(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial judge’s ruling. I believe Missouri had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Siberts’ apartment.
As noted by the majority, the trial judge’s ruling on this issue can only be reversed if there is clear error. If any evidence supports the ruling, it will be affirmed. State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 65-66, 528 S.E.2d 661, 665-66 (2000); State v. Williams, 351 S.C.App, 591, 571 S.E.2d 703 (2002) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 32 at 66).
The majority opinion outlines the numerous findings of fact made by the trial judge. After observing all of the witnesses, the trial judge found Missouri had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched.
The trial judge specifically found that Missouri and Curtis Sibert were “good friends” and had grown up together, and that Missouri frequently visited the Siberts’ apartment, sometimes spending the night. Moreover, he found that Missouri on “some occasions” had a key to the apartment and kept a change of clothes there. He also found the Siberts did not charge Missouri to use the apartment.
*131However, the majority makes its own findings of fact, some contrary to those made by the trial judge. The majority characterizes Missouri’s relationship with the Siberts as that of an “occasional” or “periodical” overnight guest. Furthermore, the majority finds “neither [Missouri’s] clothes nor a key was found” in the apartment. It also states the main purpose of Missouri’s presence at the apartment was for “business” reasons.
The United States Supreme Court, in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), held an overnight guest had a reasonable expectation of privacy.2
On the other hand, in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998), the Court addressed “the issue of whether a person present in another’s home for a ‘purely commercial ... transaction,’ for only a ‘relatively short period of time,’ and having no ‘previous relationship with’ the householder, could claim the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 180 (D.C.1999) (quoting Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, 119 S.Ct. 469). The Court *132said such person did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In Carter, the Court held there was nothing “similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469. The Court further stated: “If we regard the overnight guest in Minnesota v. Olson as typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely ‘legitimately on the premises’ as typifying those who may not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in between.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, 119 S.Ct. 469.3
I believe this case is more like Olson than Carter. In Carter there was “no suggestion that [the defendants] had a previous relationship with [the householder], or that there was any other purpose to their visit.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469. In this case Missouri and Sibert were good Mends, and Missouri had visited the apartment on a frequent basis, sometimes spending the night. Missouri was free to come and go as he pleased and paid nothing to use the apartment. Missouri had a change of clothes at the apartment and on some occasions had a key. He used the apartment as a place to “get away” and as a place to “find comfort.” On the day the warrant was executed, Missouri had been at the apartment for approximately seven hours. Additionally, when left alone at the apartment, Missouri could control who came and entered the apartment.
The trial judge’s findings of fact support his ruling that Missouri had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. This ruling is clearly supported by the evidence. Therefore the trial judge should be affirmed.
. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized the facts of Olson were similar to those in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). Olson, 495 U.S. at 97, 110 S.Ct. 1684. Jones is likewise instructive in the present case. The defendant in Jones sought to challenge a search warrant after being arrested in a friend’s apartment. Jones testified that "the apartment belonged to a friend ... who had given him the use of it, and a key, with which [Jones] had admitted himself on the day of the arrest.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled in part by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (rejecting the "automatic standing” rule based on possession of seized goods established in Jones). Jones also testified he had clothing in the apartment, "that his home was elsewhere, that he paid nothing for the use of the apartment, that [his friend] had let him use it ‘as a friend,’ [and] that he had slept there 'maybe a night[.]’ ” Id. The Court ruled Jones could challenge the search because he was "legitimately on [the] premises.” Although this particular standard has been repudiated, the Court stated it did "not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). "Rakas thus recognized that, as an overnight guest, Jones was much more than just legitimately on the premises.” Olson, 495 U.S. at 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684. There is nothing in Jones to indicate the defendant was an overnight guest the evening before the search warrant was executed.
. The Court in Carter also recognized the continuing validity of the factual "holding of Jones that a search of the apartment violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 89-90, 119 S.Ct. 469.