(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent because I disagree that the Court of Appeals correctly found the trial court had committed reversible error by excluding evidence of the CPSC guidelines and ASTM standards (hereinafter collectively referred to as the guidelines). While the majority opinion and the decision of the Court of Appeals focus on whether the guidelines were adopted by Richland/Lexington School District Five (the District), I believe this is an improper predicate upon which to base the ruling. The more appropriate question is whether the guidelines are applicable to the District’s existing playground equipment.
Given that respondents did not present evidence the guidelines were applicable to the existing playground equipment on the District’s property, the trial court properly disallowed evidence regarding those guidelines. While respondents’ expert, Steven Bernheim, testified the District should have had policies and procedures regarding the existing equipment’s compliance to the guidelines, Bernheim never testified, nor was it shown as the majority opinion contends, that the guidelines in fact applied to existing playground equipment. Bernheim merely testified the District should have had procedures in place for retrofitting existing equipment in accordance with the guidelines. However, he did not opine that the guidelines applied to existing playground equipment. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected the proffered testimony. See Pike v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 343 S.C. 224, 540 S.E.2d 87 (2000) (admission and rejection of testimony is largely within trial court’s sound discretion, the exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion).
Further, even if the trial court had committed error by not admitting the evidence, respondents were not prejudiced by the alleged error. The proffered evidence was cumulative to the admitted testimony of respondents’ experts. At trial, Bernheim testified that, according to the standards and practices of the industry, [the playground equipment] did not meet *191the proper safety standards. Further, the District’s equipment purchaser, Joe Tommie, testified, in bids for purchasing new playground equipment, the District specified the new equipment must meet the guidelines. Therefore, while specific evidence regarding the guidelines was not admitted, respondents were still able to show that the equipment did not meet the standards set by the playground equipment industry. Additionally, both Bernheim and respondents’ other expert, Archibald Hardy, testified the monkey bar was not meant to be walked upon. Hardy also testified that he had recommended to the Irmo Elementary School principal that all of the older equipment on the playground be bulldozed. Given the above testimony, additional information regarding the guidelines would not have bolstered respondents’ case any further.
While the majority opinion contends respondents were prejudiced by the trial court’s decision because the bulk of the experts’ testimony went to the element of breach of duty and that evidence of the guidelines would have established the applicable duty of care, respondents were able to present evidence of the applicable duty of care through the testimony of Bernheim and Tommie as noted above. Consequently, I do not find this contention persuasive as to why respondents were prejudiced by the alleged trial court error.
For the above stated reasons, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting respondents’ proffered testimony.