Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.
This case presents two related questions: first, whether zoning ordinances of the City of Long Branch, New Jersey (“Long Branch” or the “City”) that prohibit churches while permitting the establish*278ment of places for secular assemblies such as theaters, cinemas, and lecture halls constitute a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA” or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.; and second, whether those same ordinances constitute a violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of the Free Exercise of Religion. In less legalistic language, we are asked whether religion can be made, to take a back seat to a City’s economic development goals. My colleagues in the Majority say it can. On this record and on the basis of the Act, I must disagree and therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the Majority’s judgment affirming summary judgment for the City. I do agree, however, with the Majority’s conclusion that the earlier of the ordinances at issue violated RLUIPA and therefore concur with the judgment to that extent. Because I believe the case can be decided strictly on statutory grounds, I do not reach the constitutional issues except to the extent that they are embodied in the Act.
I. Factual and Procedural Background18
The Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. is a New Jersey nonprofit corporation formed in 1991 and led by Reverend Kevin Brown, an ordained Baptist minister.19 Lighthouse’s mission is to minister to its congregation in kéeping with Christian doctrine, to operate a school for those interested in joining the ministry, and to provide a variety of benevolent services to the community in which it has operated and seeks to operate. On March 1, 1992, Lighthouse began its work in rented space on 159 Broadway in Long Branch by holding Bible study classes and public prayer meetings. In the years since, it has also provided daily meals for the poor, as well as job placement and substance abuse counseling. Lighthouse deliberately chose to establish itself in a community “where nearly one quarter of the households ... earn[ed] under $15,000 a year” so that it could provide services where it perceived the needs were most acute. (Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Appendix [“PA”] 27.)
On November 8, 1994, Lighthouse purchased an abandoned building across the street from its rented location, at 162 Broadway, and planned to continue its mission there. When it purchased the property, it believed it had the support of the City. The City’s mayor had voiced his support on many occasions, had written a congratulatory letter to Reverend Brown after the purchase, and had awarded Lighthouse a mini-grant “for the expansion of [its] soup kitchen and related facilities to new quarters.”20 (PA 63 (emphasis removed).)
The 162 Broadway property is located in a part of the City once known as the C-l Central Commercial District, as designated by Long Branch Ordinance 20-6.13 (the “C-l Ordinance”). The C-l Ordinance did not list churches as one of the “permitted uses” within the C-l district, but it did list, among other things, restaurants, post-sec*279ondary educational institutions, assembly halls, bowling alleys, motion picture theaters, municipal buildings, health spas, gyms, barber shops, and beauty salons. (PA 81-83.) Lighthouse claims that, soon after it acquired the property on 162 Broadway, the City restrained it from performing its mission, despite having allowed it to do so for years when it rented space across the street. On August 1, 1995, Lighthouse submitted an application for a variance to the City Planning Board to operate a soup kitchen and counseling center and to provide missionary outreach, job skills training, Bible classes, and life skills classes.21 The City deemed the application incomplete, saying it was not completely filled out, the fees were not paid, and the plans and survey submitted with it were not sealed.
This was an early round in what Lighthouse claims was a concerted effort by the City to thwart Lighthouse’s attempt to obtain a variance, an effort Lighthouse says was characterized by the City’s stalling Lighthouse’s application with technical requests, failing to put it on the City’s agenda when Lighthouse met the technical requests, and failing to consider Lighthouse’s request for a waiver of fees on account of its nonprofit status.22 Indeed, according to Lighthouse, the City’s Director of Community Development was plain enough to state that the City “was never going to allow [Lighthouse] to use 162 Broadway.” (PA 31.) Lighthouse asserts that Reverend Brown met with officials from an organization called Pendar Development (“Pendar”) to find an alternative location to pursue its mission. Pen-dar agreed to approach the City to discuss the possibility of allowing Lighthouse to relocate to a former nursing home. According to Lighthouse, the City told Pen-dar and Reverend Brown after several meetings that it would work with Pendar to develop the property on the condition that Pendar “dropped its affiliation with Rev. Brown.” (PA 31.)
On March 26, 1997, Lighthouse applied for a zoning permit to use the property as offices for Lighthouse personnel. The *280City granted the zoning permit, but specified that the property could not be used for “church services/soup kitchen/classes.” (PA 509.) On April 26, 2000, Lighthouse applied for a zoning permit to use the building as a church. The zoning officer denied the application the next day because the proposed use was not permitted in the C-l zone without a variance.
On June 8, 2000, Lighthouse and Reverend Brown filed a complaint against the City in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The City subsequently removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On October 23, 2000, Lighthouse filed an amended complaint alleging, among other things, violations of the Free Exercise Clause and the then-newly enacted RLUIPA.23 On March 18, 2001, Lighthouse filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to compel the City to grant Lighthouse’s zoning permit application. The District Court denied Lighthouse’s motion.
Lighthouse appealed the District Court’s denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction and this Court, in a nonpreceden-tial opinion, affirmed. The Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism Inc. v. The City of Long Branch, 100 Fed.Appx. 70, 73 (3d Cir.2004). Regarding Lighthouse’s RLUI-PA claim, we stated that, because Lighthouse “did not show that it would be prohibited from operating in the district if it applied under the ‘assembly hall’ category, it could not show that the [C-l] Ordinance, on its face, treated it on less than equal terms than a nonreligious assembly.” Id. at 77.24 We also stated that Lighthouse had failed to produce any evidence that the nonreligious assemblies it identified were similarly situated “such that a meaningful comparison could be made” under the provision of RLUIPA that forbids treating religious and nonreligious assemblies on less than equal terms. Id. As support for that statement, we cited a case decided under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., 309 F.3d 120 (3d Cir.2002)).
In the meantime, while Lighthouse’s motion for a preliminary injunction was pending in the District Court, the City changed the applicable zoning ordinances. On October 8, 2002, the City passed redevelopment ordinance 47-02 (the “Redevelopment Plan” or, as the Majority refers to it, the “Plan”) pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 40A:12A. The Redevelopment Plan superseded the “applicable provisions of the development regulations of the municipality or constitute^] an overlay zoning district within the redevelopment area.” N.J.S.A. § 40A:12A-7(c). The City’s stated purpose in adopting the Redevelopment Plan was to “achieve redevelopment of an underdeveloped and underutilized segment of the City” by, among other things, strengthening retail trade and city revenues, increasing employment opportunities, improving the city’s image, and attracting more retail and service enterprises. (PA 87-88.) To achieve those goals, the City planned to “establish a center for the arts that [would] attract artists from the whole region” and “restore lower Broadwayf, i.e., the ‘Zone’], traditionally the downtown of Long Branch, as the principal commercial district of the city.” (PA 95, 97.) The City wanted to accommodate “rich and varied uses” in the Zone, to stimulate retail in all areas, and *281to have a “diversity of attractions” to “bring people together from all parts of Long Branch and neighboring communities.” (PA 97.) The Redevelopment Plan listed the kinds of entities the City wanted in the Zone, such as theaters, cinemas, dance studios, culinary schools, music instruction centers, theater workshops, fashion design schools, art studios, restaurants, bars and clubs, book stores, and craft stores. (Id.) Churches did not make the cut. Evidently, “rich and varied uses” were not seen to include religious devotions. Since churches were not on the list of desirable downtown entities, the Redevelopment Plan prohibited them.
The Plan created new application requirements for development within the affected areas. Under those new requirements, no property could be developed in the Zone until a Request for Qualification (“RFQ”) and a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) had been approved by the City Council.25 While no formal procedure for individualized zoning waivers was included in the Plan itself, there is evidence to suggest that the City Council did, as in this instance, at least consider waivers with respect to the Plan, (see PA 231 (“Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the City Council of the City of Long Branch that the application for a waiver of the Redevelopment Plan to allow houses of worship in the entertainment/commercial section of the Redevelopment Zone 6 in lower Broadway is denied.”)), and, of course, the City Council had the power to amend the Plan.
On November 11, 2003, Lighthouse submitted an RFQ and application to develop its property as a church. On December 23, 2003, the Redevelopment Council of the City of Long Branch notified Lighthouse that its application had been rejected because the “proposed church use did not comport with the Redevelopment Plan and would in fact disrupt the zone.” (PA 226.) Lighthouse appealed that decision to the Mayor and City Council and, at the same time, sought to have the Redevelopment Plan amended to allow houses of worship in the Zone or, alternatively, to obtain a waiver of the prohibition of church use.
After administrative hearings, the City Council voted unanimously to deny the waiver and application because churches were not permitted in the Zone and because the RFQ was “sketchy” with respect to project funding, scope, aesthetics and design, and plans for parking. (PA 226, 232.) The City Council determined that granting a waiver would have a “detrimental effect on the zoning planned for the area which was to be an entertainment/commercial zone with businesses that are for profit.” (PA 227.) As emphasized by my colleagues in the Majority, one problem the City perceived is that a state statute and a municipal ordinance prohibit the City from issuing liquor licenses to businesses within the vicinity of a church. Consequently, according to the City, allowing Lighthouse in the Zone “would destroy the ability of the block to be used as a high end entertainment recreation area.” (PA 229.) The City reached that conclusion despite a provision in the state statute allowing a church to waive its rights under the statute,26 despite Lighthouse’s express *282agreement to waive those rights in perpetuity if allowed to establish a church within the Zone, and despite the City’s apparent failure to enforce its own ordinance in any meaningful way.27
On July 26, 2004, Lighthouse amended its complaint to add statutory and constitutional challenges to the Redevelopment Plan. On December 27, 2005, the District Court granted summary judgment for the City on all of Lighthouse’s claims. The Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. The City of Long Branch, 406 F.Supp.2d 507, 524 (D.N.J.2005). On appeal now are the District Court’s conclusions regarding the alleged violations of section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (“section 2(b)(1)”) and the Free Exercise Clause.
II. Analysis
In my view, both the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan are unlawful. Since my colleagues in the Majority and I are in agreement that the C-l Ordinance violated RLUIPA, my analysis is focused primarily on the Redevelopment Plan and its shortcomings under RLUIPA. I do not reach the question of whether the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan also violate the Free Exercise Clause because Lighthouse ought to obtain full relief under the statute. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”).
Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l). It is uncontested that the City is a “government” within the meaning of the statute, that the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan are “land use regulations” within the meaning of the statute, and that churches are “religious assemblies] or institution[s]” that are treated differently than nonreligious assemblies or institutions under the City’s land use regulations. See Maj. Op. at 262. Nevertheless, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City with respect to Lighthouse’s section 2(b)(1) claim. As accurately described by the Majority, the District Court concluded that *283Lighthouse had failed to demonstrate that the City imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion and that Lighthouse had failed to show it was similarly situated to nonreligious assemblies receiving more favorable treatment from the City. The City now argues that, in addition to the grounds the District Court relied upon, summary judgment was appropriate on Lighthouse’s section 2(b)(1) claim because the land use ordinances are neutral and generally applicable. The City also argues that, even if it did treat Lighthouse on less than equal terms than nonreligious assemblies, it had a compelling government interest for doing so and that the means it used were narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
The City’s arguments are not well founded, and neither is the District Court reasoning that the City attempts to defend here. With all respect to the District Court and its work on this challenging case, and likewise with due regard for my colleagues who have wrestled with the case on this and the previous appeal, I believe the District Court undertook an analysis that is neither warranted by the text of the statute nor compelled by any concern regarding the statute’s constitutionality, and I further believe that some measure of the responsibility for that error lies in our earlier opinion, to the extent it encouraged the District Court to read into RLUIPA a “similarly situated” analysis imported from equal protection jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, I do not find myself totally at odds with the Majority’s opinion on this latest round in the dispute. I agree with the Majority that the District Court should not have grafted onto section 2(b)(1) a “substantial burden” requirement. I also agree that the District Court erred by holding that, for Lighthouse to prevail on its 2(b)(1) claim, Lighthouse had to show that it was treated on less than equal terms than a secular counterpart so similarly situated that both entities, the religious and the secular, involved exactly the same combination of land uses. I acknowledge, as does the Majority, the need for some kind of comparator. That is, of course, inherent in the concept of “less than equal terms,” which implies a comparison. But, unlike the Majority, I do not believe the statute requires any greater similarity than is inherent in the broad terminology “assembly or institution,” i.e., the terminology of the statute itself. The correct analysis should begin and, to the extent possible, end with the language of the statute. Since the text of both the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan treats churches differently than nonreligious assemblies or institutions, I would reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the City and direct that judgment be entered in favor of Lighthouse on its RLUIPA claim.28
A. Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA Does Not Require Plaintiffs to Demonstrate a Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise
As previously noted, I agree with the Majority that, for reasons they cite and I will not repeat, section 2(b)(1) does not require Lighthouse to demonstrate a substantial burden on religious exercise. When interpreting a statute, the starting point is to determine if the language is plain and unambiguous, “for ‘[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’ ” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) (quoting Chevron *284U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). Section 2(b)(1) very simply prohibits zoning regulations that treat religious assemblies or institutions “on less than equal terms” than secular assemblies or institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). It is a spare and straightforward statute. Congress included no language in section 2(b)(1) indicating that a plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial burden on religious exercise, to obtain relief, and I can discern no constitutionally compelled basis for reading that requirement into that subsection of the statute.
B. Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA Addresses the Neutrality and General Applicability of a Challenged Ordinance Within the Framework of a “Less than Equal Terms” Analysis
In my view, the appropriate analysis to undertake in deciding whether the City’s imposition or implementation of the challenged ordinances violates section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA requires three steps. First, we should determine whether each of the challenged ordinances is a land use regulation. Second, though it is in this instance self-evident and not seriously disputed, we should decide whether Lighthouse is a religious assembly or institution. Third, we should decide whether the City’s enactment or implementation of the challenged ordinances results in Lighthouse being treated on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.
No one contests that the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan are land use regulations. Nor is there any legitimate contention that Lighthouse is not a religious assembly or institution.29 The parties further agree that several of the permitted uses under both the Ordinance and the Plan constitute nonreligious assemblies. Thus, the dispute in this case is whether the City’s instituting or implementing of the challenged ordinances has resulted in Lighthouse being treated “on less than equal terms” with one of the permitted nonreligious assemblies.
The Eleventh Circuit has identified three distinct ways in which a government’s enactment or implementation of a land use regulation might result in a religious assembly being treated “on less than equal terms”:
(1) a statute that facially differentiates between religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions; (2) a facially neutral statute that is nevertheless ‘ger*285rymandered’ to place a burden solely on religious, as opposed to nonreligious, assemblies or institutions; or (3) a truly neutral statute that is selectively enforced against religious, as opposed to nonreligious assemblies or institutions.
Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana v. Broward Cty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.2006).
In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.2004), the Eleventh Circuit confronted the first situation: a statute that, on its face, differentiated between religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies. There, the town of Surfside had a zoning ordinance that permitted theaters, restaurants, private clubs, lodge halls, health clubs, dance studios, music instruction studios, modeling schools, language schools, and schools of athletic instruction in the town’s business district, but that did not permit churches or synagogues. Id. at 1220.30 Because churches, synagogues, private clubs, and lodges all fell under the definition of “assemblies” or “institutions,” and because Surfside permitted private clubs and other secular assemblies in the business district but categorically excluded synagogues and other religious assemblies, the court held that the town’s zoning ordinance, on its face, violated section 2(b)(1). Id. at 1231. Indeed, the court noted that the legislative history indicated that section 2(b)(1) “was intended to apply in precisely the situation [it was addressing].” Id. at 1231 n. 14; see also 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (“Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes.”).
The facts of this case bear a striking resemblance to those in Midrash. Here, the texts of the challenged ordinances permit schools, assembly halls, gyms, theaters, cinemas, restaurants, and bars and clubs, all of which qualify broadly as assemblies or institutions because people gather in those places to be entertained or educated or to otherwise organize themselves for some common purpose.31 Religious assemblies, such as churches and synagogues, are not permitted under either ordinance.32 Like the Eleventh Cir*286cuit in Midrash, I conclude that such differential treatment on the face of both the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan constitutes a violation of section 2(b)(1). Put simply, churches are treated “on less than equal terms” than the permitted nonreligious assemblies because churches are categorically prohibited.33 The City here may have a laudatory redevelopment aim, but, as in Midrash, that does not save the City’s actions from being unlawful.34
The Majority and the District Court each reject the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Midrask because they apparently fear it interprets RLUIPA so broadly as to make rational zoning impossible whenever a church is in the mix. Contrary to those concerns, however, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of section 2(b)(1) does not prohibit governments from applying zoning restrictions to churches. For one thing, an ordinance prohibiting churches in a zone would not likely violate section 2(b)(1) if nonreligious assemblies and institutions were also prohibited. See Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that a zoning ordinance permitting “model homes” and “home occupations” in a residential zone but prohibiting synagogues and church services did not, on its face, violate section 2(b)(1) because “model homes” and “home occupations” did not qualify as “assemblies or institutions”).
Again, contrary to the Majority’s claim, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of section 2(b)(1) does not “give any and all religious entities a free pass to locate wherever any secular institution or assembly is allowed.” Maj. Op. at 268. The Majority hypothesizes that,
under the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, if a town allows a local, ten-member book club to meet in the senior center, it must also permit a large church with a thousand members — or, to take examples from the Free Exercise caselaw, it must permit a religious assembly with rituals involving sacrificial killings of an*287imals or the participation of wild bears— to locate in the same neighborhood regardless of the impact such a religious entity might have on the envisioned character of the area.
Id. This parade of horribles has the benefit of some “lions and tigers and bears, oh my!” shock value, but I do not read RLUI-PA as somehow preventing a city from including in its zoning ordinances rational terms restricting the use of land, as long as those terms apply equally to religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies. See Digrugilliers v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 615, 2007 WL 3151201, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct.30, 2007) (“Whatever restrictions the City imposes on other users of land in [its C-l commercial district] it can impose on the Baptist Church of the West Side without violating the ‘equal terms’ provision.”).
For example, a large church might lawfully be prohibited from locating in a neighborhood by an ordinance regulating the physical size of buildings. See, e.g., Vision Church, United Methodist v. Village of Long Grove, 397 F.Supp.2d 917, 930 (N.D.Ill.2005) (holding that a zoning ordinance restricting building size did not violate section 2(b)(1) because the ordinance applied equally to religious and nonreligious institutions), aff'd on other grounds, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.2006). Moreover, while I have not found any cases explicitly addressing the point, no one that I am aware of has suggested that section 2(b)(1) prevents a city from prohibiting either animal slaughter or the possession of wild bears in a zone. If a city wanted to, it could properly enact a zoning ordinance prohibiting either, as long as the ordinance applied equally to religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies.35
In this case, however, the applicable ordinances do not treat religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies on equal terms. Instead, religious assemblies are categorically prohibited. Holding that these ordinances violate section 2(b)(1) does not give religious entities “a free pass.” It does nothing more than reach exactly the result Congress intended. See 146 Cong. Rec. at S7774 (“Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes.... Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes.”).
Nevertheless, the City argues, and the Majority accepts, that the City did not treat Lighthouse on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and institutions because the zoning ordinances at issue are “neutral and generally applicable.” I fundamentally disagree with that characterization of the ordinances, and believe that the City and the Majority have approached the question from the wrong direction.
The “neutral and generally applicable” language is lifted from Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”). While it is true that the legislative history of RLUIPA shows that Congress intended to codify aspects of *288that jurisprudence, see 146 Cong. Rec. at S7776 (“Sections 2(b)(1) and (2) ... enforce the Free Exercise Clause rule against laws that burden religion and are not neutral and generally applicable”), that does not mean Congress meant to simply replicate the analysis that would be undertaken in addressing a Free Exercise claim. Viewing a RLUIPA claim as the precise equivalent of a Free Exercise claim renders the statute superfluous. Congress chose to define a violation under section 2(b)(1) not in terms of an ordinance’s lack of neutrality and general applicability but rather in terms of equality of treatment, i.e., whether the ordinance treats a religious assembly or institution “on less than equal terms” with a nonreligious assembly or institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). Again, we should be starting with the text. If we were taking the language Congress chose as the starting point of our analysis, we would not only be faithful to legislative intent, we would avoid the confusion that attends a multiplication of legal tests.
Moreover, to say an ordinance is neutral and generally applicable should be no defense to a charge of unequal treatment. First, it presents a logical contradiction. As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Mi-drash, if a zoning law on its face treats religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions on less than equal terms, that law is not genuinely neutral or generally applicable, “because such unequal treatment indicates the ordinance improperly targets the religious character of an assembly.” 366 F.3d at 1232. Second, it is, in an important sense, beside the point. If the treatment is unequal and the other prerequisites set by the statute have been met, then a claim has been established. Even if one were to find an instance of unequal treatment imposed in accordance with a neutral and generally applicable statute — and, again, I think that akin to an oxymoron — what you would then be dealing with would not be a defense to the charge that a RLUIPA violation had occurred but rather would be an attack on RLUIPA itself, on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally broad, as was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Cf. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”). Since the City never purported to raise a constitutional challenge to the statute, those ramifications of their “neutral and generally applicable” defense were never explored.36
*289But, even accepting that the correct analytical approach under RLUIPA is to ask whether the challenged ordinance is “neutral and generally applicable,” the Majority does not address the fundamental question in this case. My colleagues state that, “[a] regulation does not automatically cease being neutral and generally applicable ... simply because it allows certain secular behaviors but not certain religious behaviors.” Maj. Op. at 265. That may be true in the abstract, but we are not talking about abstractions. We have here two reasonably well-defined sets of proposed uses. If an ordinance on its face permits, indeed encourages, secular assemblies for the purpose of education and entertainment, which is what the ordinances at issue do, I am hard put to say it is neutral and generally applicable when that same ordinance leaves out of the “permitted” category religious assemblies. Many people who attend church services are seeking edification and learning. On what principled basis can an art workshop or a cooking class be governmentally preferred to a theological or philosophical discussion in Sunday School? Many people who attend church services find personal enjoyment and entertainment in the sermons they hear. Why should Hollywood’s latest cinematic offering or a production of a popular Broadway play be governmentally preferred to preaching? I submit that there is no proper basis for the distinctions made in either the C-l Ordinance or the Redevelopment Plan.
The City nevertheless defends its unequal treatment of religious assemblies by pointing to the state law that prohibits *290issuing liquor licenses within a certain distance of religious institutions.37 According to the City, if churches were allowed in its Redevelopment Zone, the liquor law would prevent it from turning the Zone into a high-end entertainment district. New Jersey law, however, cannot take the City off the hook for violating RLUIPA. RLUIPA is a federal law, and no state or local government can defend against a charge that it has violated federal law on the basis that its actions were required by state law. Were it otherwise, a state could nullify RLUIPA simply by passing a statute mandating that churches be treated on unequal terms.
Indeed, in Digrugilliers v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected an identical argument to the one the City makes here. 2007 WL 3151201, at *3-4. There, the city of Indianapolis had a zoning ordinance that permitted assemblies such as auditoriums, assembly halls, community centers, and civic clubs in its C-l commercial district, but that did not permit churches. Id. at * 1. Indianapolis defended its discriminatory treatment of churches on the basis of state laws that forbade the sale of liquor within two hundred feet of a church, or pornography within five hundred feet. According to the city, allowing churches in the C-l district could therefore interfere with other uses in the district. The Seventh Circuit, however, persuasively rejected the argument that the state laws could be a defense to an “equal terms” violation:
Government cannot, by granting churches special privileges (... the right of the church to be free from offensive land uses in its vicinity), furnish the premise for excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts....
It is irrelevant that the [two hundred foot and five hundred foot] protective zones ... were commanded by the state, while the exclusion itself was commanded by the City. The City is part of the government of Indiana, and if it would violate the federal Act for the City to exclude churches from C-l districts-and since the City does not argue that the state is required by the First Amendment to create protective zones around churches — the City may not exclude churches from those districts. For the federal Act treats state and local government interchangeably, 42 U.S.C § 2000ec-5(4)(A)(i), and Indianapolis’s power to zone is conferred by state law.... [A] state cannot be permitted to discriminate against a religious land use by a two-step process in which the state’s discriminating in favor of religion becomes a predicate for one of the state’s subordinate governmental units to discriminate against a religious organization in violation of federal law.
Id. at *3-4.
Like the city of Indianapolis, the city of Long Branch’s power to adopt the C-l Ordinance and the Redevelopment Plan is conferred by state law. N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-62 (power to adopt a zoning ordinance); N.J.S.A. § 40A: 12A-4 (power to adopt a -redevelopment plan). The state’s liquor law is therefore no defense to a zoning exclusion challenged under section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA, a federal law. Moreover, the City’s argument in this case is deprived of whatever persuasive force a true conflict of laws might provide because the state’s liquor law permits churches to *291waive their rights under the statute,38 and Lighthouse has expressly agreed to waive those rights if allowed to establish a church within the Zone.
The City also defends its unequal treatment of religious assemblies on the basis of economics. There are two answers to that. First, the economic rationale lacks credibility because the Plan contains no prohibition on non-profit museums, nonprofit theater companies, non-profit educational institutions, or other non-profit organizations. Why such organizations are less likely to “disrupt the zone” than Reverend Brown’s church is not apparent. Second, the motive for violating the Act is simply irrelevant. Whatever the reason that secular assemblies, even non-revenue generating ones, are permitted while religious assemblies are forbidden, we are faced with precisely the problem Congress sought to rectify with RLUIPA. An economic rationale is not a license to ignore the lawful will of Congress.
C. Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA Does Not Require Plaintiffs to Demonstrate That They Are “Similarly Situated”
Because it reasons that a literal interpretation of section 2(b)(1) would lead to results unintended by Congress, the Majority disregards the plain language of the statute and replaces it with a new legal test that requires a religious assembly to identify “a better-treated secular comparator that is similarly situated in regard to the objectives of the challenged regulation.” Maj. Op. at 268. The Majority reaches this conclusion after examining a number of Free Exercise cases from both this Court and the Supreme Court. As explained above, however, just because Congress intended to codify certain aspects of Free Exercise jurisprudence does not mean that Congress intended to replicate the analysis that would be undertaken in addressing a Free Exercise claim.
Putting that aside, however, the Majority’s analysis is misguided for another reason. The cases relied on by the Majority in formulating its new test are inapposite because none of them deal with circumstances in which the face of the challenged law distinguishes between conduct engaged in for religious reasons and conduct engaged in for nonreligious reasons. Instead, in all of those cases one of two circumstances was present: (1) the challenged law, while neutral on its face, had the effect of targeting conduct engaged in for religious, as opposed to nonreligious, reasons, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533-35, 113 S.Ct. 2217; or (2) the challenged law, while neutral on its face, was selectively enforced against conduct engaged in for religious reasons, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167-68 (3d Cir.2002).
In the first type of case, it may be relevant to compare the proscribed religious conduct with similarly-situated nonreligious conduct in order to support a conclusion that a challenged law, while facially neutral, improperly targets conduct engaged in for religious reasons. For example, in Lukumi, the Supreme Court examined facially neutral ordinances that had the effect of prohibiting religiously-motivated animal slaughter by adherents of the Santería religion while permitting animal slaughter for other reasons. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533-35, 113 S.Ct. 2217. *292Among the City’s justifications for the ordinances were to prevent cruelty to animals and to preserve the public heath; however, the ordinances provided exceptions for secular conduct that implicated those same concerns in the same ways as the proscribed religious conduct. Id. at 543-45, 113 S.Ct. 2217. By comparing the prohibited religious conduct with permitted conduct that implicated the city’s interests in the same ways, the Court was able to conclude that the ordinances pursued the city’s interests only against conduct engaged in for religious reasons. Id. at 545, 113 S.Ct. 2217.
Likewise, in the second type of case — a facially neutral law that is selectively enforced — it may be necessary to compare the proscribed religious conduct with similarly-situated nonreligious conduct in order to support a conclusion that the government is improperly targeting certain conduct only when it is engaged in for religious reasons. For example, in Tenafly, we examined a facially neutral ordinance barring citizens from affixing signs or items to utility poles. Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 151. The local government enforced the ordinance against an Orthodox Jewish group that attached lechis, religiously significant items, to the poles, but permitted others in the community to attach items such as ribbons and church directional signs. Id. at 167-68. The government’s justification for the ordinance was to prevent clutter; however, the government failed to enforce the ordinance against other conduct that implicated its concern in the same way as the religious group’s conduct. Id. at 167-68, 172. By comparing the prohibited religious conduct with permitted conduct that implicated the government’s interest in the same way, we were able to conclude that the government enforced the ordinances only against conduct engaged in for religious reasons. Id. at 167-68.
As these examples show, examining how a law would apply, or is applied, to similarly-situated secular conduct may indeed be useful when dealing with Free Exercise challenges to facially-neutral laws because it helps courts to determine whether the law improperly targets religiously-motivated conduct. But such an analysis is not necessary when the text of the challenged law itself distinguishes between religiously-motivated conduct and nonreligiously-motivated conduct. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue ... regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”). Thus, even if I were to accept the Majority’s premise that a RLUIPA claim should be analyzed like a Free Exercise claim, I do not believe it follows that a religious assembly must identify “a better-treated secular comparator that is similarly situated in regard to the objectives of the challenged regulation” under circumstances in which the face of the regulation distinguishes between religious and nonreligious assemblies. Instead, I believe a violation of section 2(b)(1) is established if the text of a zoning ordinance categorically excludes religious assemblies from an area where secular assemblies are permitted.
That is also the view of both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits, which have held that courts should not graft a “similarly situated” requirement onto section 2(b)(1) under circumstances in which the face of the land use regulation differentiates between religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies. Each has stated that, for purposes of a challenge under section 2(b)(1), “the standard for determining whether it is proper to compare a religious group to a nonreligious group is not whether one is ‘similarly situated’ to the *293other, as in our familiar equal protection jurisprudence.” Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 1002-03 (emphasis added) (quoting Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1324).
There are three other reasons that convince me Congress did not intend for courts to employ a “similarly situated” analysis when analyzing a section 2(b)(1) claim such as the one at issue here. The first is, again, the plain language of the statute. It does not state that religious and nonreligious entities must be “similarly situated” for a religious entity to find relief. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1229 (“[W]hile § [21(b)(1) has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.”).39
Second, and closely related, the plain purpose of the statute, evidenced by its text and legislative history, shows that Congress was seeking to enforce the Free Exercise Clause. See 146 Cong. Rec. at S7776 (“Sections 2(b)(1) and (2) ... enforce the Free Exercise Clause rule against laws that burden religion.... ”). No one has cited, and I am not aware of, any Supreme Court case holding that parties must demonstrate that they are “similarly situated” to someone else to establish a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Third, incorporating into RLUIPA the type of “similarly situated” analysis embedded in equal protection cases would frustrate Congress’s intention of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause, because it would make it very difficult for religious assemblies to qualify for relief under section 2(b)(1). Our court has held that, to demonstrate that a religious entity is similarly situated to other entities permitted under a questioned zoning ordinance, one must show that the religious entity’s purposes are not “functionally different” from the purposes of permitted entities, and that its uses “seem compatible” with the uses allowed in the area. Congregation Kol Ami, 309 F.3d at 142. Consequently, because religious and nonreligious assemblies and institutions are generally established for different purposes, with different goals and objectives, creative municipal officials and their lawyers should not find it difficult when a zoning conflict arises to find functional differences between the religious and nonreligious entities. Cf. id. at 130 (employing “similarly situated” requirement and “rational basis” test in vacating district court’s decision that a municipality could not “allow a train station, bus shelter, municipal administration building, police barrack, library, snack bar, pro shop, club house, country club or other similar use to request a special exception under the [challenged] Ordinance, but not [a religious congregation]”). If a “similarly situated” requirement is read into the statute, local governments will have a ready tool for rendering RLUIPA section 2(b)(1) practically meaningless.40
*294That is, sadly, exactly what has happened in this case. The District Court held that, because Lighthouse’s “combination of intended uses ha[d] no similarly situated counterpart,” Lighthouse was not “similarly situated to any nonsecular permitted uses either currently in existence or as imagined by the Redevelopment Plan” and thus could not establish a violation under section 2(b)(1). Lighthouse, 406 F.Supp.2d at 518. With a somewhat different analysis, the Majority has come to the same conclusion. In light of the statutory text and the abundantly clear legislative history of RLUIPA, I find it difficult to believe that Congress intended to incorporate sub silencio an analytical requirement that, as has happened here, can so readily undo the explicit “less than equal terms” requirement of the statute.
III. Conclusion
At a minimum, section 2(b)(1) means that a city’s zoning ordinance cannot categorically exclude churches from an area where secular assemblies are permitted. In a case like this, there is simply no legitimate basis for grafting onto section 2(b)(1) a “substantial burden” requirement, a “similarly situated” requirement, or a “neutral and generally applicable” requirement. Congress used its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a straightforward statute that courts can apply, if they will, and that state and local governments can follow, if they will. By grafting additional elements onto section 2(b)(1) that do not reflect congressional intention, we hinder Congress’s objective of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible. Therefore, while I concur in the judgment to the extent it reverses the District Court’s decision regarding the C-l Ordinance, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the judgment upholding summary judgment for the City.
.While I generally agree with the background information set forth in the majority opinion, I provide the following as further - context for my perspective on the case. Because we are reviewing an appeal of a grant for summary judgment, I present the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, against whom the order was entered. Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir.2007).
. As did the Majority, I will, for brevity, hereafter refer to Lighthouse and Reverend Brown collectively as “Lighthouse” unless otherwise noted.
. According to Lighthouse, it never received those funds because the newly constituted city council that took office in July of 1994 voted to retract the mini-grant.
. According to the Majority, Lighthouse first sought approval to use its property as a church in April of 2000. Maj. Op. at 257. While not wanting to argue semantics, the purposes for which Lighthouse sought to use its property in its 1995 application include uses that one could fairly say indicate that Lighthouse was seeking land use approval as a "church.” Since the City in 1997 denied use of the property for, among other things, "church services” (PA 509), it is clear that the City understood Lighthouse was trying to operate as a church before April of 2000.
. Lighthouse describes its views of the bureaucratic run around as follows:
Right from the outset to the very present, the Mission's Application became ensnared in "the Loop”, with the Loop being defined as the Long Branch’s bureaucracy's concerted endeavor designed to frustrate, discourage, and ultimately thwart the Mission’s efforts to gain use, by among other things:
a. continually restraining the Mission from performing its ministerial functions at 162 Broadway;
b. exhibiting deliberate indifference to the Mission's Application by allowing it to languish;
c. stalling the Mission’s Application with hyper technical requests, and then when these requests were fulfilled, still failing to place the Application on the 'agenda';
d. failing to consider the Mission's request for a waiver of fees on account of the Mission’s non-profit status (a common practice when the applicant is a charitable organization);
e. not granting use, thus preventing the Mission from obtaining its constitutionally guaranteed tax exemption; and
f. attempting to harass and intimidate the Mission and Rev. Brown through the constant issuance of various summonses for alleged code violations, as well as other forms of continual harassment.
(PA 30 at ¶ 25.)
. RLUIPA was signed into law on September 22, 2000. Pub.L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803-806.
. The City has since admitted in an interrogatory that, under the C-l Ordinance, the term "assembly hall” did not include Houses of Worship.
. As noted by the Majority, an RFQ requires applicants to describe the development team members’ qualifications, experience, and financial capacity. An RFP requires a detailed description of the project to be undertaken.
. N.J.S.A. § 33:1-76 provides that the "protection of this section may be waived at the issuance of the license and at each renewal thereafter, by the duly authorized governing body on authority of such church ..., such waiver to be effective until the date of the next renewal of the license.” And, if the "license *282has been ... renewed on authority of annual waivers by the church ... for 15 or more consecutive years, the holder of such license shall thereafter be entitled to apply for renewal or reissuance thereof without ... [a] waiver ... of the church....” N.J.S.A. § 33:1— 76.2.
. According to the City’s brief, the City has its own alcoholic beverage ordinance that prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages within one thousand feet of a religious organization and prohibits the issuance of a license within one thousand feet of another establishment with a license. (Appellee's Brief at 32, 41.) However, the parties have not submitted a copy of the ordinance for the record, or even a citation to it, and Lighthouse disputes its existence. The City's assistant planning director and acting zoning officer testified that it was possible there were churches in the City within a thousand feet of an entity with a liquor license. In fact, the City has conceded in its brief that it issued waivers with respect to the part of the alcoholic beverage ordinance that prohibits the issuance of a license within one thousand feet of another establishment with a license. In addition, the City admitted at oral argument that it was "relaxing” its enforcement of its alcohol laws in the Zone to promote the goals of the Redevelopment Plan. I agree with the Majority, Maj. Op. at 259 n. 7, that, under these circumstances, the City's alcoholic beverage ordinance warrants no consideration.
. The District Court denied Lighthouse's cross-motion for summary judgment on its claims under RLUIPA at the same time it granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Lighthouse, 406 F.Supp.2d at 524.
. As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, Congress did not define the terms "assembly'’ or "institution” in the statute. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir.2004). Accordingly, we should construe the statutory terms "in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning[s].” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). An "assembly” is defined as "a company of persons gathered together for deliberation and legislation, worship, or entertainment,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 69 (10th ed.2002), or as "[a] group of persons organized and united for some common purpose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 111 (7th ed.1999). An "institution" is "an established organization or corporation ... esp. of a public character.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 605 (7th ed.1999); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 801 (7th ed.1999) (defining "institution” as "[a]n established organization, esp. one of a public character”); see also Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230-31 (defining both "assembly” and "institution” in a manner consistent with the foregoing dictionary definitions).
The City asserts that Lighthouse has not "produced evidence to show that it is an assembly,” (Appellee’s Brief at 30); however, the City cannot seriously contend that Lighthouse is not a religious assembly when one of the reasons it denied Lighthouse’s RFQ application was because the "proposed church use did not comport with the redevelopment plan....” (PA 226.)
. Similar to this case, the town alleged that it designed its zoning ordinances "in part to invigorate [its] business district and to create a strong tax base” through retail establishments. Id. at 1221. The business district, the town claimed, was vital to its tax base, job base, and its ability to serve the needs of the residents. It asserted that allowing religious institutions in that district would contribute little synergy to retail shopping areas, disrupt the continuity of retail environments, erode its tax base, jeopardize its economic stability, and eventually result in economic hardship on the residents. Id.
. Not all of these entities were permitted under both ordinances, although there is substantial overlap. The C-l Ordinance allowed establishments such as restaurants, educational institutions, assembly halls, bowling alleys, motion picture theaters, municipal buildings, health spas, and gyms. (PA 81-83.) The Redevelopment Plan permits establishments such as theaters, cinemas, dance studios, culinary schools, music instruction, theater workshops, fashion design schools, art studios, restaurants, and bars and clubs. (PA 97.)
.Neither ordinance explicitly states, "Churches are forbidden”; however, churches are plainly prohibited by both ordinances because churches are not listed by either as a permitted use. Indeed, the City denied Lighthouse's April 2000 application to use the Property as a church because churches were not permitted in the C-l zone, and the City denied Lighthouse's December 2003 application because "church use did not comport with the Redevelopment Plan.” (PA 226.) Both the text of each ordinance and the City's expressions of its own understanding of that text make it clear that churches, as a category, are not permitted.
. Because the challenged ordinances, on their faces, differentiate between religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions, there is no need to examine whether the ordinances are unlawful in either of the other manners identified by the Eleventh Circuit. See Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1311. It is noteworthy, however, that Lighthouse has presented evidence that the city’s zoning ordinances were selectively enforced. In other words, Lighthouse has proffered evidence that the challenged ordinances were implemented in a manner that treated Lighthouse on less than equal terms with other, secular assemblies. I am not suggesting that, in fact, the City’s leaders bore a grudge against Lighthouse and Reverend Brown. That may ultimately be a question for a finder of fact. I simply note that there is evidence to support Lighthouse’s assertion that the City deliberately put the Reverend and his church on the bureaucratic equivalent of an Escher staircase, creating and enforcing an endlessly recursive zoning procedure to prevent Lighthouse from ever opening its doors at 162 Broadway. I believe there is a basis in the record to conclude that the City simply didn’t want this religious group downtown, ever, and therefore there is an additional reason that summary judgment was improper.
. The Majority concludes that violations of section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA do not receive strict scrutiny; instead, it holds that RLUIPA imposes a strict liability standard. I do not think it necessary to decide in this case whether section 2(b)(1) imposes strict liability under all circumstances because, at least with respect to a zoning ordinance that, on its face, treats religious assemblies on less than equal terms, strict scrutiny, no less than strict liability, will result in liability. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) ("A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”).
. Of course, to comply with the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause, such a law must also either be neutral and generally applicable or withstand strict scrutiny. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217.
. The Majority takes me to task for advocating an interpretation of section 2(b)(1) that it doubts is constitutional. See Maj. Op. at 269 n. 14. It is noteworthy, however, that no one in this case has challenged the constitutionality of section 2(b)(1), even though the straightforward reading of the statute I propose was expressly advocated by Lighthouse.
Nevertheless, I wish to note that I do not harbor the same degree of skepticism as the Majority regarding the constitutionality of section 2(b)(1) as written. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad power to enact legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, a right that applies to state and local governments through the Due Process Clause. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). That right to enforce does not allow Congress to alter the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, but it does include the power to enact preventive and remedial legislation. Id. at 519, 524, 117 S.Ct. 2157. And Congress has “wide latitude” to determine how far it can go in exercising that power. Id. at 519-20, 117 S.Ct. 2157.
In enacting RLUIPA, Congressional sponsors were endeavoring to avoid constitutional issues raised by the Supreme Court when it *289struck down portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA”). City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 532-33, 117 S.Ct. 2157. Those sponsors were careful to point out that discrimination against religious entities in the land use context was "a nationwide problem." 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). Congress compiled what it characterized as “massive evidence” that "[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, [were] frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.” Id. at S7774. The evidence proved to Congress that state and local governments had enacted zoning codes that frequently excluded “churches in places where they permitted] theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes.” Id. The evidence also demonstrated that government entities frequently allowed churches in those places "only with individualized permission from the zoning board, and zoning boards use[d] that authority in discriminatory ways.” Id. Congress found that, most often, discrimination against religious entities had lurked behind "vague and universally applicable reasons” such as a concern for aesthetics, or concerns that allowing a church was “not consistent with the city's land use plan,” or was not appropriate in commercial zones because churches don’t generate business. Id. at S7774-75. On the basis of that record, Congress enacted RLUIPA as prophylactic legislation to prevent discrimination against churches in the processes of land use regulation. See id. at S7775 (RLUIPA provides “proportionate and congruent responses to the problems documented in this factual record.”); cf. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (emphasizing that "[r]emedial legislation under § 5 ‘should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide against.’ ” (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883))).
Because Congress developed a record, expressly relied on that record, and endeavored to tailor RLUIPA to meet the constitutional guidance provided by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne, I disagree with my colleagues’ assertion that interpreting RLUIPA according to its plain language is ill-advised. Moreover, if a constitutional attack on RLUIPA had been mounted and were before us, and we were to conclude that RLUIPA is unconstitutionally broad, the proper result would be to strike it down as unconstitutional, not to re-draft it. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536, 117 S.Ct. 2157.
. New Jersey state law prohibits the issuance of liquor licenses within two hundred feet of any church. N.J.S.A. § 33:1-76.2.
. N.J.S.A. § 33.1-76 states that "[t]he protection of this section may be waived at the issuance of the license and at each renewal thereafter, by the duly authorized governing body on authority of such church....” The constitutionality of a statute of this sort is questionable. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120-27, 103 S.Ct. 505, 74 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
. According to the Eleventh Circuit, if the government implements a land use regulation that, on its face, treats a religious entity on less than equal terms with a nonreligious entity, and those entities fall within the "natural perimeter” of the definition of "assembly” or “institution,” there is a violation of section 2(b)(1). Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230-31. The "natural perimeter” test appears to me to be nothing more than a practical approach to interpreting words. It asks what the common-sense reach of language is. It is a recognition that words in statutes generally have enough of a commonly understood meaning that, when not unduly stretched, they can be construed and sensibly applied to resolve legal disputes. In short, it is a label that encourages what ought to happen in every case, not just in First Amendment jurisprudence, namely, application of the statutory text in a manner that gives the words their natural, generally accepted meaning.
. Indeed, in Digrugilliers, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the city of Indianapolis's attempt to do just that. Digrugilliers, 506 F.3d *294612, 613, 2007 WL 3151201, at *1-2. In that case, the city defined "religious use” in its zoning code to include residential accessory uses (such as a rectory for the church minister) and then attempted, unsuccessfully, to use its own broad definition of "religious use” to justify its exclusion of churches from zones where other assemblies were permitted. Id. at 2.