dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority view that evidence of the July 13, 2004 incident was admissible. Thus, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
ANALYSIS
The issue in this case is not whether the Commonwealth could question appellant as to her knowledge of crack cocaine. Instead, the issue is whether the Commonwealth could introduce evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine on July 13, 2004. The Commonwealth argues that the evidence is admissible for either one of two purposes: (1) as part of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, to show appellant’s guilty knowledge and intent to distribute crack cocaine on March 4, 2004, or (2) to impeach the appellant’s testimony on cross-examination that she did not know what crack cocaine was or what it looked like. I address each of these matters separately.
*345 Admissibility for the Commonwealth’s Case-In-Chief
On appeal, appellant contends that the prejudicial effect of the July 13, 2004 drug offense outweighs its probative value. Appellant contends that evidence of the July possession of crack cocaine is highly prejudicial because it conveys to the jury that appellant “had a history of drug dealing and a propensity to sell drugs____”
The Commonwealth argues that the July 2004 drug offense shows appellant had knowledge of crack cocaine, thus making the possession charge relevant during its case-in-chief to prove appellant distributed crack cocaine on March 4, 2004.
The general rule is well established that in a criminal prosecution, proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of the commission of other crimes and offenses at other times, even though they are of the same nature as the one charged in the indictment, is incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime charged. It is also well established that evidence of other offenses should be excluded if offered merely for the purpose of showing that the accused was likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment. However, the exceptions to the general rule are equally as well established. Evidence of other offenses is admitted if it shows the conduct and feeling of the accused toward his victim, if it establishes their prior relations, or if it tends to prove any relevant element of the offense charged. Such evidence is permissible in cases where the motive, intent or knowledge of the accused is involved, or where the evidence is connected with or leads up to the offense for which the accused is on trial. Also, testimony of other crimes is admissible where the other crimes constitute a part of the general scheme of which the crime charged is a part.
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970).
Other crimes evidence which tends to prove the defendant’s knowledge has been permitted in two narrow circumstances: where knowledge of a particular fact is an essential element *346of the crime which the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or where the offenses were interrelated so that evidence of one tended to show the defendant’s guilty knowledge of the other.
Meadows v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 243, 246, 385 S.E.2d 906, 907-08 (1989) (citations omitted).
In order for other crimes evidence to be admissible under the guilty knowledge exception, the Commonwealth must show its relevance to prove a material fact or issue. See Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). In other words, the Commonwealth must be entitled to introduce this evidence during its case-in-chief. “Evidence of collateral facts or those incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference on matters in issue, because too remote or irrelevant, cannot be accepted in evidence.” Bunting v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 309, 314, 157 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1967).
Even if evidence is factually relevant, it must nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Coe, 231 Va. at 87, 340 S.E.2d at 823. The responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of probative value and prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617 (1990).
I agree with the Commonwealth that the Commonwealth must prove appellant’s knowledge of the illegal nature of the items distributed. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 64, 67, 448 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1994) (“The burden [is] on the Commonwealth to establish that the defendant knew the nature and character of the materials he was charged with distributing.”). However, “[t]he Supreme Court [of Virginia] has been particularly careful to recognize the danger of misusing other crimes evidence in drug-related charges.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 213, 221, 429 S.E.2d 229, 234, aff'd on reh’g en banc, 17 Va.App. 248, 436 S.E.2d 193 (1993).
In three cases, the Supreme Court has addressed the relevance and admissibility of prior drug-related offenses to *347prove an element or elements of the charged offense. See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 52, 53, 189 S.E.2d 359, 359-60 (1972) (per curiam); Eccles v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 22, 197 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1973) (per curiam); Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 156, 300 S.E.2d 768, 774 (1983). The general principle stated in those cases is that prior sales of drugs do[ ] not, without more, tend to prove that an accused on another unrelated occasion intended to possess or sell drugs. Evidence of prior drug-related conduct is irrelevant and inadmissible and does not fall within one of the Kirkpatrick exceptions where there has been no showing of an intimate relation or connection between the prior conduct and an element of the crime charged.
Wilson, 16 Va.App. at 221-22, 429 S.E.2d at 234-35 (other citation omitted).
If the Commonwealth was allowed to prove, as an exception to the general rule prohibiting other crimes evidence, that the defendant knew the nature and character of the substance he is charged with possessing because he possessed the same substance on a prior occasion, the exception would swallow the rule in drug cases. Thus, in order to admit evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July 2004 under the guilty knowledge exception, the Commonwealth must show an “intimate relation or connection between the prior conduct and an element of the crime charged.” Id.
No such relation or connection was established in this case. While appellant may have been fully knowledgeable of the nature and character of crack cocaine in July 2004, it does not follow that she knew of crack cocaine on the earlier date of the distribution offense. See Eccles, 214 Va. at 22, 197 S.E.2d at 333 (holding that, in a prosecution for distribution of marijuana, evidence of appellant’s possession of marijuana at a different time and place was not admissible to show appellant’s knowledge of marijuana); see also Cooper v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 643, 648-49, 525 S.E.2d 72, 74-75 (2000) (en banc) (holding that evidence that defendant had sold imitation crack cocaine two months before the charged offense was “a separate act without logical or natural connection with [defen*348dant’s] present charge of possession of imitation cocaine with the intent to distribute” and, thus, inadmissible); Brown v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 150, 152, 442 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1994) (holding that a prior act of drug distribution could not be admitted to show defendant’s state of mind or intent to distribute drugs twenty minutes later).
The prejudice to the appellant in this case is great. The jury, in determining appellant’s guilt for distributing crack cocaine, was advised that appellant was arrested for possession of crack cocaine at a later date.
Because appellant’s possession of crack cocaine “lacked a logical relationship to the offense charged,” it was “irrelevant and showed only the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged.” Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 141-42, 495 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1998) (“Since this evidence was inadmissible and had no probative value, we hold that its admission caused undue prejudice to the defendant.”). Thus, I would hold that even if the July 2004 possession has any marginal probative value it is substantially outweighed by the prejudice to appellant. Accordingly, I would find that the evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July 2004 was not admissible during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief under the guilty-knowledge exception.
Admissibility to Impeach Appellant’s Credibility7
The Commonwealth argues that it was entitled to introduce evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July 2004 *349in order to impeach appellant’s testimony that she did not have any knowledge of crack cocaine. I disagree.
Because appellant’s denial that she had any knowledge of crack cocaine was elicited on cross-examination, the Commonwealth was “subject to the rule prohibiting impeachment on collateral matters elicited during cross-examination.” Simpson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 604, 607, 414 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1992). “ ‘The test as to whether a matter is material or collateral, in the matter of impeachment of a witness, is whether or not the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it in support of his case.’ ” Williams v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 928, 935, 434 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1993) (quoting Allen v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 834, 842, 94 S.E. 783, 786 (1918)); see also Maynard v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 437, 445, 399 S.E.2d 635, 640 (1990) (en banc) (holding that where a party could not present evidence on certain issues in support of his case-in-chief, this evidence was collateral and not a proper matter for cross-examination).8
*350In Simpson, the defendant was charged with possession of heroin and cocaine with the intent to distribute. Simpson, 13 Va.App. at 605, 414 S.E.2d at 408. At trial, Simpson testified that the police had planted the drugs on him when they arrested him. Id. at 606, 414 S.E.2d at 408. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Simpson if he sold cocaine, and Simpson replied that he did not. Id. at 606, 414 S.E.2d at 409. The Commonwealth was then permitted to offer a police officer’s testimony that he had purchased drugs from Simpson four months after his arrest. Id.
As in the instant case, in Simpson the Commonwealth argued that the other crimes evidence was admissible under Santmier. We distinguished between a denial made by the defendant during direct examination and one made by the defendant during cross-examination:
In Santmier, the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine the defendant concerning a prior conviction of selling marijuana because the defendant on direct examination had denied using drugs. Santmier, 217 Va. at 319-20, 228 S.E.2d at 682. In this case, the defendant did not deny the use of drugs during his direct examination. Instead, the Commonwealth elicited during cross-examination his denial of having sold drugs. This difference is significant because on cross-examination the Commonwealth is subject to the rule prohibiting impeachment on collateral matters elicited during cross-examination. Seilheimer [v. Melville], 224 Va. [323,] 326, 295 S.E.2d [896,] 898 [(1982)].
Simpson, 13 Va.App. at 607, 414 S.E.2d at 409. See Waller v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 53, 57, 467 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1996) (holding that “if the subject matter is raised for the first time on cross-examination and is collateral to the issues on trial, it cannot be the basis for impeachment by proof of a prior *351inconsistent statement”); see also 1-4 The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 4-5 (“Evidence of prior conduct inconsistent with present testimony is admissible to impeach under the same rules applicable to the use of prior inconsistent statements.”).
Thus, “[a] witness may not be cross-examined regarding any fact irrelevant to the issues on trial when that cross-examination is for the mere purpose of impeaching his credit by contradicting him.” Simpson, 13 Va.App. at 606, 414 S.E.2d at 409; see also Maynard, 11 Va.App. at 444, 399 S.E.2d at 639 (“A witness cannot be impeached by evidence of a collateral fact which is not relevant to the issues of the trial, even though to some extent it has a bearing on the issue of credibility.”).
As discussed above, evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July 2004 was not admissible to prove the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. As such, “the Commonwealth, having elicited this collateral evidence from [appellant] during cross-examination, was required to accept [appellant’s] response and could not impeach [her] testimony by contradicting it.” Simpson, 13 Va.App. at 608, 414 S.E.2d at 410; see also Blaylock v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 579, 593-94, 496 S.E.2d 97, 104 (1998) (“If the witness answers a question on a collateral issue, the answer is conclusive and may not be contradicted with further evidence ... [b]ecause we hold that the Commonwealth could not introduce the child pornography evidence in its case-in-chief, the videotape is impeachment evidence on a collateral matter and should not have been shown to the jury.”).
Thus, I would hold that the July 13 offense was “collateral to the issues on trial” and it could not be used to impeach appellant’s credibility.
Jury Instruction
The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the purpose for which the evidence of appellant’s later *352possession of crack cocaine could be considered.9 The limitation was for the jury to consider that as evidence “of the defendant’s intent, opportunity or as evidence of the absence of mistake or accident----” However, this instruction did not ameliorate the prejudice caused by the evidence of the July 13, 2004 incident.
The issue before the jury was not appellant’s intent, opportunity, mistake or accident. It was simply a credibility issue. Thus, the limiting instruction did not address the prejudice of the introduction of the later offense, i.e., the propensity of the appellant to commit drug-related offenses.10
The jury was exposed to inadmissible evidence, unworthy of consideration in any issue at trial. The instruction limiting the utility of such evidence expressly approved improper consideration by the jury, albeit for a restricted purpose. A jury cannot be presumed at once to follow a direction to consider improper evidence and remain unaffected by its content.
Boney v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 795, 802, 514 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1999). Thus, I would hold that the instruction could not cure the trial court’s error in admitting the evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July 2004.
CONCLUSION
I would find that the evidence of appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July 2004 was not probative of appellant’s knowledge of cocaine at the time of the distribution offense in March 2004. As the possession charge was a fact collateral to the issues at trial, it could not be used to impeach appellant’s credibility. The prejudice resulting from the admission of the *353later possession evidence was overwhelming, and the trial court’s instruction to the jury limiting their consideration of the evidence could not ameliorate the prejudice. I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.
. The Commonwealth also contends that, because appellant denied any knowledge of crack cocaine during cross-examination, the Commonwealth was entitled to introduce appellant’s possession of crack cocaine in July. Essentially, the Commonwealth urges that appellant "opened the door” to rebuttal evidence regarding this separate offense.
It is well settled that, where a criminal defendant offers evidence on direct examination that is calculated to mislead the jury, "the defendant open[s] the door to cross-examination for the purpose of attacking his credibility.” Santmier v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 318, 319-20, 228 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1976). However, the Commonwealth cannot open the door for itself to present otherwise inadmissible evidence through its cross-examination of a defendant. See Camm v. State, 812 N.E.2d *3491127, 1135 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (“Statements made by a defendant that are elicited by the State on cross-examination cannot be relied upon to ‘open the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence.”), transfer denied, 822 N.E.2d 980 (Ind.2004); see also Crenshaw v. State, 125 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex.App.2003) (holding that the prosecutor cannot open the door to a collateral matter through her own cross-examination).
Thus, I would hold that appellant could not open the door to evidence of her possession of crack cocaine in July 2004 by denying knowledge of crack cocaine during her cross-examination by the Commonwealth.
. The Commonwealth relies on Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 421 S.E.2d 821 (1992), for the proposition that a criminal defendant who testifies on his own behalf opens the door for any questions on cross-examination that are relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence. This assertion is correct; however the Commonwealth's reliance on Satcher in this case is misplaced.
Satcher does not deal with collateral evidence of prior bad acts brought out during cross-examination. In Satcher, the defendant was questioned on cross-examination about his familiarity with the crime scene and about whether he knew before he was arrested that he was a suspect in the crimes for which he was on trial. Id. at 251, 421 S.E.2d at 840. On appeal, the defendant argued that it was error for the trial court to allow these questions because they exceeded the scope of his direct examination and were raised for the first time during cross-examination. Id. at 251-52, 421 S.E.2d at 840. The Satcher Court *350never considered the rules regarding collateral evidence and prior bad acts, as the questions went directly to the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the charges for which he was on trial. Id. at 252, 421 S.E.2d at 840. By its very definition, collateral evidence is not relevant to appellant’s guilt or innocence and thus is not a proper matter for cross-examination.
. We presume the jury followed those instructions absent evidence to the contrary. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983).
. While appellant did not object to the limiting instruction, it is of no importance. We are not determining whether the trial court erred in granting the instruction but only the prejudicial effect of the July 13 offense.