appeals, explored the meaning of the clear abuse of discretion standard:
A sentence may represent a “clear abuse of discretion” if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. E.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982); State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 604 P.2d 737 (1979). This formulation recasts the “clear abuse” standard in positive terms, and enables us to focus upon the ingredients of “reasonableness.”
In our view, “reasonableness” implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.
... We hold that a term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case. A sentence of confinement longer than necessary for these purposes is unreasonable.
Such determinations cannot be made with precision. In deference to the discretionary authority vested in Idaho’s trial courts, we will not substitute our view for that of a sentencing judge where reasonable minds might differ. An appellant must show that, under any reasonable view of the facts, his sentence was excessive in light of the foregoing criteria.
Before these criteria can be applied ..., we are confronted with the question of how to measure the term of confinement imposed by an indeterminate sentence.
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568-69, 650 P.2d 707, 710-11 (Ct.App.1983).
On a few occasions the Court of Appeals has ruled that a sentence was excessive. See, e.g., State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 757 P.2d 211 (Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 759 P.2d 926 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Martinez, 109 Idaho 61, 704 P.2d 965 (Ct.App. 1985), overruled, 111 Idaho 281, 723 P.2d 825 (1986); State v. Martines, 105 Idaho 841, 673 P.2d 441 (Ct.App.1983). In these cases the Court of Appeals cited the standard developed in Toohill and evaluated the excessiveness of the sentence under this standard. In overruling the Court of Appeals’ modification of the sentence in Martinez, this Court did not refer to the Toohill standard. Ill Idaho at 283-84, 723 P.2d at 827-28. The Court specifically disagreed with the statement of the Court of Appeals in Martinez concerning the inappropriateness of a fixed life sentence in a case where there was not the intentional and unlawful taking of a victim’s life. Id. at 284, 723 P.2d at 828.
The essence of the standard Judge Burnett formulated in Toohill for determining the reasonableness of a sentence has been adopted by this Court:
Where reasonable minds might differ as to the sufficiency of time of confinement, the discretion vested in the sentencing court in imposing sentence will be respected. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983). Our task is one of deciding whether a clear abuse of that discretion has been affirmatively shown and the question is whether the sentence is unreasonable upon the facts of the case. To establish that the sentence imposed was improper, the defendant must show that in light of the governing criteria, her sentence was excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (App.1982).
State v. Small, 107 Idaho 504, 505, 690 P.2d 1336, 1337 (1984); see also State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610, 627 (1991); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 428, 776 P.2d 424, 437 (1989); State v. Chapman, 112 Idaho 1011, 1013, 739 P.2d 310, 312 (1987).
*146Under the Toohill standard, it is necessary for us first to determine the term of confinement imposed by the sentence. The Unified Sentencing Act enacted in 1986 requires the trial court to specify a minimum period of confinement — the fixed portion of the sentence — which may be followed by an indeterminate period of custody. I.C. § 19-2513. We have adopted the rule established by the Court of Appeals that the fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the Unified Sentencing Act “is the term of confinement for the purpose of appellate review.” State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 999, 783 P.2d 859, 866 (1989) (citing State v. Maxfield, 115 Idaho 910, 911, 771 P.2d 928, 929 (Ct.App.1989); see also State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct.App.1989)).
Applying these standards to this case, in order for us to conclude that Jeremy’s fixed fifteen-year sentence is unreasonable, we must be convinced that considering (1) the protection of society, (2) deterrence of Jeremy and others, (3) the possibility of Jeremy’s rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or retribution for Jeremy, the sentence was excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. As stated by Judge Burnett in Toohill, “we will not substitute our view for that of a sentencing judge where reasonable minds might differ.” 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710.
Jeremy’s attorney asks us to modify the Toohill standard in this case to take into account Jeremy’s age. Specifically, we are asked to hold that where a child is sentenced as an adult pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806A, we should review the sentence having regard for the needs and best interest of the child and should determine the reasonableness of the sentence in light of those needs and best interest.
In this case, Jeremy was subject to prosecution and sentencing as an adult because he turned fourteen on January 30, 1989. The murder occurred on February 23, 1989, just twenty-four days after Jeremy’s fourteenth birthday. I.C. § 16-1806A(1) provides that any person age fourteen to age eighteen who is alleged to have committed any of the crimes enumerated in the statute shall be charged and proceeded against as an adult. I.C. § 16-1806A(3) provides that a person convicted pursuant to this statute may be sentenced as a juvenile in accordance with the juvenile sentencing options set forth in the Youth Rehabilitation Act, as it existed at the time of Jeremy’s sentencing in 1989. Under the Youth Rehabilitation Act, as it existed in 1989, the most severe disposition that Jeremy could have received would have been commitment to the legal custody of the Department of Health and Welfare for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his nineteenth birthday, “unless extended jurisdiction is necessary to complete the rehabilitation goals of the department.” I.C. § 16 — 1814(1)(4) (1989).
In this case, the trial court decided not to sentence Jeremy in accordance with the juvenile sentencing options of the Youth Rehabilitation Act, but to sentence him as an adult pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806A(3). No appeal was taken from that decision, and therefore, we will not address the propriety of Jeremy being sentenced as an adult.
In deciding whether Jeremy should be sentenced as an adult at the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered Jeremy’s youth and what was in Jeremy’s best interest. This was the appropriate time for the trial court to give special consideration to these factors. After the decision to sentence Jeremy as an adult was made, the fact that Jeremy was only fourteen was one circumstance, along with all the other circumstances the trial court had before it, to be considered in arriving at an appropriate sentence.
In fashioning Jeremy’s sentence, the trial court focused heavily on the protection of society. Toohill and many of our cases indicate this is appropriate. E.g., State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991); State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 304 P.2d 1101 (1957). The trial court explained that the purpose of the fifteen-year fixed portion of Jeremy’s sentence is “so that the State will be able to, at the end of the fixed portion of the sentence, better determine when it would be in the best interests of society for *147[Jeremy] to be placed on parole and placed back in society.”
The psychiatrist who testified at the sentencing hearing stated on direct examination that Jeremy did not pose much of a threat to society and that it was extremely unlikely that Jeremy would kill again. The psychiatrist did say, however, that he could not predict that it would not happen again and that Jeremy might do it again, “if the constellation of variables precipitate out again like they did this time.” On cross-examination, the psychiatrist testified:
The fact that he’s done it once may actually make him less likely to do it again.
However, I suppose you could also make the case that since he’s done it once, he might be more likely to do it again. And I think the only honest answer to that is I don’t know.
The psychologist who testified at the sentencing hearing stated on direct examination that he could not reasonably predict whether or not Jeremy would be likely to commit a crime of this nature again. On cross-examination, the psychologist testified that it was possible that Jeremy would be a danger if he were in a position where someone in authority was trying to get him to “toe the line on something” that caused Jeremy to suffer the same kind of stress that existed in his relationship with his father.
In response to this testimony, the trial court said that the experts said they didn’t know whether Jeremy was any more of a risk to society than any other person. The trial court concluded: “So I think that there has to be a consideration of protection of society from a person who has demonstrated by his own acts that he kills.”
We conclude that reasonable minds might differ as to whether a fifteen-year fixed term, or some lesser fixed term, is necessary to protect society from Jeremy Broadhead. It was a reasonable view of the facts for the trial court to conclude that a fifteen-year fixed term was necessary to protect society. Under these circumstances, we will not substitute our view of the appropriate term of confinement for the view of the trial court.
We conclude that Jeremy’s sentence was not unreasonable.
III.
THE SENTENCE WAS NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Jeremy’s attorney asserts that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. We disagree.
A sentence ordinarily will not be regarded as cruel and unusual in violation of art. 1, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution if the sentence is within the limits prescribed by the applicable statute. King v. State, 91 Idaho 97, 98, 416 P.2d 44, 45 (1966). To the extent that some of our cases state or imply that a sentence within statutory limits is per se not cruel and unusual punishment, we overrule those cases. E.g., Watkins v. State, 101 Idaho 758, 759, 620 P.2d 792, 793 (1980) (construing the eighth amendment); State v. Prince, 97 Idaho 893, 894, 556 P.2d 369, 370 (1976); State v. Chaffin, 92 Idaho 629, 635, 448 P.2d 243, 249 (1968). As we have pointed out in part II of this opinion concerning the analysis as to the reasonableness of a sentence, the determination that a sentence is within the statutory limits resolves only that the sentence is not illegal. While a sentence within the statutory limits will not ordinarily be regarded as cruel and unusual, this is only the first level of the analysis that must be conducted to determine whether the sentence is cruel and unusual.
The federal courts have followed this same threshold test in reviewing sentences under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. Annotation, Comment Note. — Length of Sentence As Violation of Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3d 335, 359-63 (1970 & Supp.1990); U.S. v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir.1988) (“Generally, as long as the sentence imposed upon the defendant does not exceed statutory limits, *148we will not overturn it on eighth amendment grounds.”).
In this case, Jeremy’s sentence was within the limits prescribed by the applicable statute. I.C. § 18-4004 provides: “Every person guilty of murder of the second-degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life.” By virtue of I.C. § 19-2513 (the Unified Sentencing Act), the trial court was required to specify a minimum period of confinement for Jeremy and was allowed to specify that the balance of the sentence was indeterminate.
The fact that the sentence imposed is within the limits allowed by the applicable statute does not, however, resolve the issue of cruel and unusual punishment. The decisions of both this Court and the United States Supreme Court require that we conduct a further analysis to determine whether the sentence is cruel and unusual. If the sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory limit, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have ruled that we must engage in a proportionality analysis to determine the constitutionality of the sentence.
In exploring the dimensions of the protections afforded by the cruel and unusual punishments clause of art. 1, § 6 of our state constitution, this Court has said:
Cruel and unusual punishments were originally regarded as referring to such barbarous impositions as pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, drawing and quartering, and the like. But it is now generally recognized that imprisonment for such a length of time as to be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable [people], is cruel and unusual within the meaning of the constitution.
State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57-58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952) (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has also employed a proportionality analysis in reviewing sentences under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment:
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals. But no penalty is per se constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. [660] at 667, [82 S.Ct. 1417 at 1420, 8 L.Ed.2d 758] (1962) a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.
When sentences are reviewed under the Eighth Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have recognized. First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty____
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive____
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions ____
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649-50 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
Jeremy’s attorney contends that while the sentence in this case might not be cruel and unusual for an adult, a different standard should be applied here because Jeremy was only fourteen at the time of the murder. In support of the adoption of this *149special standard, the attorney cites three cases: Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988); People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d 441, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 (1983); and Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 779 P.2d 944 (1989). These cases do not persuade us that a special standard should be employed in reviewing a sentence imposed on a fourteen-year-old who is prosecuted and sentenced as an adult. We note again, as we did in part II of this opinion, that no challenge has been made in this case to the prosecution and sentencing of Jeremy as an adult pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806A. Therefore, we will not consider the propriety of sentencing Jeremy as an adult.
Thompson v. Oklahoma was a death penalty case in which a fifteen-year-old boy was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to be executed. The Court’s analysis was devoted to an examination of the statutes and practices concerning the execution of children. The specific holding of the case was that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.” 487 U.S. at 838, 108 S.Ct. at 2700, 101 L.Ed.2d at 720. Having carefully reviewed the reasoning of the Court in Thompson, we conclude that it does not provide support for the announcement of a special rule for reviewing penitentiary terms imposed on a person under the age of sixteen. Because of the special scrutiny the Supreme Court has given to the imposition of the death penalty, we doubt that the Court in Thompson intended to establish a rule that would affect the usual proportionality analysis set forth in Solem v. Helm.
In People v. Dillon, the California Supreme Court considered whether a life sentence imposed on a seventeen-year-old who was convicted of first-degree felony murder violated the cruel or unusual punishments provision of the California Constitution. In reviewing the facts of the case, the California court noted that the defendant “was an unusually immature youth.” 194 Cal.Rptr. at 419-20, 668 P.2d at 726-27. The court also noted several other circumstances that caused it to rule that the punishment by a sentence of life imprisonment for a first-degree murderer violated the state constitution. The court ordered the judgment modified by reducing the crime to murder in the second-degree and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant should be committed to the Youth Authority. Id. at 420, 668 P.2d at 727. The defendant’s youth and immaturity were considered along with all the other circumstances in the case. The California court did not create any special rule for determining the proportionality of sentences imposed on children. As we read the lead opinion and those of the concurring justices, the result was dictated more by the California court’s consideration of the felony murder rule than it was by the defendant’s age.
In Naovarath v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court considered a life sentence without the possibility of parole imposed on a boy who was thirteen when he committed a first-degree murder. The Nevada court ruled that this was cruel and unusual punishment under both the state constitution and the eighth amendment. In doing so, the court focused not only on the defendant’s youth, but also on the fact that the child was mentally and emotionally disordered. 779 P.2d at 945-46 n. 3, 949. The court ordered the sentence modified to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. We do not read the opinion of the Nevada court as establishing a categorical rule which prevents a thirteen-year-old, under any circumstances, from being sentenced to imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court said specifically:
To say that a thirteen-year-old deserves a fifty or sixty year long sentence, imprisonment until he dies, is a grave judgment indeed if not Draconian. To make the judgment that a thirteen-year-old must be punished with this severity and that he can never be reformed, is the kind of judgment that, if it can be made at all, must be made rarely and only on the surest and soundest of grounds. Looking at the case before us from this perspective, we conclude that the sentence *150of life imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed upon Naovarath was cruel and unusual under the Nevada Constitution and the United States Constitution.
Id. at 947.
Without imposing a special standard because of Jeremy’s age, we are left then to make the proportionality review that both this Court and the federal courts have required when a challenge is made that a sentence is cruel and unusual.
Jeremy’s attorney asks us to overturn the sentence fashioned by the trial court on the grounds that it was disproportionate to the crime Jeremy committed under the test stated in Solem v. Helm. We are asked to scrutinize the sentence from the perspective of Jeremy’s age and lack of maturity. We are also asked to compare Jeremy’s sentence with sentences imposed on others in Idaho and other jurisdictions.
As set forth in State v. Evans, the standard for determining if a sentence is cruel and unusual under art. 1, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution is whether it is “out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable [people].” 73 Idaho at 58, 245 P.2d at 792. In considering the proportionality of Jeremy’s sentence under our state constitution, we have considered the sentence in light of the gravity of the offense and have considered whether the sentence would shock the conscience of reasonable people. To assist us in this analysis, we have reviewed homicide cases appealed to this Court in which youthful offenders were sentenced. We believe it is likely that these are the cases where the most severe sentences have been imposed for crimes similar to the one in this case. Other cases where less severe sentences were imposed are not as likely to have been appealed. State v. Matthews, 108 Idaho 453, 700 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1985) (sentence not appealed).
There is an interesting trio of cases involving youthful defendants convicted of murder after being prosecuted as adults pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806A. Each of these cases was decided by our Court of Appeals. The cases involved the beating death by five youngsters of another youngster with whom they had been incarcerated in jail. State v. McKeown, 108 Idaho 452, 700 P.2d 74 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Matthews, 108 Idaho at 453, 700 P.2d at 75 (Ct.App.1985) (sentence not appealed); and State v. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454, 700 P.2d 76 (Ct.App.1985). The judge who sentenced Anderson considered the homicide to be senseless and brutal. Id. at 459, 700 P.2d at 81.
McKeown and Anderson each pled guilty to second-degree murder. McKeown was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty-five years. Anderson was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty-one years. Matthews was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to an indeterminate life term. Since these cases arose in the era before the Unified Sentencing Act, no fixed term was specified by the trial court in any of the three cases. Under I.C. § 20-223, as it existed at the time of the sentencings, McKeown and Anderson were each required to serve at least one-third of their sentences and Matthews was required to serve at least ten years. Automatic good time of ten days for each month served was also available to each of these defendants if they observed all rules and were not subject to punishment. I.C. § 20-101A (1985). This good time provision was amended in 1986 to limit its application to those committed to the board of correction prior to July 1, 1986. 1986 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 322, § 1, p. 789. The net effect of these statutes is that, assuming good conduct by each of these defendants, McKeown was required to serve six years before being eligible for parole, Anderson, approximately five years, and Matthews, approximately seven years.
In State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 506 P.2d 1340 (1973), this Court upheld an indeterminate thirty-year sentence imposed on a young man who was eighteen when he killed the two-year-old son of his fiance. Under the parole and good time provisions that governed the case, Beason was re*151quired to serve approximately seven years before becoming eligible for parole.
A fifteen-year-old boy who killed his father and who was prosecuted as an adult appealed to this Court from a ruling that he not be dealt with under the Youth Rehabilitation Act. State v. Christensen, 100 Idaho 631, 603 P.2d 586 (1979). The magistrate who had ordered the boy prosecuted as an adult found that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent and premeditated manner. The boy had two prior offenses for auto theft, including one where a handgun was used, as well as one instance of petty theft. The magistrate found that the protection of the community required isolation of the boy beyond that afforded by the juvenile facilities. Id. at 633, 603 P.2d at 588. After this Court upheld the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, the boy was found guilty of first-degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate twenty-year term. State v. Christensen, (Case No. 3453, Bonneville County). Under the parole and good time provisions that governed the case, the boy was required to serve approximately five years before he was eligible for parole.
In State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1983), our Court of Appeals upheld a twenty-year indeterminate sentence for second-degree murder imposed on a boy who was seventeen when he and some other boys smothered an old man. One of the other boys, who was fifteen, was sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty years. 103 Idaho at 895, 655 P.2d at 102. Under the parole and good time provisions that governed these eases, the boys were required to serve approximately five and seven years, respectively, before they were eligible for parole.
In State v. Griffith, 114 Idaho 95, 753 P.2d 831 (Ct.App.1988), affd on review, 116 Idaho 173, 774 P.2d 343 (1989), the Court of Appeals and this Court both upheld a fixed fifteen-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter imposed on a young man who was seventeen at the time he participated in the brutal homicide of an individual who was stomped to death. Griffith had a long history of incorrigible antisocial behavior, had previously been committed to a youth correction facility, had refused to cooperate in a rehabilitation counseling program, had a bad temper, was unable to deal with authority, was a drug user, had no home, lived primarily in the streets, exhibited antisocial behavior and was involved in fights at the jail, and had used alcohol before the homicide. 114 Idaho at 96, 753 P.2d at 832.
In State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991), this Court upheld a fixed life sentence for a defendant who was eighteen when he committed the vicious first-degree murder of a woman who taunted him because he would not succumb to her sexual advances. Although in Enno the trial court rejected the death penalty in favor of a fixed life sentence, we believe the case is of some significance to our proportionality analysis in this case, because of Enno’s youthfulness.
We conclude that Jeremy’s sentence is not out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense he committed, nor is the sentence so severe as to shock the conscience of reasonable people. Jeremy laid in wait and killed his father with a rifle. While there were some extenuating personal circumstances involved, the murder can only be described as unprovoked and cruel. Although the fifteen-year fixed portion of the sentence is somewhat disproportionate to the minimum term of confinement in all of the cases we have examined above, except Griffith, it is not so disproportionate as to shock our conscience, nor do we believe it would shock the conscience of other reasonable people. Therefore, the sentence is not cruel and unusual under art. 1, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution.
The same basic analysis is appropriate to determine whether Jeremy’s sentence violates the eighth amendment. In Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court said:
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; (iii) the sentences im*152posed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011, 77 L.Ed.2d at 650.
The only additional element to be evaluated in our proportionality analysis under the eighth amendment from that under our own constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments is the proportionality of Jeremy’s sentence to sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
We have reviewed the report of numerous sentences for homicide and other crimes involving violence to others in Annotation, Comment Note. — Length of Sentence as Violation of Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970 & Supp.1990). The cases reported in this source cause us to conclude that while there are sentences in similar cases that have been imposed in other jurisdictions that were less severe than the fifteen-year fixed term imposed on Jeremy, there are some that were more severe. For instance, in Rogers v. State, 257 Ark. 144, 515 S.W.2d 79 (1974), cert. denied, Rogers v. Arkansas, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.Ed.2d 87 (1975), a seventeen-year-old first offender was sentenced to life imprisonment without an opportunity for parole for first-degree rape.
We also note that in one of the cases cited by Jeremy’s attorney, Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d at 944, the Nevada Supreme Court modified the sentence of a thirteen-year-old who had murdered a man. The original sentence was life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The modified sentence was life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The Nevada law specified that the child was required to serve at least ten years of this sentence. Id. at 952 n. 7.
We conclude that Jeremy’s sentence is not so disproportionate under the analysis specified in Solem v. Helm as to be cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
We affirm the sentence imposed on Jeremy by the trial court.
BAKES, C.J., (concurs in Parts I & II, concurs in result in Part III), BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.