dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
The central question presented by this case is whether this court should recognize a policy exclusion for an act of sexual molestation committed by a gynecologist. I suggest that such an exclusion is void as against public policy.
*456The majority concludes that an insurance policy is “nothing more than a contract between the insured and the carrier.” Such a simplistic view ignores the reality that medical malpractice insurance is a means of providing compensation to injured parties. Indeed, many courts have recognized that liability policies exist for the benefit of the injured party as well as the insured. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz.App. 1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga.App. 1982); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kamby, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich.Ct.App. 1982); Hartogs v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisc., 391 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (Wis. 1977); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Wis.Ct.App. 1984).
The focus should be on the injured victim. A woman is vulnerable to her gynecologist. There could be no greater exploitation of a patient’s inherent vulnerability than nonconsensual sexual assault. In such cases, when women are being subjected to traumatic, emotional and physical injury, an adequate system of compensation must be available.
Insurance is a means for compensating the victims of such malpractice injuries. Coverage is reasonable where the tortious act is also an act of malpractice. See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Mich.App. 1981) (potential criminal liability does not negate malpractice claim against psychiatrist for inducing patient into sexual relationship); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz.App. 1986) (public policy supports finding of insurance coverage where improper sexual manipulations occurred during gynecological examination).
For these reasons I would reverse the order of the district court.