Mele v. Turner

Pearson, J.

(dissenting) — The majority incorrectly frames the issue in this case as whether plaintiff "is entitled to recover damages from his neighbors for injuries which resulted when he put his hand in or under the running mower." Majority opinion, at 74. In reality, the issue before the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now this court, is whether the defendants had a duty to warn plaintiff of the lawn mower's dangerous condition. The majority apparently believes this case presents an issue of liability when, in fact, the issue is one of duty. The distinction is important. This court's function is to determine whether defendants owe a particular duty to the plaintiff; but it is the jury's function to determine whether the defendants should be held liable for a breach of that duty. By transmogrifying a duty question into a liability question, the majority usurps an important function of the jury. Accordingly, I dissent.

The procedural context of this case is important. It comes to us after the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a matter of law, the defendants had no duty to warn plaintiff of the lawn mower's dangerous condition. Because the trial court decided this case on an order of summary judgment, this court must engage in the same inquiry as the trial judge. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). A summary judgment pursuant to CR 56(c) can be granted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material *82fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson, at 437. In reviewing the motion for summary judgment, this court "must consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party", Wilson, at 437, in this case plaintiff.

In Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wn.2d 465, 467-68, 423 P.2d 926 (1967), this court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965). Section 388 defines the liability of a supplier15 of a dangerous chattel for failure to disclose the danger to the user. This duty to disclose arises if the supplier

(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965); Fleming, at 468. If these two conditions are satisfied, the supplier has a duty to disclose. The supplier is liable for a user's injuries, however, only if he "fails to exercise reasonable care to inform [the user] of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388(c) (1965).

Although a duty issue constitutes a pure question of law, a determination that a duty exists under § 388 requires a certain amount of fact-finding. In particular, the court must determine whether the supplier knew or had reason to know the chattel was dangerous. § 388(a). Furthermore, the court must determine whether the supplier had reason to believe the user realized its dangerous condition. § 388(b). Because these factual questions must be answered before a court can resolve the legal question of whether a duty atta*83ches, summary judgment on the duty question would be appropriate only if there was no genuine issue as to these material facts. A genuine issue exists if reasonable persons could reach more than one conclusion. Cf. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494-95, 519 P.2d 7 (1974).

As I interpret § 388, a supplier of a chattel has a duty to disclose if the supplier knew the chattel was dangerous and had no reason to believe the user recognized the danger. In this case, reasonable persons arguably could reach but one conclusion on the factual question of whether defendants knew or had reason to know the rotary lawn mower was dangerous. Reasonable persons could differ, however, on the question of whether the defendants had no reason to believe plaintiff realized its dangerous condition. The record clearly shows the plaintiff had never used the defendants' mower before the day of the accident. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the defendants had ever observed plaintiff using a similar type of lawn mower. In short, I fail to see how the majority could arrive at the factual conclusion, implicit in its holding, that the defendants did have reason to believe the plaintiff understood the dangers of that particular type of mower.

The majority points to a portion of plaintiff's affidavit in which he stated that he "obviously realized that one should not put his hand under the machine where the blade runs . . ." Majority opinion, at 80. Based on this statement, the majority concludes that "[s]ince the 'dangerous condition' of the lawn mower . . . was obvious and known to him . . . the defendants had no legal duty to warn him of such a condition." Majority opinion, at 80.1 have two responses to the majority's analysis.

In the first place, I believe the majority places far too much weight on plaintiff's statement that he realized the dangers associated with placing one's hand "under" a running lawn mower. Plaintiff did not thrust his hand "under" the defendants' mower, as the majority suggests, but rather swept away grass clippings that accumulated at the discharge chute. The mower blade apparently reaches quite *84near the chute's mouth, but is difficult to observe due to the speed of the blade's rotation. Unlike those who normally operated this mower and were aware that the discharge chute frequently clogged, plaintiff was unaware of the danger of sweeping accumulated clippings from the chute's opening.

Regardless, the question under § 388(b) is not whether the danger was obvious to plaintiff, but rather whether the defendants had reason to believe that plaintiff realized its dangerous condition. As stated above, there is a dearth of evidence in the record suggesting that the defendants had reason to believe plaintiff realized the dangers associated with that particular mower. I do not suggest that the defendants could not adduce such evidence, but rather that such evidence does not exist in the record before this court. Without such evidence, I am unable to conclude that, as a matter of law, the defendants had no duty to warn plaintiff of the mower's dangerous condition. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court's entry of summary judgment, but under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, rather than § 390.

Utter and Dore, JJ., and Winsor, J. Pro Tern., concur with Pearson, J.

Because I do not believe the Garretts are "suppliers” within the contemplation of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388,1 would not apply § 388 analysis to plaintiffs claim against them. I express no opinion on the question of whether the Garretts owed plaintiff some duty under other principles of tort law.