dissenting.
Bonny Corporation owned a shopping center, and it leased to Kroger Company one of its largest units for a period of 15 years, with renewal options. The lease was on a printed form supplied by Kroger Company, providing for rental at the rate of $2,253 per month. At the end of the printed form there was a typed paragraph which stated: "Tenant agrees to pay to landlord a sum equal to 1% of its sales in excess of $2,704,000 per year hereinafter called the minimum sales base.” During the last year of *841occupancy prior to Kroger’s moving out, the amount paid on such gross sales to Bonny was $4,688.73, in addition to the $2,253 per month. But in December, 1973, Kroger moved out and opened another store in a new shopping center a mile and a half away, and contended that it no longer owed any rent except the $2,253 per month; and that as it was no longer operating a store in the shopping center, the typed part of the lease contract as to payment of 1% of gross sales in excess of $2,704,000 per year was null and void.
The question here is whether the tenant could avoid payment of the rental stipulated to be paid, including $2,253 per month, plus 1% of gross sales in excess of $2,704,000 per year. Kroger contended it had the right to vacate the premises before the termination of the lease, so long as it paid the $2,253 per month.
1. The contract was provided by Kroger, and any ambiguity or doubtful part therein must be construed most strongly against Kroger. Benevolent Burial Assn. Inc. v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 239 (181 SE 829); Howkins v. Atlanta Baggage &c. Co., 107 Ga. App. 38 (1) (129 SE2d 158).
2. When a contract is partly printed and partly written, the written part is entitled to most consideration. Code § 20-704 (7). Typed provisions prevail over printed matter. Taylor v. Dunaway, 79 Ga. App. 754, 758 (54 SE2d 381). Therefore, as to the question of whether the $2,253 per month (which was in the printed part of the contract) was of equal importance with the 1% of the gross receipts provided for (in the typed part of the contract), the typed part would be entitled to more consideration. Under no circumstances here could it be said that Bonny would have leased to Kroger but for the consideration of 1% of the gross receipts as typed at the end of the lease agreement.
3. The majority opinion cites many foreign decisions to support its contention that Kroger had no obligation to operate a store and pay 1% of the gross sales (beyond $2,704,000 per annum) to Bonny. But this court is not bound by foreign decisions. See: Hooper v. Almand, 196 Ga. 52, 67 (25 SE 778); Etowah Heading Co. v. Anderson, 73 Ga. App. 814 (38 SE2d 71); Martin v. Henson, 95 Ga. *842App. 715, 733 (99 SE2d 251); Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 459, 500.
This is especially true here, as we have decisions of our own state on the question. Our own decisions will not be set aside in favor of foreign authorities. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Davis, 47 Ga. App. 601 (171 SE 150), it is held that where a gas and oil service station is leased for a term, the rent to be a designated sum of money per gallon on all gasoline sold, and not less than $10 per month, when the lessee stops selling gasoline, he breaches the contract. Again in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Giddens, 54 Ga. App. 69 (1) (187 SE 201), a similar lease was executed and this court held: ". . . it is clearly within the contemplation of the parties to the contract that the lessee shall, during the term of the lease, operate upon the premises a service station for the sale of gasoline. . .” (Emphasis supplied.) And his failure to do so was accounted as a breach of its lease agreement. In Hodges v. Ga. Kaolin Co., 108 Ga. App. 115 (132 SE2d 86), it was shown that Hodges had leased lands to Georgia Kaolin for the purpose of mining minerals, and payment for which was to be on a royalty basis, at 15 cents per ton, later amended to 16.2 cents per cubic yard. After 1954 Georgia Kaolin "has done nothing on plaintiffs land” and Hodges sued for $167,612 principal for the kaolin "that could have been mined from the land but wasn’t.” The lower court sustained a general demurrer to petition, and this court reversed, and held that Hodges had the right to sue Georgia Kaolin for damages, and at p. 120: "Thus, where a right to mine coal or other minerals is granted in consideration of the reservation of a certain portion of the product to the grantor, the law implies a covenant on the part of the grantee to work the mine in a proper manner and with reasonable diligence, so that the lessor or grantor will derive the income which both parties had in contemplation when the contract was entered into.” (Emphasis supplied.)
4. To uphold Kroger in moving out and leaving the store vacant, with no gross receipts, thereby defeating Bonny’s right to collect the full rental contemplated by the parties in the added typed stipulation at the end of the lease, would be to allow Kroger to violate the terms of the lease at its own option, to the loss and disadvantage of *843Bonny.
The lease would not have been entered had plaintiff not anticipated receipt of percentage rental. The lease does not state that defendant had to continue the operation of a supermarket on the premises for the full term of the lease, but since the lease authorized increases due to sales and the evidence showed an increase of sales, a jury question remains as to whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages by the alleged violation of the lease since it clearly appears that rent other than the base amount shall be due. This court in construing the contract cannot re-write the contract by cutting out the percentage rental clause. This court simply cannot, and must not, decide issues of fact by weighing evidence in reviewing summary judgment cases. See Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 (126 SE2d 442); McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178 (1) (129 SE2d 408). Clearly, jury questions remain for determination.
5. For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court, and respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pannell joins in this dissent.