I concur in the judgment, but respectfully dissent to the majority’s reasoning. In my view, the collateral attack permitted by People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15] should be limited to cases involving alleged denial of the fundamental right to counsel. Indeed, as the majority acknowledges, a substantial number of Court of Appeal cases have so held. (E.g., People v. Reeves (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 65, 68-69 [176 Cal.Rptr. 182], and cases cited.) These cases *925cite “the difficulty and lengthy delays in prosecution and trial of criminal cases which would result if [Coffey] were extended to matters ‘other than the easily determined fact of representation by, or waiver of, counsel.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 69.)
In the present case, unlike Coffey, we deal with a possible violation of certain technical procedural rules (the “Boykin/Tahl” rules) requiring specified advice and waivers prior to accepting a guilty plea. The majority’s ruling herein will require a full evidentiary hearing whenever the defendant alleges noncompliance with these rules, allegations which presumably will be routinely made whenever the official record in the prior proceedings fails, as here, affirmatively to establish full compliance with Boykin/Tahl. Because the majority imposes on the defendant no time limitation or laches requirement, the People may have considerable difficulty proving such compliance. (Untranscribed notes of a guilty plea hearing evidently are often discarded after five years. See Gov. Code, § 69955, subd. (d).)
In my view, where defendant raises the supposed defect for the first time on collateral attack in a subsequent criminal proceeding, we should conclusively presume that the trial court performed its official duties, gave the requisite advice and obtained the requisite waivers prior to accepting the defendant’s guilty plea.
I concur in affirmance of the judgment.