dissenting.
I would reverse. The critical question to be resolved is one of legislative intent in enacting W.S. 1-89-105 (1988), which provides in part:
A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury * * * caused by the negligence of public employees * * ⅜ in the operation of any motor vehicle ⅜ * *.
Damages “caused by * * * public employees * * * in the operation of any motor vehicle” is equated by the court to damages caused by the operator while operating a motor vehicle. If the legislature had intended this naiTow interpretation, it could have said so. The construction of this statute by the court today will result in governmental immunity for damages caused by defectively repaired state vehicles put in operation on a highway and causing injury to its citizens. Thus, if a state employee is negligent in the repair of brakes on a vehicle so that “in the operation” of the vehicle the brakes fail and a pedestrian, child or another is killed or injured, the State will shirk its responsibility for the re-suiting loss — because the State has immunity, the majority of this court now holds. This construction of the statute by the court does not do much to recognize “the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity” in W.S. l-39-102(a) (1988), nor does it correct that unfairness. By this dissent, I do not mean to suggest that appellant should recover damages — only that appellant has a claim not subject to decision on summary judgment.
I am convinced the legislature intended to compensate citizens injured in accidents involving motor vehicles, if such accidents and injuries are the result of negligence on the part of the state employees. For the reasons stated,
I dissent and would reverse.