dissenting.
Because I agree with the district court that Officer Ripberger had reasonable suspicion to stop Keith’s vehicle, I respectfully dissent. I would AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Keith’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest and subsequent search of his car.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government” in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir.2003). The Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to stop a vehicle if specific and articulable facts give him reasonable suspicion that an occupant is committing a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While more than an “unparticular-ized suspicion” or “hunch” that criminal activity is afoot is required, Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the proof required to indicate reasonable suspicion is “less demanding” than that needed for probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). To assess the validity of a Terry stop, the court considers the totality of the circumstances and “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). The experience of the law enforcement officer must be taken into account in determining whether his or her suspicion was reasonable, and we allow officers to make inferences from the information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
A careful review of the factual scenario reveals those facts which led the magistrate judge to conclude, based on the photographic exhibits and officers’ testimony, that Officer Ripberger had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. At 1:45 a.m. on March 29, 2006, Officers Gregory Ripberger and Leonard Stephens were standing at the northwest corner of Fourth Street (“Fourth”) and Central Street (“Central”) in Newport, Kentucky, just after assisting with an unrelated arrest. Officer Ripberger had been a member of the Newport Police Department for six years. He observed the activity along with Officer Stephens, who had been with the Newport Police Department for fourteen years. Both officers were members of a “directed patrol” unit that focused on “problem areas within the city, one being narcotics.” The magistrate judge found the testimony of both officers to be credible, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report. On the opposite corner *508from where the officers and their lighted cruisers were located stood Big Daddy’s, a liquor store with a drive-up window. The drive-through lane ran parallel to Fourth Street, from East to West. There were several exits from Big Daddy’s: two exits onto Fourth, one just before the entrance to the drive-through lane and one just past the exit of the drive-through lane, and a third exit which allowed cars to exit the drive-through directly onto Central. The store is located in a “high drug trafficking crime area” and both officers knew that the store sold items used in the consumption of narcotics, such as “small glass vials” and “Chore Boys,” which are household items commonly used as filters for smoking crack cocaine.
The parking lot of Big Daddy’s was well-lit, and the officers’ attention was directed to Keith when Crawford, a male pedestrian, crossed the parking lot and approached Keith’s silver Pontiac vehicle, which was waiting in line in the drive-through lane. Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 1; Defendant’s Exhibit 2 at 2 (“officer [Ripberger] observed listed suspect in line at the drive-up window”). The officers observed the pedestrian lean into the vehicle’s passenger side, look back at the officers, and lean back into the car. Instead of directly exiting the lot, Keith’s car then pulled around the building to the building’s south side and out of the officers’ view. Once Keith’s car had pulled away, Crawford looked at the officers a second time, and then followed the car to the far side of the building, out of the officers’ view. The most direct route to exit the parking lot from the drive-through would not have required the car to pull around behind the building. A “few seconds” later, Keith pulled out onto Fourth, headed West, made a left turn onto Central, and turned left onto Fifth Street, where he was stopped. Officer Ripberger, who had adequate time to enter his cruiser and turn his vehicle around while Keith and the man on foot were behind the building, promptly pulled over Keith’s vehicle. Upon seeing marijuana residue on Keith’s pants, Officer Ripberger arrested him, and found a gun, marijuana and cocaine in his possession.
The majority places little weight on the fact that Crawford, the pedestrian, glanced directly at the police cruisers and leaned down to speak with Keith before both individuals proceeded to a location that was out of the officers’ sight. The majority states that “it is entirely to be suspected that, out of curiosity, Crawford’s attention was drawn to the nearby police cars with flashing lights at that time of night.” While this may be true, the Supreme Court has instructed that we must consider the “totality of the circumstances ... to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Further, in considering all the circumstances, “the question is not whether there is a possible innocent explanation for each of the factors, but whether all of them taken together give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Jacob, 377 F.3d 573, 577 (6th Cir.2004)(citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744). Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we must consider Crawford’s glance along with the fact that upon spotting the officers and for no apparent reason, he and Keith’s car immediately moved to a side of the building that was out of the officers’ view. While the fact that Crawford twice looked in the officers’ direction would not be sufficient in itself to satisfy a finding of reasonable suspicion, it was certainly a fact, that, along with the surrounding circumstances, contributed to the magistrate judge’s finding that Officer Ripberger’s suspicion was reasonable.
*509Additionally, the majority leaves out the important fact that, once Keith’s car had pulled away from Crawford, Crawford again looked at the officers immediately prior to walking to the south side of Big Daddy’s. Officer Ripberger testified that “before [Crawford] left our view he looked back at us to see what we were doing, and then he walked back to the south part of the building where we couldn’t see him no more.” Officer Stephens stated that Crawford “looked at us before he walked to the rear” and “looked to see where we were and then again went behind the building as well.”
The majority found it relevant to characterize the location to which Crawford as well as Keith’s car traveled next as being the “side” of Big Daddy’s. In recounting the facts, however, the majority notes that “Keith was only ‘behind’ Big Daddy’s from the perspective of the officers.” Our task here, however, is to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, not whether Keith or any other individual felt that his behavior was suspicious. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690. When asked “And did the car actually go behind the building?” Officer Stephens testified ‘Tes, sir, it did.” Indeed, from the officers’ perspective, whether Keith was technically on the side or backside of the building, his behavior suggested an intent to obscure himself from the officers’ view. The fact that, immediately upon noticing the officers’ presence, both Crawford and Keith proceeded to a location which was hidden from the officers’ view instead of exiting the parking lot in the most convenient manner, was a fact that the magistrate judge was entitled to consider in determining whether the officers had reasonable suspicion.
The majority asserts that “it was possible that Keith was indecisive about which exit from the parking lot to use.” That possibility, however, does not explain why Crawford would have followed Keith’s car to the far side of the building. Officer Ripberger was specifically asked, “Is there anything in the parking lot of Big Daddy’s that would cause an individual on foot to go back there?” Officer Ripberger responded, “No, sir.” In United States v. Paulette, we considered the defendant’s “efforts to evade the police upon noticing them” in holding that reasonable suspicion existed. 457 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir.2006). In Paulette, “when [defendant] noticed the officers approaching in their marked squad car, he quickly moved his hand to his pocket and began to walk away from the officers.” Id. at 602. The majority accurately notes that, in Paulette, the officers “actually ‘observed [the defendant] and another individual engage in a hand-to hand transaction.’ ” In analyzing whether reasonable suspicion existed, however, the Paulette court explicitly listed both “hand movements consistent with drug-dealing activity” and “efforts to evade the police upon noticing them” as factors that the police were justified in considering. Id. at 606. The fact that one of those listed factors was absent in the present case does not prevent us from considering Keith’s efforts to evade the officers as one factor among the numerous facts which led to the officers’ reasonable suspicion.
While each reasonable suspicion case is factually unique, I do not find the majority’s attempt to distinguish the evasive behavior in United States v. Green from the behavior of the individuals in this case persuasive. See 157 F. App’x 853 (6th Cir.2005)(unpublished). The facts in Green are described as follows:
[A]t about 2:45 a.m., Officer Matthew Sharp ... saw a woman leaning close to the passenger side of a car that had stopped in an area known for drug trafficking and prostitution. As Officer *510Sharp approached the vehicle in his marked police cruiser, the woman left abruptly and the vehicle began to creep forward. Then it quickly pulled off the road and on to the sidewalk. Officer Sharp concluded, based on his experience and knowledge of the area, that the woman may have been soliciting prostitution.
The majority distinguished this case by asserting that in Green, the officers directly observed criminal conduct (soliciting prosecution), while in this case, the officers “did not witness any act that arguably appeared to be illegal.” The record reveals that from the perspective of the officers, the conduct of Keith and Crawford certainly “arguably appeared to be illegal.” When asked what he thought was “going on” when he observed Crawford walk behind the building, Officer Ripberger testified “I believed it to either be a drug deal or possibly somebody that just bought alcohol for an underage person.” Further, Officer Stephens testified that the behavior of Keith and Crawford was “typical of a drug transaction in this area.” In discussing Green, the majority states that “Crawford and Keith could very well have been neighborhood acquaintances rather than drug traffickers, and Crawford might well have leaned into Keith’s car window to greet him or to ask if he knew why police ears with flashing lights were gathered on the corner.” While this proffered factual scenario may have turned out to be true, the majority fails to conduct the proper inquiry. We have stated that “the question is not whether there is a possible innocent explanation for each of the factors, but whether all of them taken together give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” Jacob, 377 F.3d at 577 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744). Keith’s evasive behavior was a factor which Officer Ripberger was entitled to evaluate based on his experience and take into account in forming a reasonable suspicion.
While the majority tries to highlight the fact that Keith and Crawford did not spend adequate time behind Big Daddy’s such that Officer Ripberger could have reasonably suspected that a drug transaction was occurring, record evidence suggests otherwise. Officer Ripberger testified that the individuals were behind the building for “fifty seconds maybe, almost a minute.” He testified that the period of time that elapsed was “[ejnough for me to be standing on the corner, get in my cruiser, turn around, and as we turned around facing north on Central Street [Crawford] was coming out.” Additionally, Officer Stephens testified that, based on his experience in dealing with drug transactions, the time that Keith and Crawford spent on the south side of Big Daddy’s was sufficient time for a drug transaction to occur.
Finally, we note that although the fact that an area is known for criminal activity will not in itself justify a Terry stop, we will consider it as a factor in determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)(noting that an “individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime,” but stressing that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”).
The majority states that apart from Crawford’s glances in their direction and the subsequent move to an obscure location by both Keith and Crawford, the officers had no “additional facts to support their claim of reasonable suspicion, other *511than the late hour and the ‘bad’ neighborhood in which they were located.” I disagree. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Ripberger had more than enough facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Keith was engaged in criminal activity. At the suppression hearing, Officer Ripberger described the facts that contributed to his reasonable suspicion:
[I]t’s late at night, it’s a known drug area, you have a subject looking at us inside the vehicle, approaches the vehicle and is inside the vehicle talking to somebody, looks back at us, steps back away from the vehicle, starts to walk away ... from our sight, pulls around the building without exiting when he could have exited onto Central Street right from the drive-through, drives back around the back of the building out of our view, the person on foot looks back at us to see what we’re doing and walks back toward the vehicle. Now by the time we get turned around they come walking out from behind the building, which would have exited onto Central Street from the entrance of Big Daddy’s, goes back behind the building, pull out on Fourth Street and then makes a left onto Fifth Street when he could have exited straight out Big Daddy’s lot.
Both officers observed a man approach and lean into a car parked in a drive-through lane at 1:45 a.m. in a high drug trafficking area. The observed encounter took place in the parking lot of a shop that was a known seller of drug paraphernalia. When the individual on foot noticeably spotted the officers’ cruisers parked across the street, he and the car moved to a location that was out of the officers’ sight and that was not in the direction from which a car would ordinarily exit that parking lot onto Central. Before obscuring themselves from the officers’ sight, the man on foot again looked at the officers. The officers’ conclusion that, based on their experience, this was indicative of a drug transaction was not unreasonable. Police officers, charged with the difficult task of protecting the public, are not required to consider every possible innocent explanation for each suspicious incident they observe, but instead are permitted to make determinations based on their own experience. Based on the suspicious actions that the officers observed, the experience of the officers in observing drug transactions, the time of night at which the encounter occurred, and the “high drug trafficking area” in which the episode occurred, reasonable suspicion existed that Keith was involved in criminal activity.
For the foregoing reasons, I would find that reasonable suspicion existed and AFFIRM the ruling of the district court.