concurring specially.
During the hearing to determine Adams’ competency to stand trial, the trial court ruled that a social worker could not testify as an expert that she had made a provisional diagnosis of “paranoid-type schizophrenia.” The majority concludes that the trial court erred in excluding that testimony. I strongly disagree with that holding and suggest that relevant precedent mandates the opposite conclusion. However, I fully agree with the remaining portions of the majority *870opinion and concur in the judgment of affirmance.
A social worker, like any other lay witness, may give non-expert opinion testimony as to sanity or insanity after stating the supporting facts and circumstances. Currelley v. State, 145 Ga. App. 29, 30 (3) (243 SE2d 307) (1978). “Courts have also admitted the testimony of psychiatric social workers when that testimony remained within the experts’ areas of specialization. [Cit.]” State v. Zola, 548 A2d 1022, 1041 (III) (E) (N.J. 1988). See also In the Interest of S. T, 201 Ga. App. 37 (1) (410 SE2d 312) (1991).
“However, because psychiatric diagnoses are generally outside the competence of psychiatric social workers, appellate courts have sustained the discretion of trial courts that excluded such testimony. [Cits.]” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Zola, supra at 1041 (III) (E). Since paranoia and schizophrenia are medical terms relating to mental disorders, “only a qualified expert such as a psychiatrist, psychologist or medical doctor would be competent to diagnose and define such a mental disorder.” Ellis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 757, 759 (3) (309 SE2d 924) (1983). See also Morris v. Chandler Exterminators, 200 Ga. App. 816, 818 (1) (409 SE2d 677) (1991), rev’d on other grounds, Chandler Exterminators v. Morris, 262 Ga. 257 (416 SE2d 277) (1992). Nothing in the social worker’s testimony here indicates that she was such an expert or even that her diagnosis was made under the supervision of a qualified expert. Compare In the Interest of S. T, supra at 37 (1).
In her testimony, the social worker relied only on her license as a clinical social worker as qualifying her to make diagnostic impressions. Compare In the Interest of S. T, supra at 37 (1). However, the mere fact that she was licensed pursuant to OCGA § 43-10A-12 does not permit her to make medical, psychiatric, or psychological diagnoses. The majority opinion, in footnote 6, quotes a portion of subsection (c) of that statute, which permits the social worker to undertake a “psychosocial evaluation.” However, the majority fails to explain how this provision authorizes social workers to diagnose. The term “psychosocial” merely means “of or pertaining to the interaction between social and psychological factors.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, p. 1561 (2nd ed. 1997). An evaluation of such interaction in a given individual would obviously not constitute, or necessarily lead to, a medical or psychological diagnosis. Neither OCGA § 43-10A-12 nor the definition of “social work” in OCGA § 43-10A-3 (13) says anything about diagnosis. See Wilburn v. State, 711 SW2d 760, 761 (1) (Ark. 1986). Compare In re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 759 A2d 755 (Md. 2000). Furthermore, nothing in OCGA § 43-10A-1 et seq. “shall be construed to authorize persons licensed under this chapter to practice nursing, occupational therapy, physical therapy, medicine, or psychology. . . .” (Emphasis sup*871plied.) OCGA § 43-10A-22. The diagnosis of mental disorders constitutes the practice of medicine or psychology, pursuant to express statutory provisions. OCGA §§ 43-34-20 (3); 43-34-26 (a); 43-39-1 (3). By choosing not to enact any similar provision permitting social workers to make medical or psychological diagnoses, the General Assembly clearly evidenced its intention to limit the making of and testifying concerning such diagnoses to physicians and psychologists. The social worker’s “special competence lay more in the treatment than the diagnosis of mental disease or defect.” State v. Zola, supra at 1042 (III) (E).
Moreover, even if a witness were qualified to diagnose a mental disorder, such testimony would not be relevant in the absence of some evidence that that condition had an adverse effect on the defendant’s competence to stand trial. Indeed, “a mentally ill person can be competent to stand trial. [Cits.]” Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3 (463 SE2d 472) (1995). The social worker testified that she was not qualified to give an opinion as to whether Adams was competent to stand trial.
[H]er recorded background is bereft of any indication that she [has expertise] in the application of psychiatric knowledge to the processes of law. Doubtless psychosomatic ailments and other organic problems can play a significant role in assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial, and doubtless [she] by her own admission is unqualified to make such an assessment.
People v. Parney, 253 NW2d 698, 701 (II) (Mich. App. 1977).
“ Acceptance or rejection of the qualifications of a proffered expert witness is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest abuse.’ [Cits.]” Turner v. State, 258 Ga. 97,100 (3) (365 SE2d 822) (1988). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the social worker was not qualified as a medical or psychiatric expert and did not err in refusing to allow her to express an opinion as to a specific mental disorder. See Ellis v. State, supra at 759 (3). I fear that, as a result of today’s opinion, trial courts will be reluctant to exercise their discretion to prevent a witness from expressing an expert opinion on any issue even if such witness is not qualified by experience or training to so testify.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Thompson join in this special concurrence.
*872Decided November 12, 2002 Reconsideration denied December 13, 2002. Michael B. King, for appellant. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Jack S. Jennings, Jane E. Grabowski, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jill M. Zubler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.